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*** 
“All States are employers. Although the role of the state in LMEs is in theory more 
limited than in CMEs, and although in much of the world the last two decades have 
seen a process of privatisation of public enterprises and contracting out of public 
services, almost universally the majority of those working in the military, law 
enforcement and public administration, and at least a substantial proportion in health, 
education and social services, are state employees (and those who are not are 
nevertheless typically subject to indirect state control of their employment conditions). 
This makes the state, broadly defined, the largest single employer in most countries. As 
a result, one may add, the simple notion of ‘three actors’ in industrial relations – 
workers, employers and government – is inadequate, since the state so to speak 
occupies two seats at the table”. 
Hyman (2013, 108-09) 
 “Compared with the rest of the economy, the public sector is special in that the state is 
necessarily both a party to employment regulation and the authority that defines the 
rules of the game … in the public sector, the principle of collective bargaining most 
sharply encounters the doctrine of state sovereignty due to the dual role of the state as 
both sovereign power and employer”. 
Traxler (1999, 57) 
 “The political nature of the government as the key factor leading to differences in 
public and private sector industrial relations is well recognised by researchers, although 
the precise mechanisms and means by which political forces influence public sector 
industrial relations structures, processes and outcomes have certainly not been 
identified and researched in sufficient depth and detail”. 
Beaumont (1992, 12) 
***  
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SETTING THE SCENE 
INTRODUCTION 
There is an elephant in the European corridors. Some might say there is, again, a 
“German question” in Europe. Since reunification, Germany has been held up for being 
both too weak first and, more recently, too strong. While it is today not so common to 
recall the days in which Germany was the “sick man of Europe”, it is indeed quite 
common to blame “it all” on Germany’s current economic prosperity. Critics of 
Germany often join forces with critics of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). The elephant, they say, is Germany’s inconsiderate export-led strategy of 
economic growth, made possible by the irrevocable fixation of trading partners’ 
exchange rates within the monetary union. This strategy, macroeconomists explain to 
us, is based on repressing the domestic sector while free riding on the European peers’ 
aggregated demand for the accumulation of current account surpluses (Flassbeck and 
Lapavitsas 2013).  
By joining a monetary union, countries relinquish the capacity to control exchange 
rates and monetary policy. Thus, the two remaining policy domains – wage and fiscal 
policy – have come to constitute the central pillars around which this critique revolves. 
On the one hand, a trajectory of marked wage restraint throughout the German 
economy has produced a substantial internal devaluation which conferred on German 
employers a cost competitiveness premium vis-à-vis its competitors. On the other, due 
to an “allergy” to public spending and a weak institutional capacity to plan and 
implement public investments (Roth and Wolff 2018), the government’s restrictive 
fiscal stance has led to the accumulation of budget surpluses. The combination of wage 
restraint and budget surpluses contributes to repress total domestic consumption, 
private and public respectively. An economy with a subdued domestic sector, with both 
private and public consumption restrained, must eventually run at a relatively lower 
inflation rate. The combination of lower-than-competitors’ wage growth (measured in 
terms of unit labour costs’ (ULCs) inflation) and low-price inflation yields a more 
competitive real exchange rate (REER). In a monetary union where competitors cannot 
devalue their currencies, a more competitive REER is conducive to the accumulation of 
trade surpluses, on which the German growth model is now said to thrive (Baccaro and 
Pontusson 2016).  
As far as we can tell, the stellar size of the German current account surplus is 
unprecedented and undeniable: after having reached its peak of 8.9% of GDP in 2015 it 
is currently projected at a 6.9% of GDP for the year 2020. The same goes for budget 
surpluses which have been consecutively reported since 2014 (AMECO Database).  
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This dissertation, however, has no desire to enter such a delicate debate on the merits 
and normative desirability of the German macroeconomic model in the EMU. Much 
has been written in this regard by other Comparative Political Economy (CPE) scholars 
and the debate, far from having been settled, seems just about to kick off. What is of 
relevance for the purpose of this dissertation is the fact that what lies at the heart of 
Germany’s adjustment process – through which the country has gone from being 
considered the sick man of Europe to becoming its “economic superstar” (Dustmann et 
al. 2014) – is a trajectory of marked wage restraint. The driving motive behind the 
dissertation is that during this long process of internal devaluation, various things 
which occurred seem to have gone unnoticed by many. The research effort takes off 
from the following empirical observation. Since the inception of the EMU (and actually 
throughout the 1990s), a pattern of wage restraint
1
 in Germany has indeed occurred in 
the private sector. But it is in the public sector where the most remarkable trajectory of 
wage restraint can be detected (Di Carlo 2018a; Müller and Schulten 2015) (see also 
figures 4 and 5). As the literature review will show, while much has been written on the 
private/export sector, very little is known about structures, processes and outcomes of 
public sector wage setting, in Germany and beyond. The subject matter of this 
dissertation is therefore the study public sector wage setting, in theory and in practice. 
In assessing the importance of public sector wages in the EMU, we learn from previous 
studies that current account imbalances in the single currency were significantly 
associated with the divergent trajectories of members’ public sector wages (Johnston 
2016; Johnston, Hancké, and Pant 2014). In fact, public sector wage trajectories among 
the EMU participants diverged substantially after 1999 (figure 5). Countries which 
successfully kept public sector wage inflation under control remained relatively more 
competitive within the monetary union, accumulating trade surpluses; and vice versa 
(Hancké 2013). Public sector wage growth has been proven to affect private sector 
wage growth (Afonso and Gomes 2008). With regard to the period before the crisis, 
economists have found a strong positive correlation and co-movement between public 
and private sector wages which, in a number of EMU countries, coincided with strong 
public wages’ growth and losses of overall competitiveness (Holm-Hadulla et al. 2010). 
In this sense, the divergent growth trajectory of countries’ public sector wages has 
contributed to exacerbate the process of countries’ structural ULCs divergence which a 
variety of studies considers as the Eurozone crisis’ culprit (Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 
2013; P.A. Hall 2012; Hancké 2013; Höpner and Lutter 2014; Iversen and Soskice 
2013; Johnston 2016; Johnston, Hancké, and Pant 2014; Johnston and Regan 2014; 
Scharpf 2011). 
                                                                
1
 By wage restraint here I mean nominal wages, discounted by total labour productivity in the economy, 
which grow slower than the common ECB’s inflation target of “below but close to 2%”. This 
formulation refers to the golden rule of wage bargaining which will be discussed in greater detail in due 
course.  
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Public sector wage setting becomes all the more interesting for countries of the EMU if 
we furthermore consider that, since public wages are paid out of governments’ budgets, 
public sector wage policy is a major item of fiscal policy. In other words, public sector 
wage policy is a subset of the government’s overall fiscal stance. Public sector wage 
policy is thus a unique policy space in the present European macroeconomic regime 
where the only two policy domains left under the remit of national and democratically 
elected governments coincide. As a result of the notable size of the wage bill in public 
budgets (figure 2), looking at the convergence/divergence of public sector wage policy 
among the members of the union is therefore an interesting way to look at countries’ 
coordination of fiscal policy within the EMU. In relation to these considerations, 
studies have found that public sector wage policies, before the crisis, contributed to 
intensify pro-cyclical fiscal policies across the EMU members, pushing apart country-
specific economic cycles (Holm-Hadulla et al. 2010).  
We know, in other words, that public sector wage setting matters in different ways 
within the macroeconomic regime of the EMU. Yet what we do not know is what 
explains the adoption of these national public sector wage policies in the first place. As 
a first step in starting to address this wider question, in this dissertation I have selected 
the German case of public sector wage restraint because it satisfies the conditions of an 
extreme and crucial case study with substantial real-world implications. The 
dissertation looks at the German case in between two historical junctures, German 
reunification in 1990 and the financial crisis in 2008. 
Germany is extreme because the entity of the public sector wage restraint which needs 
to be explained assumes extreme values in the mid-2000s. Within the divergent growth 
trajectories of members’ public sector wages which can be observed since the inception 
of the EMU (figure 5), it is the only country that pursues such a remarkable pattern of 
restraint. It is an outlier in this respect. Moreover, Germany is a crucial case for the 
scholarly literature because it constitutes a most-likely case in which to expect an 
explanation of public sector wage restraint based on the established pattern bargaining 
thesis. This argument, I will show, cannot be validated in the very crucial case for 
which this theory has been popularised in the first place. In fact, what I term “the 
pattern bargaining hypothesis” maintains that public sector wage restraint in Germany 
is ensured via the country’s specific wage bargaining institutions through which public 
sector’s wage growth is pegged to that in the export sector, ensuring overall wage 
restraint across the economy. It will be shown that this explanation does not withstand 
the test of empirical observation, leaving us in the dark as far as our understanding of 
public sector wage restraint in Germany is concerned.  
This dissertation thus addresses the following central question: what explains 
Germany’s trajectory of public sector wage restraint vis-à-vis its EMU peers? Posing 
this question has both policy relevance and theoretical importance. With regard to the 
former, the dissertation speaks to the necessity of finding an answer to the bigger 
question which has implications for the smooth functioning of the EMU, namely: why 
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have countries which were subjected to the same hard monetary regime experienced 
such divergent trajectories of wage growth in their public sectors? Working out an 
answer for the German case is crucial because Germany is the most populous member 
and most powerful (politically and economically) actor at the heart of the single 
currency. Theoretically, asking this question assumes importance in light of the failure 
of the pattern bargaining hypothesis in explaining Germany’s public sector wage 
restraint. In fact, the theoretical question the dissertation poses in light of this failure is 
the following: if we cannot explain Germany’s public sector wage restraint through the 
theory of inter-sectoral wage coordination via export-led pattern bargaining, what 
other factors, so far unaccounted for, explain Germany’s trajectory of public sector 
wage restraint? In answering this theoretical question this dissertation will not only 
challenge a dominant theory in the field of both CPE and industrial relations studies. It 
will also provide a more accurate historical and institutional explanation for the case at 
stake with the hope to produce new information that shall add incrementally to our 
current stock of knowledge on public sector wage setting and industrial relations more 
generally. 
To answer these questions, the dissertation will employ a two-step process tracing 
methodology. I blend together elements of deductive and inductive process tracing. As 
a first step in the explanatory effort, I proceed with theory testing process tracing to test 
the validity of extant explanations for the case at stake. Subsequently, after having 
refuted alternative explanations, I proceed with a more inductive type of theory-guided 
process tracing for the purpose of explaining the German case of public sector wage 
restraint. 
THE ARGUMENT OF THE DISSERTATION 
In line with actor-centred institutionalism (Scharpf 1997b), on which this dissertation 
draws, I distinguish between phenomena’s proximate and remote causes. Proximate 
causes behind the adoption of given policies are to be found in the actors’ interacting 
choices while institutional conditions are treated as remote causes in that they provide 
the institutional structures within which these policy choices are made (Scharpf 2000, 
764). 
The proximate cause behind Germany’s trajectory of public sector wage restraint vis-à-
vis its EMU peers, I posit, is the public employers’ necessity to achieve fiscal 
consolidation through wage restraint given the lack of fiscal autonomy on their fiscal 
revenues’ side. Through public sector wage setting, the German public employers went 
on the offensive against the unions in order to rein in the fiscal costs of wage setting in 
the public administration. To save money, they also attacked all other aspects of the 
employment relation as well. They managed to extend working hours, to merge and 
reduce bonuses, curtail holiday and overtime payments so that wage restraint was but 
one dimension of this strategy of consolidation. The public employers’ necessity for 
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fiscal consolidation, however, is not homogeneously distributed among the three 
German public employers (i.e. the Federal, the States and municipal levels). This is 
because it is mediated by the institutional configuration of the German state. Three 
institutional domains structure wage setting interactions in the public sector and shall 
therefore be considered remote causes behind Germany’s pattern of restraint. These are: 
the fiscal constitution of the German state, which regulates the public employers’ 
capacity to raise revenues; the structure of the politico-administrative system which 
defines the organisation of the polity and the distribution of legal competences and 
public personnel within it; the system of public sector employment relations and 
interest representation which regulates the process of wage determination in the public 
administration. 
On the revenues’ side, Germany’s fiscal federalism system is unique. Its central feature 
is the centralisation of tax legislation at the federal level in addition to the Länder’s 
legal capacity to veto tax legislation in the Bundesrat. This means that, neither the 
Federation nor each Land alone can independently manipulate their tax revenues at 
will. The structure of fiscal revenues is thus rigidly fixed according to pre-decided 
formulae which, to be changed, require a negotiated change of the constitution capable 
of winning hard-to-achieve qualified majorities. On the expenditures’ side, the 
asymmetric distribution of competences decreed by the German constitution yields an 
asymmetry in the stock of labour costs which the different German employers face. 
While the Federation has mostly legislative competencies, most of the administrative 
competencies lie within the remits of the Länder and the municipalities. As a result, 
within the German politico-administrative system, the bulk of public employees are 
employed by Länder and municipal employers. The interaction effect between a legally 
constrained fiscal autonomy and an asymmetric distribution of personnel costs has 
created scope for fatal conflicts of interests among the public employers. Public sector 
wage setting in Germany is regulated by a hybrid system of public sector employment 
relations. Public employees are regulated through collective bargaining. Here wage 
restraint could be pursued thanks to public employers’ strength in the face of unions’ 
structural weaknesses. A weak mobilisation capacity among Länder’s public employees 
and dynamics of privatisations and outsourcing of municipal services have undermined 
the capacity of public sector’s unions to hold out against the employers’ offensive. 
Civil servants are instead subjected to the state’s sovereign authority. Here wage 
restraint could in theory have been pursued via unilateral legislation. Yet, in practice, 
this could rarely be the case because public employers were internally divided. Thus, I 
argue, the state’s sovereign authority in public sector wage setting is de facto not 
absolute but contingent: it can only be deployed under the condition that public 
employers overcome their internal dividedness.  
In rebuttal of the “pattern bargaining hypothesis” which sees public sector wage 
restraint as a by-product of export sector’s dominance in inter-sectorally coordinated 
wage bargaining across the economy, this dissertation argues that the public employers 
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are crucial state actors who are no subaltern to a producer groups’ coalition in the 
German export sector. In other words, I suggest that the state should not be thought of 
as a mere executor of the economic affairs of “dominant” producer groups in the export 
sector. Implicit to these arguments there lies an understanding of the German state as a 
monolithic bloc capable of frictionless unitary action, which export sector’s actors can 
capture. However, there is no such thing as a German government. Germany is a 
“semisovereign state” characterised by a fragmented polity in which political authority 
in important policy areas, most notably public sector wage policy, is assigned to or 
shared with the sub-national governments which compose the Federation. Thus, to 
paraphrase Katzenstein (1987, 16), the “federal government has no choice but to 
negotiate and cooperate with centres of state power over which it has no control”. 
Hence, if there is no single centre of political power in the German political economy, 
there must be no single political entity over which export sector wage setters can so 
smoothly exert their dominance. This complicates matters. 
The dissertation argues that the state is not a neutral actor in public sector industrial 
relations. Nor is it a mere instrument of a dominant social bloc in the export sector, as 
implicitly assumed in these arguments. The state matters and is crucial for the study of 
public sector wage setting. But who and what is the state? I posit that the state should 
be understood as an institutional contextualisation. The state does not act in public 
sector wage setting. Public employers do; within the legal and institutional contours of 
the state. Modern States are fragmented and decentralised. They are ensembles of 
multiple institutional entities and centres of political power each with its own interests, 
preferences and strategies. Nothing ensures us that these interests will be aligned 
among themselves, nor that they will be aligned with those of an export sector’s elite. 
Rather, States’ fragmented nature creates scope for intra-state conflicts of interests in 
policy making. Public sector wage setting in Germany is a case in point. What 
characterises the German public employers is, in fact, their internal dividedness. So the 
state matters. But it is not a unitary actor. Through a detailed historical reconstruction, 
it will be shown that the public employers follow their own logics which are fully 
independent from the export sector producer groups’ necessity to ensure the 
competitiveness of German goods in international markets. Quite to the contrary, the 
dissertation shows that in different occasions, militant unions in the German export 
sector managed to break up with the pattern of moderation started in the public sector 
and push their pay settlements up. For the public employers these expensive patterns 
created headaches. While the public employers were desperately trying to save money 
through public sector wage restraint, at times the export sector’s patterns forced them to 
revise upwards their initial meagre pay offers. In other words, the public sector unions 
could point at the generous export sector settlements and play the pattern against the 
stingy public employers. Thus, I posit that public employers’ interests are rooted in the 
organisational imperatives of the state institutions they represent. At their core, these 
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interests are fiscal in nature, i.e. the public employers must guarantee the financial 
soundness of the public organisations they are responsible for. 
The story of public sector wage setting in post-reunification Germany is a story of a 
political misalignment within the public employers’ wage bargaining coalition. For 
more than forty years, a wage bargaining coalition (Tarifgemeinschaft) stipulated by 
the three public employers of the German administrative system (the Federation, the 
Länder and the municipalities) had ensured unity in collective bargaining negotiations. 
As a result, public sector wage setting in Germany (differently from the private 
sector’s) had for long been centralised and encompassing under the formal leadership 
of the federal Minister of the Interior. This guaranteed uniformity of employment 
conditions and pay terms across the country. Similarly, civil servants’ pay 
determination, which in Germany is part of a separate legal sphere, had for long 
remained a legal competence in the remit of the federal government. Thus, the fact that 
until 2006 the federal level set the terms of employment and pay has ensured 
uniformity across the country’s civil service at all levels of government. The two 
distinct legal spheres were kept coordinated via a system of intra-public-sector pattern 
bargaining. The pay settlements negotiated through collective bargaining were then 
transferred to the civil servants via legislation drafted by the Ministry of the Interior 
and approved by the federal parliament. 
Reunification dealt a blow to the finances of the German public employers. This 
coincided also with a prolonged period of slow economic growth and high 
unemployment not least because of the Bundesbank’s decision, in the early 1990s, to 
severely tighten monetary policy. After the inflationary pressures which followed 
reunification, through a stop-go type of monetary policy, the Bundesbank intended to 
“punish” policy actors for the loss of fiscal and wage discipline. The central bank did 
not digest the government’s expansionary fiscal policy, the wage setters’ exuberance 
and the government’s weak stance in public sector wage setting. The economic 
recession which ensued meant lower tax revenues, higher social expenditures and an 
increasingly tighter fiscal space available to public employers. The tighter the fiscal 
space grew, the more constrained the public employers’ ability to pay became. In 
winter 1996, when Germany risked missing the 3% deficit rule agreed in Maastricht, 
the public employers united behind the leadership of the federal Finance Minister Theo 
Waigel. In order to achieve fiscal consolidation the public employers pushed 
aggressively for a two-year “zero wage round” in the public sector. The unions caved in 
but, in the process, managed to obtain a modest pay settlement instead of a wage freeze 
and cuts in sickness pay. Public sector wage restraint was instrumental and perhaps 
fundamental for Germany to comply with the Maastricht criteria by 1997. This is 
because the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in opposition and the Länder governments 
were blocking other cost-cutting measures through the Bundesrat. In all, the three 
governmental levels remained united within the public employers’ coalition throughout 
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the 1990s and, in pushing through a fierce pattern of restraint in 1996, supported the 
firm stance of Theo Waigel. 
With the collapse in tax revenues caused by the Schröder’s tax reform (especially the 
2001 step), the public employers’ fiscal space grew tighter and tighter in the 2000s. 
Germany was being held up as the sick man of Europe. At the same time it remained 
under the radar of the European Commission for its consecutive breaches of the 3% 
deficit rule. Within this context of financial hardship, a political conflict emerged 
among the public employers which eventually led to the partial decentralisation of 
public sector collective bargaining. With their finance in dire straits, in 2003 the Länder 
governments decided to pull out of the historical public employers’ coalition. This 
decision was primarily rooted in the disproportional stock of personnel costs the Länder 
public employers face. This is due to the asymmetric distribution of administrative 
competencies which the German constitution assigns to sub-national governments. This 
asymmetric distribution of labour costs is made irremediably problematic by the 
centralisation of tax legislation which characterises the German fiscal federalism 
system. As a result of the lack of fiscal autonomy, the Länder could not adjust their 
revenues in the face of structurally rising costs of public sector wage setting. 
By threatening to leave their Länder employers’ association (TdL), the States forced it 
to quit the wage bargaining coalition with the Federation and municipalities. In so 
doing, they pushed instead for the institutionalisation of a new system of Länder-level 
collective bargaining (the TV-L contract agreed in 2006). This was meant to contain 
the fiscal costs of their personnel expenditures by escaping the leadership of the federal 
level in wage negotiations. Also, it consisted of a strategic move to “get rid” of the 
municipal employers. The municipal level had always been the weak chain of the 
bargaining coalition due to the employers’ fragility vis-à-vis workers’ militancy in key 
infrastructural services (e.g. local transport, waste disposal, etc.). In parallel to the 
overhaul of the hitherto centralised collective bargaining framework, the Länder also 
succeeded in obtaining the return of the legislative competence on their civil servants’ 
careers and pay. This occurred within the context of the reform of the German fiscal 
federalism in 2006. 
The federal and municipal employers decided instead to stick together and negotiated a 
new joint collective bargaining framework (the TVöD contract agreed in 2005) with the 
trade unions. The condition for the municipalities to remain together with the 
Federation was that the design of the TVöD be premised on the need of municipal 
employers (represented by VKA) to reduce the costs of public services’ provision in the 
face of ever tighter budgets. The unions went along with the municipal employers’ 
desires under the serious threat of privatisations and outsourcing of municipal services. 
In fact, during the 2000s, the trade unions were pushed on the defensive in all these 
processes and had to compromise with concessionary bargains. They preferred to 
compromise rather than see the whole collective bargaining edifice disintegrate. The 
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two-tier collective bargaining system to which they agreed, although a second best for 
them, is still to be preferred to the full collapse of collective bargaining. 
Wage restraint was pursued throughout this period in the form of extended working 
hours, benefits’ cuts and meagre lump sums. These were conceded to the unions 
(during the period 2005-2008) in exchange for their agreement to the reforms. To 
maintain the collective bargaining framework alive, the unions needed – and still need 
– the public employers to remain united as a negotiating partner. Paradoxically, since 
the unions need united public employers more than the employers actually wish to be 
together (due to their internal conflicts of interest), the political divisions among the 
public employers ended up strengthening their bargaining power: were the unions not 
to accept public employers’ demands for fiscal savings, employers would pull out of 
their associations and collective bargaining would collapse, making bargaining 
unmanageable for the unions. 
Eventually, the result of this parallel process of institutional and constitutional changes 
has led to the institutionalisation of what I term a “low-wage institutional equilibrium” 
in public sector wage setting. This is a situation in which public sector wage policies in 
Germany can only be set as a lowest common denominator which negotiators must find 
by calibrating public sector wage policies according to the poorer employers’ ability to 
pay. Thus, this institutional setting creates a structural bias toward wage restraint in 
public sector collective bargaining. By equilibrium I mean, specifically, a situation in 
which no actor has an interest in challenging the status quo. Each of the three public 
employers benefit from the current institutional configuration, although in different 
ways. This is clearly an employers’ friendly status quo which the unions can only 
challenge at the risk of ending up in an even worse situation, i.e. the complete collapse 
of collective bargaining in the public sector. For the unions, the current institutional 
configuration represents a second best which is worse than the status quo ante when the 
system was centralised and encompassing. But the current system is anyway better than 
atomistic and fragmented bargaining. This equilibrium, I argue, currently prevents the 
pursuit of policies of public sector wage/fiscal inflation which may be desirable to 
reflate the German economy and provide a more symmetric adjustment within the 
EMU. The equilibrium consists of three complementary legal dimensions of which 
Germany’s public sector wage setting is now composed: the TVöD contract which 
regulates public employees at the federal and municipal level; the TV-L contract which 
regulates public employees at the Länder level; the legal competence on civil servants’ 
pay which is now within the remits of each of the Länder’s legislators. 
Within the TVöD, the only wage policies which can obtain a majority in the VKA’s 
Mitgliederversammlung (members’ general assembly of municipal employers), are 
those which are calibrated according to the poorer municipalities’ ability to pay. Even 
assuming an inflationary policy would somehow make it through a majority, were this 
policy to be too expensive, poorer municipalities would sooner or later leave the VKA. 
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This is possible because membership is voluntary. This means wage policies need to be 
set as a lowest common denominator between the poorer and richer municipalities and 
the federal level. Since the federal level knows that wage policies beyond the poorer 
municipalities’ ability to pay will produce a stalemate of the whole wage bargaining 
machinery, during normal times, it converges by default on the VKA’s internal need to 
accommodate various stakeholders. This creates a structural downward tendency which 
prevents the pursuit of policies of public sector wage inflation in the TVöD.  
In the TV-L contract poorer and richer Länder negotiate together within the TdL. Both 
types of Länder have an interest in a lowest common denominator wage policy 
calibrated on the poorer Länder’s ability to pay. Through horizontally coordinated 
bargaining the rich States obtain fiscal savings which they can divert to other uses. This 
is because a lowest common denominator brings about wage policies which are cheaper 
than the settlements they would have to pay were they to negotiate freely in a fully 
competitive labour market. Richer Länder have, so to speak, an “interest in being 
outvoted” by poorer ones within the TdL. The poor Länder instead avoid a system of 
competitive federalism in which they would lose out against the richer Länder’s greater 
ability to pay. The attainment of the legal competence on civil servants’ careers and pay 
by the Länder squares the circle. It gives richer Länder the possibility to deviate in 
melius from this low-wage equilibrium. In Germany the private sector is generally a 
more attractive employer and public employees are a scarce resource. Richer Länder’s 
employers who need to compete with the private sector in their local tighter labour 
markets need a flexibility valve. They need to have the possibility to deviate from these 
contracts upward in order to remain attractive employers. Since the decision on the 
legal status of the newly-hired falls on the employers, richer public employers with a 
greater ability to pay, who need to be more attractive recruiters, can offer better terms 
of employment through the “civil service valve”. This has led to a fragmentation of 
civil servants’ career structures across the country. Pay differentials in the civil service 
now stand at around 11% between Berlin (the poor) and the Bavaria (the rich). 
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation is structured around two parts. Each of them has four chapters. Part 
one is more theoretical in nature. Part two is empirical and deals with the case study. 
Part one deals with issues of conceptualisations, theory and methodology. In chapter 
one I conceptualise the outcome of public sector wage setting deriving it from 
macroeconomic theory. I then discuss the importance of public sector wage policies 
within the macroeconomic regime of the EMU and explain the puzzle of Germany’s 
public sector wage restraint. In chapter two I deal with the methodological approach of 
the dissertation. I explain the logic of case selection, the type of process tracing 
employed and the sources utilised. In chapter three I perform a wide literature review in 
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line with suggestions from the best practices of process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 
2015; Trampusch and Palier 2016). I “cast the net widely” in search for explanations 
and other useful insights, relevant for the case of interest. Before concluding the 
chapter I test empirically the main rival explanation. This leads me to refute it and 
move forward in the search for an alternative explanation. In chapter four I thus 
introduce the alternative theoretical approach of the dissertation and discuss theoretical 
aspects which characterise the key actors involved in public sector wage setting: the 
public employers and the public sector’s unions. Subsequently, I introduce an analytical 
framework which theorises the state as the institutional contextualisation within which 
public sector wage policies are enacted. Lastly, I discuss why to fully understand public 
sector wage setting we should trace it back to the politics of fiscal policy. 
Part two puts the framework into action and proceeds with the empirical analysis of the 
German case. In chapter five I describe the peculiarities of the German institutional 
setting. The subsequent two chapters engage with the historical reconstruction of public 
sector wage setting in Germany. Chapter six covers the 1990s. Chapter seven covers 
the 2000s. Each of these chapters is concludes with an analytical section in which I 
reflect critically on what could be observed during the historical reconstruction in light 
of what could be expected on the basis of the literature review. Chapter eight then 
discusses in greater details the micro-foundations and the institutional logics of the new 
institutional equilibrium which has emerged after 2006. 
In the conclusions I do three things. First, I wrap up the findings of the case study. 
Secondly, I elaborate on the theoretical aspects of the causal mechanism which this 
dissertation has uncovered and discuss the scope conditions of what I have termed: “the 
fiscal mechanism of public sector wage restraint”. By briefly contrasting these findings 
with the Italian case of public sector wage inflation, I discuss why the mechanism I 
have uncovered maintains its explanatory power only within the scope conditions of 
cases of public sector wage restraint. Thirdly, I conclude the dissertation by discussing 
the wider implications of the dissertation’s findings for the recent turn toward growth 
models research in CPE. Furthermore, I briefly hint at the implications of the identified 
institutional equilibrium for Germany’s capacity to offer a more symmetric adjustment 
in the EMU through wage/fiscal reflation. Alas, my tentative answer is negative. 
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CHAPTER 1. WAGE POLICIES IN EMU’S PUBLIC SECTORS 
This chapter is theoretical in nature. The purpose is to introduce and conceptualise the 
outcome to be studied. Starting from the golden rule of wage bargaining, in sub-section 
1.1, a taxonomy composed of three alternative wage policy options is derived. The 
typologies of policy options serve as the analytical tool for the analysis to be executed 
in the dissertation. This exercise is in fact preparatory to conceive of the outcome to be 
explained, i.e. public sector wage restraint. Sub-section 1.2 then discusses the 
importance of public sector wage policies for the macroeconomic regime of the EMU. 
In light of these theoretical considerations, sub-section 1.3 presents the puzzle of 
Germany’s public sector wage restraint within the EMU, clarifying why solving this 
puzzle has both policy implications and theoretical relevance. Lastly, in sub-section 1.4 
I provide a definition of the public sector, i.e. the economic arena in which public 
sector wage restraint will be analysed. 
1.1 DEFINING WAGE POLICY OPTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EMU MACROECONOMIC 
REGIME 
The aim of the dissertation is to explain a specific type of policy outcome, namely 
public sector wage restraint. Doing so implies explaining choices in the conduct of 
public sector wage policy. To accomplish the task, a typology of policy alternatives is 
needed to define the set of possible courses of action (policy options) (Gourevitch 
1986) from which any wage setters may choose. This means to conceptualise and 
define the qualitative outcome to be explained.  
There exist two ways of conceptualizing a typology of policy alternatives: via 
deduction or via induction (Van Evera 1997). In the EMU context, given the available 
literature, this can be done deductively by resorting to the concept of the golden rule of 
wage bargaining. The golden rule is an analytical construct derived from 
macroeconomic theory which acquired great importance at the launch of the EMU. The 
golden rule was meant to provide a “soft” functional equivalence for the lack of pan-
European wage coordination and ensure macroeconomic governability of the EMU. By 
resorting to this concept, it is thus possible to deduce the taxonomy of policy options. 
According to the golden rule, nominal wages ought to be set in line with the sum of the 
common inflation target in the monetary union (the ECB’s “below but close to 2%, i.e. 
1.9%) and the rate of national average labour productivity. 
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Golden rule: 
(1) ∆% nominal wage = 1,9% + Δ avg. Labour Productivity 
Starting from (1), two alternative wage policies which diverge from the golden rule can 
be defined. When the rate of increase in nominal wages (∆%) overshoots the golden 
rule (upward divergence from the benchmark) we shall treat these as policies of wage 
inflation. When ∆% undershoots the golden rule (downward divergence), we shall 
consider these as policies of wage restraint. As a result, from (1) we can derive the 
formulation of the two policies. 
Policy of wage inflation: 
(2) ∆% nominal wages − ∆% avg. labour productivity > ECB’s inflation target 
Policy of wage restraint: 
(3) ∆% nominal wages - ∆% avg. labour productivity < ECB’s inflation target 
In theory
2
, public sector wage setters can thus choose to adopt three alternative types of 
wage policies in the public sector: 
i. Policy of the Golden Rule  
ii. Policy of wage inflation 
iii. Policy of wage restraint  
The policy outcomes are conceived here as qualitative ones with characteristics which 
make them exclusive categories: wage inflation and wage restraint consist of bi-
directional types of divergence from the theory-deducted benchmark. Two 
clarifications are of order. First, since I am interested in understanding structural 
divergence of wage setting outcomes in the public sector, the qualitative outcome I 
aspire to explain consists of trajectories rather than individual yearly bargains per se. 
This leads me to categorise a country’s trajectory as inflationary or deflationary 
depending on whether public sector wage developments diverge from the benchmark in 
a systematic way. Secondly, since wage setting in the real world is not such a neat 
exercise as it is described in theory, to make the taxonomy useful (and meaningful) in 
practice, it is necessary to grant an “error margin” to the conceptualisation of the wage 
policy. In this way, countries with public sector wage trajectories more or less in line 
                                                                
2
 Given the difficulty of calculating productivity in most public services and given the absence of a 
market to determine prices, every such attempt to devise an analytical construct of this kind will remain 
open to criticism. Nevertheless, so far, the so-called Golden Rule remains the best available option, as a 
composite of the inflation rate (wage floor protecting real purchasing power) and average labour 
productivity (determining a “fair” wage ceiling based on the average productivity of all workers in the 
economy). Its importance also stems from the real-world importance which policy makers attached to it 
at the beginning of the EMU. 
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with the benchmark can be considered as pursuing policies of the golden rule even 
when they do not neatly coincide with the mathematical calculation of the golden rule. 
This, however, is not a problem for the German case of interest here which is, 
unequivocally, a case of public sector wage restraint.  
This way of proceeding necessarily creates room for subjective choices to be made. As 
such, they shall be open to debate. At the same time however they shall be excused on 
the grounds of making abstract concepts applicable to the real world for analytic 
purposes. These wage trajectories are, in other words, conceptualised as ideal types 
necessary to guide us in the empirical inquiry. Most importantly, it should be clear 
from the beginning that I do not assume that wage setters do necessarily understand, 
accept and follow the golden rule when setting public sector wages in the real world. 
Yet the concept of the golden remains analytically important for two reasons. First, for 
positive analysis, it is the analytical benchmark that makes the operationalisation of the 
dependent variable meaningful in the context of the macroeconomics of the EMU. 
Second, and consequently, from the perspective of normative analysis, setting this 
benchmark allows us to establish and understand cases which, from the perspective of 
economic governance in a monetary union, deviate from policy outcomes which would 
be desirable under the conditions of the EMU. Germany is precisely one of these cases. 
Of the three outcomes conceptualised, the dissertation will embark on explaining only 
one type of public sector wage policy, namely public sector wage restraint in post-
reunification Germany. This is because, given the centrality of the German case for 
both academic theory and policy making in the EMU, Germany requires an inquiry on 
its own. The following sub-section elaborates on the importance of public sector wage 
policy within the macroeconomic regime of the EMU. 
1.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF WAGE POLICY IN THE EMU 
Capitalist economies are inherently unstable and the recurrence of economic shocks is a 
fact of economic life (Minsky 2008 (1986); Wray 2016). As it has long been 
recognised, governments’ intervention aimed at correcting unstable markets is a 
necessary function in modern economic systems (Keynes 1936; Musgrave 1959). 
However, by joining the EMU, the control of crucial instruments of macroeconomic 
management is removed from the hands of democratically accountable governments 
(Scharpf 2011). This complicates matters. 
Adjusting to the fluctuations of capitalist cycles requires either a “mechanical 
adjustment” or a “policy-induced adjustment” (Enderlein 2006). The former means that 
changes in economic fundamentals will trigger a self-enforcing adjustment which, over 
time, will reinstate equilibrium in the economic system. The latter means that policy 
authorities intervene to correct the functioning of the market economy to induce the 
correction of disequilibria. This entails policy makers’ use of stabilisation policies. 
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In theory, there exist four standard policy instruments for macroeconomic stabilisation 
(Hancké 2013, Ch.5; Scharpf 1991). Fiscal policy, which can be of restrictive and 
expansionary nature, depends on whether the government subtracts from or adds to the 
economy fiscal resources, defined as the difference between total revenues and total 
expenditures. Monetary policy can also be restrictive or expansionary. In today’s 
monetary policy frameworks it entails the setting of interest rates by the monetary 
authority so as to steer the economy toward its statutory-mandated inflation target 
(Carlin and Soskice 2014; Ch. 13). Exchange rate policy consists of devaluations or 
revaluations
3
 of a country’s nominal exchange rate. This is tantamount to adjusting the 
price of a country’s currency to one’s convenience. Wage policy, which is also 
expansionary or restrictive in nature, depends on whether the determination of wages 
between employers and employees leads to real wages that grow faster/slower than 
productivity rates. 
Joining a monetary union does bring with it costs and benefits. The benefits are mostly 
concentrated at the microeconomic level. It is generally accepted that monetary 
integration stimulates higher trade and investment by increasing economies’ allocative 
efficiency though enhanced economies of scale and lower transaction costs; that cross-
national competition in goods and labour markets brings efficiency gains; that 
monetary union increases the liquidity of financial markets (Carlin and Soskice 2014, 
430). A monetary union reduces the exchange rates’ volatility characteristic of systems 
of flexible exchange rates. In so doing, it also eliminates the political conflicts which 
ensue from exchange rates’ adjustments (Höpner and Spielau 2015) and precludes the 
emergence of poisonous competitive devaluations across nations. Through the 
delegation of monetary policy to an independent supranational bank, the EMU also 
helps countries to stabilise their inflation rates and to bring down interest rates on 
governments’ borrowing. This was particularly beneficial for some of the European 
economies which had for long time struggled to keep inflation and borrowing costs 
under control. 
Yet joining a monetary union entails severe costs. These are related to the loss of 
sovereignty over the policy instruments which are generally used for the stabilisation of 
the economy. Economists have maintained that these costs are greater the less the 
monetary union resembles an “optimal currency area” (OCA) (Kenen 1969; McKinnon 
1963; Mundell 1961). If the economic cycles of participating countries were fully 
synchronised – as they should in an ideal OCA – then supranational monetary policy 
would help restore equilibrium in the face of a commonly experienced shock. In the 
case of a country-specific shock instead, countries with no monetary independence will 
dispose of no possibility to adjust neither through monetary nor exchange rate policies. 
If wages were flexible enough and/or if the labour force were sufficiently mobile to 
                                                                
3
 This depends on the monetary regime. In a flexible exchange rates system: depreciations and 
appreciations. 
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relocate elsewhere, then mechanical adjustment would automatically bring the 
economy back to equilibrium even without policy intervention. Alternatively, if a 
supranational fiscal budget were present, the asymmetric shock could be counteracted 
by a transfer of fiscal resources from the unaffected economies to those experiencing 
the shock. 
The OCA theory has attracted criticism and praise whose review goes beyond present 
purposes. Important is the fact that, in the EMU, a sizeable supranational fiscal budget 
has not been set up. The EU budget currently stands at around 1% of European GDP. 
Persistent and heterogeneous labour market and wage setting institutions continue to be 
a prominent feature of the European political economies: employment protection 
remains relatively high and collective bargaining widespread (Du Caju et al. 2008; 
Höpner and Schäfer 2012; Visser 2013). Labour mobility is rather low (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen 1997). These structural characteristics make it hard for the EMU to meet 
the conditions of an OCA. 
The failure of the EMU to meet the criteria of the OCA indicates the desirability of 
“policy-induced” macroeconomic stabilisation. Yet, in the Eurozone, policy makers’ 
menu is irremediably constrained. The prerogative to set monetary policy is bestowed 
on a supranational institution, the ECB, modelled on a Germany-inspired type of 
central banking. This design was premised on an independent and conservative central 
bank whose primary objective, as laid out in art. 105 of the Treaty on the European 
Union, is the maintenance of price stability (De Grauwe 2016; Ch.8). Similarly, the 
possibility to make use of nominal exchange rates’ adjustments is precluded by the very 
relinquishment of participants’ national currencies. With regard to domestic fiscal 
policy, members’ full ownership of the policy instrument is de jure constrained by the 
Stability and Growth Pact adopted under the push of the German Finance Minister 
Theo Waigel (Heipertz and Verdun 2004). This legal provision requires countries’ debt 
stock to converge toward 60% of GDP and budget deficits to remain below 3% of 
GDP. A preventive arm is intended to strengthen budgetary surveillance ex ante. A 
corrective arm aims at ensuring Member states adopt ex post appropriate policies to 
correct excessive deficits by implementing country-specific excessive deficit 
procedures or incur fines.  
The EMU thus represents not only a problematic divorce between (supranational) 
monetary and (national) fiscal authorities (C. Goodhart 1998; Schelkle 2012). It is also 
a unique macroeconomic regime in which the possibility for policy coordination 
between European monetary authorities and national wage setters is hampered by the 
very setup of the macroeconomic regime. The presence of one supranational central 
bank targeting an EMU-wide inflation level in the face of multiple national wage 
bargaining systems makes the coordination between wage and monetary policy 
sclerotic (P.A. Hall 1994; Hancké 2013; Soskice and Iversen 1998).  
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Before the EMU was created, it was recognised that with a single nominal interest rate 
set by the ECB, as soon as members’ inflation rates and output gaps started to diverge 
from Euro area averages, monetary policy would have adverse effects, resulting in self-
enforcing economic cycles
4
. These destabilizing dynamics would take place via the so-
called real interest rate channel: countries with higher-than-average inflation will have 
lower real interest rates and vice versa. For these countries, monetary policy would 
elicit higher rates of investment and consumption, pushing domestic growth beyond 
potential, eventually triggering a self-reinforcing inflationary cycle. This would lead to 
structural overshooting, possible asset prices bubbles and current account deficits 
(Enderlein 2006). Mechanical adjustment, it was thought, would occur via the so-called 
real exchange rate channel and prevent destabilisation: high inflation countries would 
eventually lose competitiveness, which will reduce export demand and stabilise trade 
balances. In other words, self-reinforcing cyclical phenomena would be counteracted 
by a decline (or boom) in exports caused by the real appreciation (depreciation) of the 
exchange rate. The REER channel was thought to prevail over the real interest rate 
channel so as to prevent full destabilisation without policy intervention (Frankel and 
Rose 1998). 
With the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen today that the REER channel has failed to 
produce adjustment. On the contrary, due to the presence of heterogeneous wage 
bargaining institutions, the REER channel has been itself a source of destabilisation. 
The persistent divergence in ULCs’ growth among EMU participants (figure 1 panel b) 
has resulted in diverging inflation rates (figure 1 panel a), leading to losses (gains) of 
competitiveness and the accumulation of current account deficits (surpluses) (Hancké 
2013; Höpner and Lutter 2014; Johnston 2016; Scharpf 2011).  
It is in this unique macroeconomic regime that fiscal and wage policies acquire centre 
stage as the key instruments available to domestic policy makers and social partners for 
the governance of the economy. In the absence of supranational stabilisation 
mechanisms, there remain two fundamental problems for national policy makers in the 
quest for macroeconomic stabilisation. The first is to prevent ex ante that 
macroeconomic developments at the national level diverge substantially from those in 
the Euro area, fostering endogenously driven shocks (e.g. divergence in countries’ 
competitiveness positions driven by ULCs’ unsynchronised
5
 growth). The second 
                                                                
4
 This policy problem is known as the Walters critique (Walters 1990) named after the British economist 
who, as an advisor of Margaret Thatcher, argued against UK participation in the EMU. According to this 
critique, the ECB’s monetary policy, by targeting the Euro area as an aggregated average, becomes pro-
cyclical as soon as domestic inflation rates and output gaps start to diverge. 
5
 I understand synchronisation and coordination of wage setting, analytically, as two different concepts. 
The former is desirable in an hypothetical situation in which countries start a monetary union from equal 
conditions. Synchronisation makes sure that wage developments unfold equally so as to prevent 
divergence. Coordination does not mean synchronisation insofar as coordination aims at producing 
different wage setting in different political economies so as to bring the countries in line with each other, 
i.e. synchronised again. From a general perspective it could be said synchronisation be required in 
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relates to the necessity to stabilise the economy ex post after an exogenous shock has 
occurred (e.g. the financial cum sovereign debt crisis). Given the failure of “mechanical 
adjustment” in EMU, a policy-induced adjustment is indeed desirable. 
Figure 1: Inflation levels and real exchange rates (REER) across the EMU. Country clusters (1999-
2015) 
 
When shocks hit a fully sovereign country, policy makers have the possibility to design 
a policy mix for adjustment through the combination of the four mentioned policy 
instruments. After joining the EMU, however, asymmetric and symmetric shocks will 
have different impacts on the participants. In the case of symmetric shocks, the 
supranational monetary authority will act to stabilise the monetary union. This occurs 
by setting the appropriate real interest rate that – via the effect on consuming and 
saving behaviour of households – brings the EMU as a whole entity back to its treaty-
based inflation target (the so called Taylor principle) (Carlin and Soskice 2014, Ch. 9 - 
12). If exogenous shocks are asymmetric among participants, however, the burden of 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
tranquil times to prevent divergence, while coordination be required to correct it. 
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adjustment will fall disproportionally on two domestic instruments: fiscal and wage 
policies. 
During normal times the challenge to a smooth functioning of a capitalist economy is 
that of preventing national macroeconomic developments from resulting in 
endogenously driven dynamics that lead to economic shocks. Avoiding national 
asymmetric developments, which may endanger the union as a whole, has called for 
pan-European policy coordination. While coordinating fiscal policy across the union 
was precisely the objective behind the creation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
wage policy was left in the remit of national social partners. Due to weak political will, 
only “soft” forms of policy coordination were provided in order to avoid divergence in 
wage policies and asymmetric competitiveness trajectories in the EMU. 
Given the lack of a pan-European wage coordination system and the disconnect 
between national wage setters and the supranational monetary authority, the German 
EU presidency set up the Macroeconomic Dialogue (MED) at the Cologne European 
Council in 1999, as a biannual meeting of the ECB, the Council, the Commission and 
the European social partners. This was an attempt to “improve the conditions for a 
cooperative macroeconomic policy mix geared to growth and employment while 
maintaining price stability” (Koll 2005, 175-212). The economic idea underpinning soft 
coordination was popularised as the golden rule of wage bargaining. The rule was put 
forward by two German civil servants
6
 and was adopted by the MED as a formal policy 
guideline for social partners (Collignon 2009, 433). 
The logic behind the golden rule is that, in the long run, price inflation reflects 
developments in ULCs
7
 (Ghali 1999; Höpner and Lutter 2014). Thus, given that the 
monetary union is premised on a paradigm of price stability and sound money, stable 
ULCs developments are necessary in order to have national inflation rates converge 
around the common inflation target. This would be necessary to avoid endogenous 
destabilizing developments fostered further by the “one size fits all” (or better none) 
monetary policy of the central bank (Enderlein 2006, 114). 
Considering that the ECB’s inflation target has been defined as a rate of inflation (the 
European Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, HICP) below but close to 2% over 
the medium term, nominal wages at the national level would thus be required to grow 
in line with the 2% target plus the rate of labour productivity in the economy. In this 
scenario, all participants to the monetary union would enjoy the same rate of ULCs 
                                                                
6
 Stephan Collignon and Willi Koll were the civil servants in the German Finance Ministry in charge of 
setting up the MED during the Germany EU-presidency in 1999 (Collignon 2009, 463, footnote 60; Koll 
2005, footnote 59) 
7
 See Höpner and Lutter (2014) for an empirical study on developments in the   Eurozone and for further 
references on ULC as the main determinants of price inflation. Höpner and Lutter (2014, 13) find a 
correlation between ULCs and inflation of r = .83. See also Collignon (2009, 430, footnote 8) for a 
review of the economic literature on the topic and Watt (2007) for a formal conceptualisation. 
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growth and inflation over the medium run. Countries’ trajectories would converge 
toward the price stability mandate and workers’ share of national income would remain 
stable.  
The adoption of the golden rule for wage bargaining was meant to engineer a “soft 
functional equivalence” for the lack of an institutionalised system of wage coordination 
across EMU members. Given the impossibility to resort to exchange rate adjustments, 
wage policy was given priority in the MED. Wage setting has since thought to be key 
in order to prevent asymmetric developments of countries’ wage and price inflation 
from driving structurally divergent competitiveness positions and thus macroeconomic 
imbalances (Watt 2010). From a normative perspective, if respected, the golden rule 
provides also an analytical tool to reconcile the conflict between capital and labour and 
to transform it into a positive sum game. Targeting the inflation benchmark provides 
the floor which ensures protection of workers’ purchasing power in the medium run. 
The productivity rate constitutes the ceiling within which non-inflationary wage 
increases can be achieved. The more the wage rate approximates the golden rule, the 
more the value created during the production process is shared equally between capital 
and labour and across the sectors of the economy. This implies redistribution of 
productivity gains from the more productive sectors of the economy to the less ones. 
The relevance of wage policy for the macroeconomic governance of the EMU stems 
from its stabilizing capacity. Wage policy is important in the EMU because it is 
charged with two stabilizing functions. First, to avoid economic shocks which are 
endogenous to the wage setting system and will eventually result in the accumulation of 
competitiveness losses/gains, policy makers should correct deviations – in either 
direction (upward/downward) - from the golden rule of wage bargaining. This means 
correcting the trajectory of wage policy while deviations from the benchmark unfold. 
This would be a preventive type of policy action. Secondly, in the event of an 
exogenous shock, wage policy can serve stabilisation purposes tailored to the nature of 
the policy problem (i.e. either through reflation or deflation). 
While this line of reasoning applies to wage policy in general, what has been often 
neglected so far is that the very nature of public sector wage policy makes it 
exponentially important in the EMU. Public sector wage policy is fiscal policy, the 
former being a subset of the latter. Since the fiscal resources necessary for public sector 
wage setting have to be eventually earmarked in governments’ budget laws (Beaumont 
1992), public sector wage policy is the only policy instrument in the political economy 
in which wage and fiscal policies coincide. Given that wage and fiscal policies are the 
only levers which remain in the remit of national authorities within the EMU, public 
sector wage policy is a unique policy instrument which enables governments to exploit 
them simultaneously for stabilisation purposes. For the EMU this also means that 
countries’ coordination of public sector wage policy is intrinsically connected to that of 
fiscal policy. Public sector wage setting shapes and is shaped by fiscal policy. 
 
 
24 
Observing public sector wage policy unfolding therefore is also a fundamental way to 
observe governments’ fiscal stance in a monetary union.  
The importance of public sector wage setting cannot risk being over-emphasized. In 
fact, “the greatest single claim on the public purse today is its wage bill” (Rose et al. 
1985, 1). This statement has not lost its significance over time. As an average of the 
EMU countries, compensation of public employees has remained rather stable over 
time, notwithstanding the two-decades long effort to reform and curtail public service 
employment according to the logics of the New Public Management (NPM) doctrine 
(Bach and Bordogna 2011; Pollitt and Dan 2011). As of 2013, the public sector
8
 
continues to employ on average 21.3% of total employees across the OECD developed 
economies (OECD 2015, 84). This means that regardless of the crisis of the tax state 
(O'connor 1973; Streeck 2011) and of times of “permanent austerity” (Pierson 2002), 
public employment remains one of those “immovable objects” (Pierson 1998). 
Employment in public services is the core pillar of our mixed-market economies: as of 
today, around 1/5 of workers across the developed world continue to be employed by a 
public employer. The compensation of public employees as a percentage of GDP in the 
EMU stands at an average of 10-11% in the EMU (figure 2).  
This makes public sector wage setting a key lever in the hands of national governments. 
After all, the idea that (big) governments could act as significant stabilisers in the 
economy is not new in the Keynesian tradition: Minsky (2008 (1986), 330) 
appropriately had it that “(B)ig Government is the most important reason why today’s 
capitalism is better than the capitalism which gave us the Great Depression”. If 
managed correctly, public sector wage policy could potentially serve governments’ 
need for stabilisation. This is exponentially important in the EMU’s constrained 
macroeconomic environment. Differently from the private sector where governments’ 
interference is either constrained or prohibited (e.g. Tarifautonomie in Germany), 
public employers remain in more or less direct control of public sector wage policies by 
virtue of their sovereign prerogatives. Yet, since its inception, public sector wage 
policies of EMU member states have been found to be pro-cyclical and to have 
influenced private sector wage setting negatively, contributing to the competitiveness 
divergence across the union (Holm-Hadulla et al. 2010). As a result, public wages have 
been a key driver of macroeconomic imbalances in the EMU (Baccaro and Tober 2017; 
Johnston, Hancké, and Pant 2014).  
Ten years after the financial crisis, and twenty years after the beginning of the EMU, 
we are still far from having understood why have public sector wages diverged so 
drastically in the EMU and why have governments not tried to make “correct use” of 
public sector wage/fiscal policy to stabilise their economies. The puzzle of Germany’s 
                                                                
8
 The OECD definition of public sector includes employment in public corporations, i.e. legal units 
producing goods and services for the market but controlled and/or owned by government units (OECD 
2015, 84). 
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public sector wage restraint, on which the following sub-section elaborates in greater 
detail, is a case in point. 
Figure 2: Compensation of public employees as percentage of GDP, average of EMU countries (1995-
2016) 
 
1.3 THE PUZZLE OF GERMANY’S PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE RESTRAINT 
The puzzle this dissertation sets out to tackle can be fully understood if we consider 
two interconnected dimensions. One is empirical, the other theoretical. The former is 
related to the pattern of structural divergence in public sector wage setting which can 
be observed during the first decade after the creation of the EMU. The latter stems from 
our theoretical understanding of the German industrial relations system and the way in 
which academic works have until now interpreted sheltered sector wage restraint 
therein. 
The empirical dimension pertains to the outcomes of public sector wage policies across 
the EMU members. Figure 3 shows the extent to which wage trajectories in the public 
sector have diverged after the introduction of the monetary union - a hard-currency 
regime based on an independent central bank and stable money. The broad picture 
shows that public sector wage setting has developed according to three main 
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trajectories. Countries at the periphery of the EMU have experienced remarkable public 
sector wage inflation. Germany has, for the most part alone, gone through an 
unrelenting trajectory of public sector wage restraint. Some other countries have wage 
developments more or less in line with the golden rule of wage bargaining introduced 
above. Interestingly, these trajectories take different patterns also within countries over 
time. So we observe that, after the inflationary peaks before the crisis, countries of the 
periphery have endured an internal adjustment which brought them more or less in line 
with wage developments in the core countries of the EMU. Germany shows a pattern of 
restraint throughout the period which, however, takes two different trends. Public 
sector wages have been pushed downward especially during the years 2004-2008. After 
the crisis wages have started to grow again and the trend seems to be more or less in 
line with the golden rule. 
Figure 3: Trajectory of hourly compensation in the public sectors of EMU members (1999-2015) 
 
From macroeconomic theory we learn that an incomplete monetary union which does 
not fulfil the requirements of an OCA is made better off by the convergence of national 
wage trajectories around the golden rule of wage bargaining. Visually, this means that 
the countries’ wage trajectories displayed in figure 3 should have shadowed the red line 
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indicating the ECB’s inflation target because, in the long run, a country’s price inflation 
reflects developments in its ULCs’ inflation. Given that the EMU is premised on a 
paradigm of price stability and sound money, stable wage trajectories in line with the 
golden rule of wage bargaining are necessary in order to have national inflation rates 
converge around the common inflation target. This is desirable to avoid destabilizing 
developments which are then enhanced further by the EMU-wide asymmetric monetary 
policy of the ECB. Yet this has not occurred. Wage trajectories in countries’ public 
sectors have diverged substantially. The general question to be asked therefore is: why 
have countries which were subjected to the same hard monetary regime experienced 
divergent trajectories of wage growth in their public sectors? To start finding the 
answer to this wider empirical question, this dissertation engages with the German case 
of public sector wage restraint displayed by the dotted line in figure 3. What explains 
Germany’s trajectory of public sector wage restraint vis-à-vis its EMU peers? 
While empirically interesting due to its extreme values on the phenomenon to be 
explained, the German case study opens up a further dimension in the puzzle which is 
theoretical in nature. In explaining public sector wage trajectories, scholars working in 
the tradition of public choice economics would posit that an outcome such that of 
public sector wage inflation is likely to be the result of self-interested politicians’ 
office-seeking nature and the exploitation of public budgets for private electoral gains. 
Great are in fact the opportunities for political actors to engage in collusive behaviour 
with rather powerful public sector trade unions. Political exchanges (Pizzorno 1978) 
may lead, through public sector wage setting, to the creation of mutually beneficial 
“distributive coalitions” (Olson 1982). Indeed, politicians and public employees alike 
may be capable of exchanging consensus for generous public sector wage increases, at 
the expenses of the common good – and the public coffers. Still, a public choice 
explanation cannot be applied to a case of severe public sector wage restraint like that 
observed in Germany. Moreover, the presence of cross-country and within-country 
variation which can be observed suggests that institutional heterogeneity and 
environmental factors are crucial tiles which are likely to help us solving the puzzle. 
In fact, a large body of literature in the field of institutionalist CPE has explained 
policies of public sector wage restraint through the presence of effective wage 
bargaining institutions which ensure wage coordination between exposed and sheltered 
sectors of the economy. Given that moderation is in the self-interest of wage setters 
who need to remain internationally competitive in the export sector, anchoring public 
sector wage setting to the export sector’s ensures the transmission of restraint 
throughout the economy. According to these arguments, the observed divergence 
across the EMU countries’ public sector wage trajectories ought to be explained by the 
presence/absence of effective wage bargaining institutions of the like described. 
Within this literature, Germany has been considered by both CPE and industrial 
relations theory as the prototypical case for such a type of export-led inter-sectoral 
wage coordination which runs under the heading of export-led pattern bargaining. This 
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and other theoretical aspects will be addressed thoroughly in due course. Suffice it to 
say here that what can instead be observed in Germany is rather a de-anchoring of 
sectoral wage trajectories. Since the mid-1990s public sector wage growth has 
substantially lagged behind that of the export sector. Rather than two sectors shadowing 
each other through inter-sectoral wage coordination, figure 4 shows “dualization” 
within the German economy. Manufacturing wages have continued to follow an 
upward trend while service sector wages, and most notably public sector wages, have 
stagnated. How could such divergent trajectories come about if wages in the export and 
public sectors were effectively anchored to each other via a pattern bargaining type of 
inter-sectoral wage coordination?  
Figure 4: Indexes of hourly wages in different sectors of the German economy (1991-2010) 
 
Di Carlo (2018a) has in fact challenged this type of institutionalist explanation based on 
export-led pattern bargaining both on theoretical and empirical grounds. This work 
constitutes the starting point for the investigation to be pursued in this dissertation. In 
fact, it has been shown that inter-sectoral wage coordination can no longer be 
considered a valid theoretical explanation for public sector wage restraint. The 
explanation is refuted in the very prototypical case on the basis of which the theory was 
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popularised. Therefore, if we cannot explain Germany’s public sector wage restraint 
through the theory of inter-sectoral wage coordination via export-led pattern 
bargaining, what other factors, so far unaccounted for, explain Germany’s trajectory of 
public sector wage restraint? 
The dissertation will tackle the empirical and theoretical puzzle of public sector wage 
restraint in Germany’s public sector. Solving this puzzle has practical relevance for 
policy making in the EMU in that a necessary precondition for addressing structural 
divergence of wage trajectories in the monetary union is to understand the domestic 
political and institutional factors which drive this divergence. Addressing the German 
case is but one step in this direction. Of more theoretical relevance for scholars of CPE 
and industrial relations should instead be the fact that the German case of public sector 
wage restraint conforms to the conditions of a crucial case study. Germany is, in other 
words, a case in which an established – and dominant – theory fails to explain the 
outcome of interest in the most likely case in which we should expect to theory to be 
valid. Solving the puzzle of public sector wage restraint in Germany is thus likely to 
help us refine and improve our wider understanding of both Germany’s industrial 
relations and, more generally, public sector industrial relations and wage setting beyond 
the German case. 
1.4 BRIEF EXCURSUS ON DEFINING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The wage policy options conceptualised above are to be studied in the arena of the 
public sector. Given substantial differences with regard to what the public sector means 
in different countries, it needs to be defined in a way that eliminates confusion. 
Defining the public sector is not easy and definitions often depend on the analytical 
point of view adopted by the researcher. Similarly, availability and quality of public 
sector data varies across time and nations (Hammouya 1999). Some definitions are 
derived by considering the organisations that collectively constitute government and 
include in the public sector all those activities funded by public money or carried out by 
either elected officials or by appointees of an elected government (Rose et al. 1985, 3). 
These definitions, however, tend to include both public services (the public sector 
proper) and public enterprises (the para-public sector), those market entities owned 
wholly or in part by public authorities. 
The treatment of public enterprises is, however, a major challenge to producing 
accurate definitions of the public sector (Beaumont 1992, 8). Distinguishing between 
the public and the para-public sector within and across countries is an extremely 
complex task since definitions and classifications differ significantly from one country 
to another and are often formulated in general terms (Gernigon 2007, 1). Some 
countries (e.g. France and Portugal) for instance include state-owned enterprises in the 
public sector, while other do not (Vaughan-Whitehead 2013, 2). Furthermore, there is 
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variation with regard to the types and diffusion of public enterprises across countries 
with disjointed and incomparable data. 
Since the purpose of this dissertation is circumscribed to the study wage setting in the 
public services, it is fruitful to adopt a circumscribed definition of the public sector 
which only looks at the public services provided by the state. Taking the cue from 
previous research (Johnston 2016, Appendix I; Johnston, Hancké, and Pant 2014; 
Vaughan-Whitehead 2013), I approximate the public sector by aggregating the 
following categories from the International Standard Industrial Classification of All 
Economic Activities (ISIC): public administration and defence plus compulsory social 
security (Category O); education (P); human health and social work activities (Q).  
Two caveats are of order with regard to public sector employment. The first refers to 
the distinction between states and markets. Organisations providing core services to the 
community may be public in the sense of being fully funded by taxpayers’ money. 
Alternatively, services of public interest may be provided by private enterprises. In the 
latter case, given the private nature of the employment relation, the state as the public 
employer would not serve as a contractual part in wage setting. The dissertation deals 
only with public employees for which the state serves as the public employer. 
Therefore, when looking at real instances of public sector wage setting here, the focus 
of the case studies will be on processes of wage determination (be it through collective 
bargaining or state unilateral intervention) which affect public employees proper and 
for which the state funds wage setting via the public budgets. Related to this 
private/public dimension is the problem that the databases on which we must rely (e.g. 
Eurostat, OECD, EU KLEMS) often do not distinguish between market (private) and 
non-market (public) units. It has to be clear that when using these databases, data will 
have to be understood as just a proxy for the public sector. AMECO data on 
governments’ expenditures for public personnel is instead a more accurate indicator of 
the public employers’ expenditures in wage setting. 
The second point relates to the structure of the state as the locus of public employment. 
All modern States, to different degrees, feature constitutionally-defined dispersion of 
political authority across different levels of government (e.g. federal, state and 
municipal) and among state agencies (Ferner 1988; 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017, 
48). In the dissertation I will consider all levels of government in the definition of the 
public sector. This is generally referred to as general government in the national 
accounts.  
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY OF THE DISSERTATION 
This chapter is methodological in nature. Its function is to explain and motivate the 
choices made regarding the dissertation’s methodological approach. The primary 
objective of this dissertation is to provide a historical explanation of a particular case 
of substantial interest. To do so, the dissertation will employ a two-step process tracing 
methodology. I blend together elements of deductive and inductive process tracing. As 
a first step in the explanatory effort, I proceed with theory testing process tracing to test 
the validity of extant explanations for the case at stake. Subsequently, and after having 
refuted the main alternative theory that explains the outcome of interest, I proceed with 
a more inductive type of outcome explaining process tracing. The chapter unfolds as 
follows. Sub-section 2.1 presents the rationale for selecting Germany as the single case 
study of the dissertation. Sub-section 2.2 elaborates on issues of methodology, 
motivating the choice made for the two-step type of process tracing. Sub-section 2.3 
discusses the nature, origin and storage of the sources exploited in the work. 
2.1 LOGIC OF CASE SELECTION: GERMANY AS BOTH AN EXTREME AND CRUCIAL CASE 
Quantitative research can rely on large samples whereby the selection of cases occurs 
through various techniques for randomisation. These techniques enable the selected 
cases to be fairly representative of an overall population. In case study research, 
instead, the sample is small, at times unique, making randomisation techniques 
unavailable. In the absence of this possibility, qualitative research must deal with 
alternative established practices for selecting the cases to be analysed. Several such 
techniques for choosing cases exist in the literature. (Gerring 2006; Ch. 5) enumerates 
no less than nine techniques for purposeful case selection on the basis of the case’s 
properties. Germany has been selected as the single case study of this dissertation for 
three reasons. 
First, Germany constitutes a case with substantial real-world implications (Mahoney 
and Thelen 2015, 13) which are intrinsically important (Van Evera 1997, 78), both to 
academic theory and to policy practice. Indeed, all public sectors matter, but some 
public sectors matter more than others. Germany is the most populous member of the 
EMU. It is the EMU’s industrial powerhouse and key centre of political and economic 
power. Not least, Germany is the single biggest trading partner at the core of the single 
market. In the early 2000s, its weight in the HICP stood at a preponderant 31%, in 
contrast to France’s 20% and Italy’s 19% (Hancké and Soskice 2003, 158). Therefore, 
Germany alone makes for around 1/3 of the total weighting of the HICP which the ECB 
should, by mandate, keep at the target level. If we believe that Germany’s 
undervaluation regime constitutes a nightmare for the very functioning of the EMU 
(Höpner 2019), then we should strive to understand the German case of public sector 
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wage restraint before formulating policy solutions of any kind. After all, with more 
than 4.5m public employees, public sector wage restraint constitutes a crucial sub-set of 
the overall trajectory of wage restraint in the German economy. This necessitates a 
stand-alone analysis of the German case. 
Second, Germany satisfies the conditions for the study of an extreme case. The logic of 
this case selection is rooted in the necessity to explain cases which show extreme 
values on the independent or dependent variable of interest. It is the case’s “extremity” 
along the dimension of interest which confers methodological relevance to the case and 
not any other theoretical aspect (Gerring 2006). Thus, the operationalisation of public 
sector wage policies around the concept of the golden rule allows us to capture the 
extent to which Germany’s public sector wage restraint is both extreme (vis-à-vis its 
EMU peers) and rather unique. This can be appreciated by confronting Germany’s 
public sector wage restraint vis-à-vis the average of public sector wage developments 
in the EMU (figure 5). 
Figure 5: Germany’s public sector wage restraint vis-à-vis EMU peers (1999-2015)  
 
Third, and to the theoretical interest of students of CPE and industrial relations, 
Germany satisfies the conditions for the study of a so-called crucial case (Eckstein 
2000). This method consists of selecting cases which “must closely fit a theory if one is 
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to have confidence in the theory’s validity or, conversely, must not fit equally well any 
rule contrary to that proposed” (Gerring 2006, 115). Since it is rather difficult in 
practice to aspire to a perfect fit between theory and observation, “most-likely cases” 
and “least-likely cases” have been elaborated according to a similar logic. The former is 
a case which should, most likely, fulfil the predictions of an established theory, and yet 
does not. These types of cases are used to disconfirm theories. Least-likely cases are 
instead useful for confirming them. In fact, the contrary logic runs in the least likely 
case where a phenomenon is observed in cases in which, according to established 
theories, we should least expect it.  
Germany constitutes a perfect most-likely case since established theories in CPE and 
industrial relations have explained public sector wage restraint with what will be 
termed “the pattern bargaining hypothesis”. As anticipated, Germany has for long 
been, and continues to be, treated as the prototypical case of export-sector-led pattern 
bargaining. Indeed, institutionalised inter-sectoral wage coordination is one of the 
central institutional pillar which famously makes Germany a coordinated market 
economy (P. Hall and Soskice 2001). This theory has been popularised in CPE by the 
seminal work of Soskice (1990) and in industrial relations by Traxler, Brandl, and 
Glassner (2008). The dissertation will show that, although Germany is a most-likely 
case where to expect export-sector-led pattern bargaining to explain public sector wage 
restraint, the empirical observations are incongruent with the predictions of the theory. 
Evidence cannot be found to validate the theory. The empirical part of this dissertation 
will confirm that public sector wage setting in Germany had little to do with the export 
sector’s. Therefore, we are left with the necessity to perform an in-depth case study to 
account for public sector wage restraint in Germany. 
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2.2 METHODOLOGY: A TWO-STEP PROCESS TRACING APPROACH 
To pursue a historical explanation means to arrive at “inferences about the causes of 
specific outcomes in particular cases” (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009, 116). 
These sorts of explanations are intended to account for outcomes “that have already 
happened, either in the distant past or in the recent past”. Thus the “goal of the analysis 
is precisely to explain the specific past occurrences; the question of whether and how 
the resulting explanation might then be generalised is a secondary concern” (ibidem). 
To “explain” in a historical manner entails the “explanation of a sequence of events that 
produce a particular historical outcome in which key steps in the sequence are in turn 
explained with reference to theories or causal mechanisms” (Bennett 2004, 21). 
Within this research tradition, the scope is not to explain historical happenings by just 
listing descriptive facts. Rather, through the case study, the researcher aspires to 
account for “well-defined aspects” of a historical happening which have been selected 
for the analysis. These very aspects are what constitute the case to be studied. A case, 
therefore, is to be understood as “an instance of a class of events of interest to the 
investigator” (Bennett 2004, 21). A case study can be understood as “the intensive 
study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light 
on a larger class of cases (population)” (Gerring 2006, 20). The case study method then 
consists of a within-case method of analysis in which the analyst must assess multiple 
sources of empirical evidence which may causally explain the case at stake.  
As described in the previous chapter, the abstract class of events of interest here 
consists of the adoption of public sector wage policy. Going down the “ladder of 
abstraction” (Sartori 1970), three alternative types of public wage policies have been 
conceptualised. Of these, the class of public sector wage policy to be studied is public 
sector wage restraint. Within the context of the EMU monetary regime, Germany 
constitutes the most prominent instance of such a class of events. I situate the in-depth 
study of this case of public sector wage restraint within two critical junctures. I start the 
analysis from the reunification of West and East Germany in 1990 and terminate it with 
the financial crisis in 2008. The motivation for the choice to begin with reunification is 
based on a priori knowledge of the German case. In fact, Germany’s public sector 
wage restraint is a phenomenon deeply rooted in the economic and political 
developments of the mid-1990s. Reunification, in conjunction with other external 
factors, triggered the reconfiguration of processes, outcomes and institutions of public 
sector wage bargaining in Germany. Thus, a detailed historical explanation of the 
German case cannot avoid harking back to German reunification. The decision to 
terminate in 2008 will hopefully become clearer by the end of the dissertation. Besides 
the financial crisis, this juncture coincides with the establishment of a new institutional 
equilibrium in public sector wage bargaining which, I posit, is currently at play in the 
German political economy. This equilibrium has come into force since 2008 when the 
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two-fold process of institutional and constitutional change of public sector wage 
determination was fully completed.  
The dissertation employs a process tracing qualitative methodology for within-case 
analysis. A problem with declaring to be doing some sort of process tracing is that there 
seems to be no univocal understanding of what process tracing means and how it shall 
be executed. In fact, Trampusch and Palier (2016) count more than fifteen different 
definitions of process tracing which have been used, either inductively or deductively, 
since the 1980s. While the literature on the topic has proliferated (Beach and Pedersen 
2013; Bennett 2010; Falleti 2006; P.A. Hall 2013; Mahoney 2015), some of the 
distinctions which are highlighted in theory may however be less accentuated in 
practice.  
Process tracing can conveniently be defined, following Bennett and Checkel (2015, 7), 
as “the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within 
a case for the purpose of either developing or testing hypothesis about causal 
mechanisms that might actually explain the case.” Thus, by executing a process tracing 
methodology, the researcher attempts to identify the causal process through which an 
initial factor or set of factors is linked to and produces the outcome to be explained. 
The researcher must identify both the causal chain and the causal mechanism which 
explains the outcome of interest. These explanations are then provided in the form of 
analytical sequences of events or causal chains which make explicit how factors located 
at different points in time contribute to an outcome to be explained (Mahoney 2015). 
Accordingly, process tracing rests on the type of social science explanations based on 
causal mechanisms as opposed to constant conjunctions (Mayntz 2004). Again, several 
definitions and understandings of causal mechanisms exist (Hedström and Ylikoski 
2010; Mahoney 2001). My ontological understanding of causality in the social and 
political world is aligned to that of scientific realists’ who put emphasis on causal 
processes and causal mechanisms as the central components of causal explanations. I 
understand causal mechanisms as being of a probabilistic nature. Hence, it is not 
assumed here that the same mechanism regularly produces the same outcome across 
time and space. Rather, mechanisms exert their causal influence probabilistically within 
environmental contexts and institutional settings over time (Falleti and Lynch 2009).  
I look favourably to the pragmatic stance followed by Bennett and Checkel (2015, 12) 
who understand causal mechanisms as: 
“ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents 
with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, 
information, or matter to other entities. In doing so, the causal agent changes the effected 
entities’ characteristics, capacities, or propensities in ways that persist until subsequent 
causal mechanisms act upon them.”  
I concur with the authors that causal mechanisms are in some sense unobservable. They 
are entities and processes in the world, but it is through the theories and hypotheses in 
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our minds which we aspire to capture them. The researcher theorises about mechanisms 
and then tests the testable implications of these hypotheses against observable 
evidence. Explaining historical cases through causal mechanisms involves, as much as 
the case at stake allows, a commitment to conduct analyses at the lowest level of 
analysis and through the greatest degree of attainable details.  
Process tracing can then be performed either deductively or inductively, although in 
practice all types of process tracing require an iteration process between theory and 
empirical evidence from within the case (Trampusch and Palier 2016). In deductive 
process tracing, the analysist infers predictions from available theories to then test them 
against a set of empirical observations. In the process, it is important to test predictions 
from a set of alternative explanations. This type of deductive process tracing gets very 
close to the systematic process analysis approach recommended by P.A. Hall (2006). 
As a first step, the researcher formulates a set of theories which identify both the 
principal causal variables thought to be conducive to the outcome to be explained and 
an account of how these variables interact in the causal chain which produces the 
outcome. In other words, these theories shall identify not only the crucial causal 
variables but also the process through which these exert causal force upon the outcome. 
The researcher must elaborate a set of at least two or more alternative theories which 
can be tested against empirical observations. Hall’s proposition is based on the “three-
cornered-fight” (Lakatos 1976) among a theory, a rival theory, and a set of empirical 
observations. As a second step, for each of the theories elucidated, the researcher 
derives predictions about patterns that should be observed in the real world, were the 
theory to be valid. Predictions shall be formulated in a way that makes them testable 
against collectable data and clearly distinguishable from the predictions of competing 
rival theories. In the third step, the researcher performs observations of the real world 
which are pertinent to these predictions. An observation consists of data obtained 
through whatever way is appropriate for maximizing the available evidence, whether 
documentary research, interviews or computation. Lastly, observations drawn from the 
cases are compared with the predictions of the theory with the purpose to reach a 
conclusion on the merits of each rival theory. Such a conclusion is based on the 
congruence between the predictions formulated for each theory and the observations 
collected for the case. 
The very strength of this method lies in the possibility to amass a multitude of different 
types of data from different types of sources and thereinafter execute multiple 
observations and tests of the theories. These include specific actions performed by 
various actors as well statements by these actors on the reasons why they performed 
such actions and, in general, all sorts of observations helpful to establish the validity of 
a formulated prediction. However, the limitation of applying a “pure” systematic 
process analysis approach in this dissertation lies in the fact that, as it will be shown, 
there is but one theory in the literature which has engaged properly with explaining 
public sector wage restraint in Germany. This is what I have called the “pattern 
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bargaining hypothesis” which I consider as the main “rival explanation” to be tested in 
the dissertation. Through a theory testing procedure like that recommended by Peter 
Hall, I have refuted the theory as incongruent with the empirical evidence. As a result, 
in the process, I have been left with an “undertheorized historical outcome” that needs 
to be explained without reference to any well-grounded existing theory. This 
necessarily implies an element of induction be introduced side by side next to a 
deductive process tracing methodology. 
In the effort to open “the black box of causality” through inductive process tracing, the 
researcher should be willing to bring in “unexpected clues or puzzles that indicate the 
presence of left-out variables” (Bennett 2004, 24), leading to the development of new 
hypotheses through which social science can advance. On the basis of the extensive 
knowledge I have acquired on the German case, I have decided, perhaps pragmatically, 
that the best (and most transparent) way to present the research conducted is through a 
two-step process tracing methodology. This includes both a deductive element of 
theory testing process tracing and a subsequent inductive element of outcome 
explaining process tracing. 
In the first step (chapter 3), following recommendations of best process tracing 
practices (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 25), I “cast the net widely” in the search for 
alternative explanations. I review critically four different strands of literature in the 
social sciences: economics, interest-based CPE, industrial relations and institutionalist 
CPE. The aim is two-fold. First, the interest is in taking stock of how the subject of 
public sector wage setting and collective bargaining has been treated in the social 
sciences more generally. Here I have found that, in the first three mentioned fields, only 
indirect insights can be derived. While going through each of these sub-sections, I will 
take good care of discussing why these insights remain only partial and unsatisfactorily 
for present purposes. 
Second, the interest is in deriving alternative explanations for the German case. Here I 
have found that a set of works has specifically dealt with the case of interest. Hence, I 
dedicate the whole sub-section 3.5 to test predictions from this theory against a set of 
empirical observations. This exercise has led me to the conclusion that the empirical 
observations are incongruent with the predictions of the pattern bargaining hypothesis. 
As a result of this failure, I have moved toward theory-guided process tracing (Falleti 
2006). The epistemological interest was more of an inductive nature here. However, I 
have let my induction be driven, informed and disciplined by a theory frame 
(Rueschemeyer 2009) assembled by putting together pertinent knowledge in different 
strands of the social sciences. Indeed, “good process tracers need good theory so that 
they know where to focus their analytical attention, which actors to study and interview 
and what historical sequences to analyse” (Trampusch and Palier 2016, 14). This is 
precisely what I attempt in chapter 4 where I formulate an alternative state-centred 
institutionalist framework for the study of public sector wage setting. This framework 
shifts the theoretical lenses onto the complex wage setting role public employers play 
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within the contours of the state’s institutional contextualisation. The framework puts 
emphasis on the very fiscal nature of public sector wage setting and urges us to think of 
public sector wage policy in terms of the politics of fiscal policy and political 
interrelations among various state actors.  
Together with other scholars engaged in institutionalist analyses of social, political and 
economic phenomena, I believe that “causal effects depend on the interaction of 
specific mechanisms with aspects of the context within which these mechanisms 
operate” (Falleti and Lynch 2009). Coherently with this credo, I theorise about an 
institutional setting within which public sector wage setters interact in the process of 
wage determination. I bring in four institutional domains which, I hypothesize, shape 
these policy interactions. I present the theoretical reasons for why and how these 
institutional domains matter in shaping processes and outcomes of public sector wage 
setting.  
The analytical framework advanced will most likely not reach the status of a full-
fledged theory. But this is not my ambition. More modestly, the framework is meant to 
discipline the inductive explanatory process. It is meant to do so by providing a theory-
grounded understanding of which actors matter, how and when they matter and in 
which way the environmental and institutional context provides incentives and 
constraints to the actors involved in the adoption of public sector wage policy. 
2.3 NATURE, ORIGIN AND STORAGE OF THE UTILISED SOURCES 
This section introduces the reader to the different types of data which have been 
collected and utilised for the study of the German case. To comply with the 
“transparency revolution”, as recommended by the best practices of process tracing 
(Trampusch and Palier 2016), I have organised all the data (both the evidence directly 
cited and other material not cited) through the software for qualitative analysis 
MAXQDA. This has enabled me to divide and organise the data in a way that is 
coherent, intelligible, chronologically-organised and easily accessible by a third party.  
The result of this logistic effort is a MAXQDA file which will be stored, together with 
a backup of the material, in the servers of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of 
Societies (MPIfG), in Cologne. The file can thus be accessed and consulted upon 
request. Due to an agreement which I have stipulated with my interviewees, all the 
interviews are anonymised in such a way that only the institutional affiliation can be 
recognised. The data I have collected is divided in primary and secondary sources. 
Primary sources are sources which provide first-hand testimony or direct evidence of 
the historical phenomenon under investigation. Secondary sources are those which 
instead interpret and analyse the phenomenon after it has occurred. I have relied on a 
triangulation of different types of primary and secondary sources which I have 
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collected before, during and after my work on the field. Table 1 provides a snapshot of 
the sources used. 
Table 1: Types of empirical sources utilised 
 
Documental Sources Interviews 
Primary Sources 
Archival, physical sources: 
- ÖTV archive (Bonn) 
- Ver.di archive (Berlin) 
- Ministries’ documents and reports 
Statistical: 
- AMECO 
- Destatis 
- EU KLEMS 
- OECD 
Elite Interviews: n. 19 
Secondary Sources 
Archival, digital sources: 
- Eurofound archive 
- EIRR archive 
- WSI Tarifarchiv 
- OECD yearly economic surveys 
- EIU’s country reports 
- IMF’s yearly country reports 
Newspaper coverage: 
- Financial Times Historical Archive 
- Lexis Nexis 
Academic yearly reports: 
- Political Data Yearbook, Germany’s yearly 
accounts 
Expert Interviews: n. 8 
During the period comprised between spring 2016 and the summer of 2017, I have 
embarked on a tour throughout Germany during which I have conducted twenty-seven 
interviews. Some of these interviews were conducted at a later stage to clarify aspects 
which, after concluding the historical reconstruction, still seemed unclear. I have 
conducted interviews with experts on both fiscal policy and public sector industrial 
relations in Germany. These were considered secondary sources. The interviewees 
whom I interviewed as experts were mostly professors with an established record of 
related publications. Alternatively, they were practitioners who work or have worked 
on the issues of interest in research institutions or policy institutions. Next to expert 
interviews, I have conducted several elite interviews which I have considered as 
primary sources. In fact, by the word elite I mean persons who had an actual position of 
power in the processes being studied. These interviewees either participated directly in 
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the processes studied or were closely involved. These actors were interviewed in 
relation to the institutional role they hold or held within the organisations involved in 
these processes. To ensure a balanced sample, I have made sure to interview actors 
representing different organisations standing on different sides of the process of public 
sector wage setting. As a result, the interviewee sample covers actors from the Federal 
Finance Ministry, from the organisations for employers’ representation at the municipal 
and Länder level and from different trade unions organisations. Unfortunately, I did not 
manage to get to interview representatives of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. A list 
of interviewees is provided in the appendix (A) at the end of the dissertation. All the 
audio files of the interviews are stored within the MAXQDA file. 
Next to interview data, I have collected statistical data from multiple sources. Data 
from the EU KLEMS database provides information on wages at the sectoral level. 
Similar information could be found through the OECD Stan database. The AMECO 
Database of the European Commission provides additional data on public spending on 
government employees’ compensation. Data on public employment and financial 
issues, decomposed at the level of Länder and municipalities, could be found on the 
German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis). The collective bargaining archive of the 
Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI) in Düsseldorf provides detailed 
information on collectively agreed wage increases at the sectoral level. All the datasets 
and the coding files (in the R software) are uploaded within the MAXQDA file. 
In order to acquire information on political, economic and contingent historical 
developments, on a yearly basis, I have collected several institutional reports. These 
constitute documented evidence. Here I will mention only the most important ones 
which have been exploited extensively in the writing of the case study. Available from 
the year 1992, the yearly edition of the Political Data Yearbook, edited by the 
European Journal of Political Research, has been a very precious source to obtain 
information about key political and social events on Germany on a yearly basis. 
Similarly, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s country report on Germany has provided 
valuable information on political and economic facts on a yearly basis. This publication 
was available only for the years 1996-2008. The OECD’s yearly economic surveys and 
the IMF’s yearly country reports provide accurate and detailed statistical data and 
analysis on both political and economic developments on a yearly basis. In the specific, 
these have been precious sources to analyse in detail the developments in the realm of 
fiscal policy in Germany. Via the Financial Times’ historical archive, which I could 
access through the infrastructure of the MPIfG, I could download the newspaper’s 
coverage on issues related to fiscal and wage policy in Germany. Not surprisingly, 
given the importance Germany’s economy, the Financial Times has covered 
extensively both issues related to fiscal policy and wage negotiations in both the export 
and public sector. Through the software Lexis Nexis, accessed via the MPIfG, I could 
also download thousands of newspaper articles in both the German- and English-
speaking press, which have covered through the years the wage negotiations in the 
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public sector. All this material – and much other not mentioned here - is divided by 
source, organised chronologically on a yearly basis and stored within the MAXQDA 
file. 
With regard to data on wage bargaining negotiations, I could access different sources. 
The WSI’s Tarifarchiv provides comprehensive documentation on wage bargaining 
processes and outcomes in conjunction with contextual political and institutional 
factors. However, reports were only available from the year 1994. The archives of the 
Eurofound provided much documentation reporting on wage setting and employment 
relations more generally. These were available only from the year 1997 onwards. I have 
complemented this document-based evidence with the use of the monthly reports of the 
European Industrial Relations Review (EIRR). The MPIfG holds copies of this 
industrial relations physical archive
9
. This was one of the most important documental 
sources I could rely on when studying events of public sector wage setting in Germany 
on a monthly basis. The EIRR provides detailed information on issues related to any 
sort of relevant happenings in the realm of employment and industrial relations. This 
gives monthly information which covers all the countries of the European Union 
spanning a time horizon of about thirty-five years (1970-2006). All of this material is 
divided by source, organised chronologically on a yearly basis and stored within the 
MAXQDA file. The EIRR archive is physical and remains stored in the library of the 
MPIfG. 
Lastly, I have personally spent time in the physical archives of the old ÖTV trade union 
and the newly formed Ver.di. The German-language documents of the ÖTV are 
contained within the Archive of Social Democracy Archive of the Friederich-Ebert 
Stiftung in Bonn. I visited ÖTV’s archive during June 2017. In the archive I could find 
first-hand documentation related to the operations of the trade union during the years 
1990-1998. Most of these documents are in hard copy and stored personally. However, 
only very few of these documents have been directly used and cited in the dissertation. 
With regard to documentation concerning the Ver.di trade union, I had the chance to 
consult the internal archive in the Ver.di’s Berlin headquarter in summer 2017. I paid 
several visits to the archive where, however, most of the documents of my interest were 
still classified. 
  
                                                                
9
 Indeed, I am extremely grateful to Susanne Hilbring and all the other extremely professional employees 
of the MPIfG’s library for having supported me throughout the process. 
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CHAPTER 3. CASTING THE NET WIDELY: GERMANY’S PUBLIC SECTOR 
WAGE RESTRAINT AND THE STUDY OF WAGE DETERMINATION IN THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 
This chapter is theoretical in nature. Its function is to take stock of the available 
literature to examine the way in which the subject of public sector wage setting has 
been dealt with in allied subfields of the social sciences. In the sub-sections which 
follow, I zoom in on various branches of economics (sub-section 3.1), of CPE (3.2 and 
3.4) and of industrial relations studies (3.3). The analysis of the literature reveals that 
the public sector proper has been either neglected or marginalised to the fringes of 
these disciplines. This appears especially true for the study of public sector’s wage 
setting and industrial relations. With this awareness in mind, I have thus extended the 
analysis to other pertinent works. Although not directly engaging with public sector 
wage setting, I have selected works which carry interesting theoretical insights for the 
specific German case at stake. In the process, I have made an effort to consider these 
scholars’ reasoning and I have tried to extend the implications of their wider arguments 
to the specific case of public sector wage restraint in Germany. From their reasoning, I 
have derived other plausible alternative hypotheses on which to reflect before arriving 
at the central rival explanation for public sector wage restraint in Germany. In sub-
section 3.4 I engage critically with institutionalist CPE since it has dealt extensively 
with the study of wage setting and industrial relations. In sub-section 3.5 I conclude the 
chapter by testing empirically the validity of main alternative explanation for the case 
of public sector wage restraint in Germany: “the pattern bargaining hypothesis”. By 
refuting this rival explanation, I prepare the ground for chapter four in which I outline 
an alternative state-centred analytical framework.  
3.1 ECONOMICS 
The public sector lies at the core of public economics. It is since the work of its 
founding father - Richard Musgrave - that the discipline has engaged with questions 
related to the intervention of governments in the market economy. Musgrave (1959) 
posited that modern governments intervene in the economic systems through the 
famous “three branches”: stabilisation, allocation and distribution. With the first, the 
government was called on to ensure that economy would remain at full employment 
with stable prices. With the second, the government intervened in the way the economy 
allocated its resources. It did so directly by buying goods and indirectly by taxing 
and/or subsidizing the private sector. Lastly, the government was concerned with the 
way in which the wealth produced in the economy would be distributed in society in 
relation to issues of equity and efficiency.  
 
 
43 
Central to the interest of public finance scholars has been the acknowledgment of 
private sector’s limitations in the capacity to produce efficient outcomes and meet the 
social needs of the community. From this, it followed the necessity for governments to 
intervene in the economy to mitigate market failures and ensure the production of 
public goods which would not be adequately supplied nor efficiently produced by 
private enterprises. Scholars thus study the nature of government intervention in the 
economy, the causes and effects of this intervention in different institutional contexts 
and policy areas and the most adequate and efficient “means” for the government to 
interfere with the functioning of private markets. 
Yet in the most prominent and recent textbook on the economics of the public sector 
(Stiglitz and Rosengard 2015), over more than nine hundred pages, there is hardly any 
mentioning of public employees’ compensation and their centrality in governments’ 
expenditures. In the discipline, governments’ outlays are mostly analysed in terms of 
their social functions, namely expenditures for defence, education, health, social 
protection, etc. The lack of interest for employees’ compensation is astonishing 
considering that, as shown in one figure of the textbook itself, expenditures for public 
employees range from more than 15% of GDP (out of a total of 54.1% ) in Sweden to 
about 6% of GDP (out of 41.8%) in Japan (Stiglitz and Rosengard 2015, 46; figure 2.7 
(data for 2009)). 
Public choice has emerged as a parallel sub-field which has tried to construct a bridge 
between political science and economics. Central to public choice is the assumption, 
formulated in the social choice theory (Buchanan 1987) that government action is the 
result of politicians acting rationally in their own self-interest and in response to the 
political rules of the game. The perspective of public choice turned the assumption of 
public finance on its head. While in the latter the benevolent government of altruistic 
politicians would enact policies that enhance the collective welfare of society, public 
choice saw self-interested politicians governing for the purpose of extracting personal 
gains
10
. Nordhaus (1975) has famously argued that incumbent governments engineer 
political business cycles. They increase budget deficits so as to stimulate the economy 
in proximity of elections to reap electoral benefits, shifting the costs into the future. 
Others have elaborated economic models
11
 based on opportunistic politicians “illuding” 
naïve voters incapable of coming to terms with the technicalities of fiscal policy 
(Buchanan and Wagner 1977); models on inter-generational and intra-generational 
redistribution through fiscal policy (Cukierman and Meltzer 1989; Tabellini 1991); 
models in which by raising debt, incumbents try to tie the hands of future governments 
to gain an electoral advantage in future elections (Alesina and Tabellini 1990); models 
with “war of attritions” games in which fiscal adjustments in the polity are delayed 
                                                                
10
 I am thankful to Fritz Scharpf for this intuition to which he led me during private conversations. 
11
 For a survey of the economic literature on the “Political Economy of Budget Deficits” see Alesina and 
Perotti (1995) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) for the more specific literature on the impact of institutions 
on budgetary policy. 
 
 
44 
indefinitely due to distributional fights between two political forces in power with 
opposing interests and electoral bases (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Drazen 1996); etc. 
What these public choice models have in common is that they are geared toward 
explaining instances of fiscal expansion or delayed fiscal adjustments (at the expenses 
of the taxpayers’ money). As such, these models appear unfit for explaining the 
German case of marked wage/fiscal restraint. 
In a different sub-field, labour market economists have focused on the structure and 
level of public sector wages in comparison to the private sector. Most of the literature
12
 
tries to track down the presence of private/public sector wage differentials and to 
quantify them while keeping constant personal characteristics (e.g. education levels, 
gender, etc.) or other labour market and collective bargaining institutions. In different 
sauces and to different extent, the literature seems to be more or less unanimous in 
identifying a so-called “public sector wage premium” (Giordano et al. 2011; Lucifora 
and Meurs 2006; Panizza 1999; Postel-Vinay 2015; Postel‐Vinay and Turon 2007). The 
gist of this literature is that the wage gap in favour of the public sector increases at the 
lower tail of the wage distribution while it turns negative at the higher tail. Put it 
differently, the jobs performed by low-skilled workers are paid better by a public 
employer as opposed to the private sector. On the contrary, the high-skilled jobs with 
managerial responsibilities are paid more generously in the private sector. In all, to the 
best of my knowledge, labour market economists have not produced models to account 
for the adoption of public sector wage policies.  
Within the sub-field of post-Keynesian macroeconomics, a group of scholars have 
produced a type of economic explanation for Germany’s wage restraint which brings 
with it an interesting ideological twist. For these scholars, economy-wide wage restraint 
in Germany is to be attributed to the obsessive Ordoliberal
13
, or anti-Keynesian (Jörg 
Bibow 2018), economic ideology guiding German policy makers in the implementation 
of a purposeful strategy of economic Mercantilism (Cesaratto 2013). According to this 
line of argument, Germany pursues a form of economic imperialism rooted in the 
pursuit of trade surpluses vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 
2015, 32). This is an explanation based on a prevalent “economic ideology” in which 
cognitive elements affect decision making in economic policy. This explanation sees 
policy outcomes as the result of national traditions and values which decision makers 
hold in relation to the economy. 
                                                                
12
 For an extensive survey of the literature see Giordano et al. (2011). 
13
 On Ordoliberalism in Germany and austerity more in general in the context of the financial and 
sovereign debt crises in America and  Europe see Blyth (2013). For works on Ordoliberalism in Germany 
see Beck and Kotz (2017), Hien and Joerges (2017). For a critical assessment of the argument on the 
ordoliberal origins of Germany’s role in the EMU (Matthijs 2016) see Hien and Joerges (2018). On the 
clash of economic philosophies between France (discretionary-based policy making) and Germany (rule-
based policy making) in the EMU see Brunnermeier, James, and Landau (2016). 
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Works along these lines advance what can be termed as the “Ordomerkantilismus 
hypothesis” (Cesaratto and Stirati 2010). Famously, Flassbeck and Lapavitsas (2015) 
argue that wages and ULCs were “hardly ever mentioned” during the debate which 
took place in Germany in the run up to the EMU. The “ideological debate” across 
Europe revolved around fiscal policy and the perils of inflation where Germany 
managed to impose its “dogmatic monetarist tradition” centred on price stability. The 
German government, flanked by the employers, applied “vigorous” pressures on labour 
unions to reduce nominal and real wages. This move was guided, the authors argue, by 
their belief in the “flexibility doctrine” of the labour market and it was “grounded in the 
neoliberal conviction that lower wages would result in more labour-intensive 
production processes across the economy” (2015, 22). As a result of this offensive, 
“Germany systematically undershot the target” of the golden rule, operating a policy of 
“beggaring-thy-neighbour” after “beggaring its own people” by “essentially freezing 
wages” (2015, 25). This led to macroeconomic imbalances which were not rectified in 
the EMU because their “macroeconomic implications were ignored due to the doctrinal 
and theoretical obsessions discussed” and because of the lack of adjustable exchange 
rates (2015, 33).  
It is necessary to reflect critically on these accounts for this type of macroeconomic 
cum ideational account bears theoretical implications. In fact, from these arguments we 
could indirectly derive a sort of alternative hypothesis worth considering further. Seen 
from the lenses of the “Ordomerkantilismus hypothesis”, we may be tempted to 
interpret Germany’s public sector wage restraint in terms of the government’s specific 
economic ideology. German governments should thus be seen as repelling budget 
deficits and, most importantly, pursuing strategically wage/fiscal restraint and labour 
market flexibilization in order to ensure price competitiveness and an undervalued 
REER. Such an undervaluation strategy enables them to sustain a mercantilist 
economic model based on export-led growth. The advantage of such an explanation 
may probably lie in its parsimony and intuitive plausibility. Formulated in this 
generalised way, the causal story can be easily digested and there would hardly be 
anyone who disputes the peculiar German aversion to budget/trade deficits and 
inflation. Yet explanations along these lines suffer from several pitfalls which make 
this hypothesis not fully satisfactory.  
In disagreement with these arguments, it must be observed that it was the German 
Presidency of the EU which, during the Cologne European Council in 1999, set up the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue (MED) recommending the golden rule of wage bargaining as 
the formal policy guideline to be followed by national social partners. This was meant 
exactly to avoid structural divergence of inflation rates and macroeconomic imbalances 
in the EMU. Prima facie, this crucial fact appears immediately incongruent with the 
hypothesis advanced by these post-Keynesian macroeconomists. It is rather difficult to 
prove that “ideological policy makers” were not aware of and ignored the implications 
of ULCs developments in a single currency. Quite to the contrary, it was two German 
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civil servants
14
 working in the German Finance Ministry who proposed the adoption of 
this soft form of wage coordination across the EMU (Collignon 2009, 433).  
Secondly, their narrative does not match the timing and the sector-specific trajectories 
of wage growth across the German economy. The argument that wage restraint in 
Germany “coincided with the formal introduction of the monetary union” (Flassbeck 
and Lapavitsas 2015, 23) appears incorrect. As the case study will show in great detail, 
wage restraint had already emerged in the early 1990s, as a consequence of the 
Bundesbank’s decision (in July 1992) to raise interest rates to unprecedented levels 
after the reunification’s inflationary boom. When EMU was launched in 1999, wage 
restraint was well under way. Most importantly, since reunification, wage restraint has 
been pursued disproportionately in the sheltered sectors of the German economy (figure 
4). What has in fact been neglected is that, since the mid-1990s, restraint has been even 
more pronounced in the public sector (Di Carlo 2018a). 
Therefore, the most crucial problem with these generalised macroeconomic grand 
narratives is that they fall short of explaining the divergent trajectories of sectoral wage 
growth within the German economy (figure 4). Not taking sector-specific interests and 
institutions seriously weakens their arguments. A large body of literature in CPE tells 
us that actors operating in sectors which are sheltered from international competition 
have different interests, pursue different strategies and engage in different political 
struggles than export-oriented producers’ coalitions (Crouch 1990b; Frieden 2014; 
1991; Hancké 2013; Johnston and Hancke 2009; Pontusson and Swenson 1996; 
Swenson 1991). Thus, it remains very difficult to pin down and tell the ideational from 
the material without a conceptualisation of sectoral interests and their institutional 
peculiarities. Economic ideology alone falls short of explaining inter-sectoral 
divergence in the German economy. For these accounts to be fully convincing, agency 
and structure would need to be nested together in a more refined understanding of how 
ideology-driven actors have secured power to transform economic ideologies into 
diverging policy outcomes in a context of conflicting interests.  
As a matter of fact, wage restraint and preoccupation for international competitiveness 
is easily understandable for both employers and trade unions in the export sector. Here, 
it may very well be the case that economic ideology and interests are aligned, leading 
to the emergence of a cross-class coalition. In the public sector we can’t reasonably 
expect workers and unions to go along smoothly with a two-decade-long pattern of 
wage restraint. Why should we expect public workers to tolerate a pattern of restraint 
that serves the interests – and possibly the ideology – of the exporting employers and 
the government? Under the realistic assumption that public sector workers long for 
improvements in their purchasing power just like any other worker, we should rather 
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expect conflict and contestation to trump ideology. For these scholars to convince us 
that the German employers (or the government for that matter) have imposed a strategic 
pattern of mercantilist restraint on the whole economy, they will have to convincingly 
show us the mechanisms through which the domestic sector has been co-opted by the 
export sector.  
As a last resort, it may be argued by these scholars that it was the government, guided 
by a specific set of economic ideologies, that “started to put political pressure on labour 
unions in an attempt to restrict the growth of both nominal and real wages” (Flassbeck 
and Lapavitsas 2015, 22). However, given Tarifautonomie in the German system of 
private sector collective bargaining, this argument seems plausible only with regard to 
public sector wage setting. In fact, as the case study will show, the German government 
did apply enormous pressures to reduce the fiscal costs of public sector wage setting. 
But this was never meant to be instrumental to a strategy of economic mercantilism. It 
was a pragmatic strategy of fiscal consolidation in hard times. In fact, these scholars’ 
narrative comes across as too simplistic. Talking about “the German government 
applying political pressures” cannot explain wage restraint in the public sector for the 
very essential reason that Germany is a decentralised federal state in which political 
authority in important policy areas is assigned primarily to the States which compose 
the Federation (Katzenstein 1987, 15-35). In fact, Germany is a “semisovereign” state, 
characterised by a fragmented polity, consensus-based politics and an intricate system 
of fiscal federalism. This carries the non-negligible implication that, especially in 
matters of public sector employment relations and wage setting, the “federal 
government has no choice but to negotiate and cooperate with centres of state power 
over which it has no control” (Katzenstein 1987, 16). There is, in other words, not a 
single government or public employer in Germany whose interests and ideology 
coincide smoothly with those of the federal government. Neither is there a single centre 
of power which export elites can easily capture. The whole dimension of intra-public 
sector conflicts of interest is ignored by these scholars with the result that the German 
government is, incorrectly, treated as a monolithic bloc capable of unitary action. A 
more nuanced analysis of the German political economy reveals, instead, a great 
influence of the institutions of cooperative federalism on policymaking and the 
presence of distributive conflicts between layers of governments together with 
asymmetries between the West and the East (Benz 2008; 1999). 
3.2 INTERESTS-BASED COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Works in CPE fall within three different types of approaches, namely ideational, 
interest-based and institutions-based explanations (P.A. Hall and Taylor 1996). Without 
intention to disparage ideational/cultural approaches, it is fair to say that when studying 
wage bargaining and industrial relations, CPE scholars have mostly privileged interest-
based and institutionalist approaches. Explanations of political and economic 
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phenomena have relied fundamentally on the material interests of principal actors 
and/or institutional structures as key explanatory variables. It is, however, not always 
easy to clearly tell the interests dimension from the institutional one in CPE. Since 
institutionalist explanations will be the object of extensive discussion in sub-section 
3.4, here I focus only on interest-based approaches and leave the discussion of the 
former to a later stage. 
Interest-based approaches generally proceed by identifying the material interests of 
principal actors to then trace the way in which power is configured through political 
alliances so as to translate preferences into favoured policy outcomes. Actors are 
understood as either individual or composite, the latter taking the form of associations 
or corporate actors (Scharpf 1997b, Ch. 3). By prioritizing material interests over 
alternative explanations (e.g. ideational), these works tend to start by asking who 
benefits (“Qui bono?”) from the policy being implemented and how actors’ material 
condition would be affected by it (Gourevitch 1986, 56). Actors’ preferences are 
shaped by their specific material condition in the economic or political arena - a 
process of preference formation perhaps best exemplified by the adage: “where you 
stand depends on where you sit” (P.A. Hall 1993, 275).  
Explanations centred on producer groups are central to the CPE discipline. These works 
generally concentrate on associations of economic actors whose preferences are 
determined by the specific position they occupy in the process of value creation in 
capitalist economies. As units of analysis, broad societal groups have often been 
derived on the basis of various distinguishing factors (P.A. Hall 1997, 176): for 
instance with regard to the actors’ relationship vis-à-vis the means of production (e.g. 
capitalists, workers, financial rentiers and landowners) or in relation to sector-specific 
interests (e.g. exposed vs sheltered sectors), and so on. Key to these specifications is 
the implication that political alliances will be forged to mobilise collective actors - of 
different nature but with similar interests - behind given policy packages. Situation-
specific policy coalitions can thus emerge within different segments of the capitalists’ 
camp, according to specific business interests. Moreover, coalitions can emerge across 
the labour/capital divide, taking the form of cross-class coalitions where the interests of 
a specific subset of capitalists coincides with those of a specific segment of the working 
class (Pontusson and Swenson 1996; Swenson 1991). 
The distinguishing feature of this approach lies in the belief that “policy requires 
politics” (Gourevitch 1986, 17), which is to say that if a policy is to be implemented it 
must advance the interests of specific socio-economic groups in the political economy. 
It also implies that, when material conditions change, regardless of the driver of 
change, the interests of principal actors would change, triggering actors’ reaction in the 
quest for the reconfiguration of political coalitions in support of newly preferred 
policies. What characterises the production profile explanation is that the material 
interests of producer groups acquire precedence over political actors. Producer groups 
hold specific preferences for policy and assemble political coalitions to capture the 
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political arena in order to arrive at desired outcomes. The arrow of causality thus moves 
from the economic onto the political arena, which producer groups must successfully 
capture. 
To the best of my knowledge, no such works directly engaged with public sector wage 
setting. However, within this sub-field, the literature on dualization and liberalisation of 
Germany’s labour markets and industrial relations bears interesting insights (Baccaro 
and Benassi 2016; Hassel 2014; Thelen 2014). Faced with the problem of increased 
competition in international markets, German industrial relations, it has been argued, 
have gone through a process of dualization which led to an unprecedented insider-
outsider division between a manufacturing core and the remaining service economy 
which was subjected to cost cutting and liberalisation measures (Hassel 2014). Stable 
and cooperative industrial relations between capital and labour have been maintained in 
the core manufacturing export sector where firms “appreciate the advantages of dealing 
with strong and unified bargaining partners” and have retained a “continued 
commitment … to traditional institutions and social partnership” (Thelen 2014, 47-58). 
Employers in the export sector have thus defended industry-wide bargaining and 
preserved peaceful relationships with strong unions to keep distributional conflicts “off 
the shop floor” and obtain flexibility within the existing bargaining structures (e.g. 
through short time work to avoid layoffs). At the plant level, cross-class cooperative 
relationships have become stronger through firm-level cooperation between managers 
and the works councils who share a strong interest in the firm’s success. 
Liberalisation trends have instead led to the erosion of wage bargaining institutions and 
unionisation rates in the service sector, leading to a process of dualization through drift 
whereby labour compensation in services has declined remarkably vis-à-vis wages in 
the export core, leading to the increase of income inequality in Germany (Thelen 2014, 
54-58). Hassel (2014) argues that liberalisation in services is functional to 
strengthening coordination and competitiveness in the export core. Baccaro and 
Benassi (2016) argue that, in fact, the export sector has “thrived at the expense of real 
wage stagnation” in labour-intensive service sectors. They posit that, since exports of 
machinery and transportation equipment (the engines of the German export industry) 
have become price-sensitive, producers’ groups in the export sector have set in motion 
a process of cost reductions and liberalisations necessary to maintain cost and price 
competitiveness in international markets. Slightly in contrast with the other views, they 
argue that processes of erosion and liberalisation have occurred also in the 
manufacturing core. The resulting wage restraint has spurred a transformation of the 
German economy into an export-led growth model (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016). At 
any rate, these authors seem to agree that this process of liberalisation at the margins 
has been driven by producer coalitions of export-oriented firms and core workers’ 
representatives. These specific dynamics in German industrial relations should be seen 
in the context of a more generalised process of liberalisation in European industrial 
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relations which has increased employers’ discretion pushing unions on the defensive 
(Baccaro and Howell 2011; 2017).  
Although these works entirely disregard the public sector in their treatments of the 
service sector, some implications can nevertheless be derived but must not be directly 
imputed to these scholars. Following the logic of the argument, one may remain under 
the impression that, as an alternative explanation, wage restraint in the German public 
sector could be a by-product of the necessity of the manufacturing export sector to 
prevent domestic inflation (of ULCs and of prices) which erodes REER 
competitiveness in world markets. In fact, Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) do not shy 
away from advancing this type of argument in their interpretation of the German case. 
An explanation of this kind would conform to the classic “production profile 
explanation” in CPE whereby social groups in key economic sectors mobilise and 
apply pressures to capture governments and obtain policies which conform to their 
economic interests.  
From the analysis of these scholars’ insights, one can indirectly derive what could be 
called the “export-sector domination hypothesis”. It is interesting to notice in this 
respect that similar arguments will be shown to be at the core of institutionalist CPE 
approaches to German industrial relations reviewed below (sub-section 3.4). We would 
thus be better off understanding these types of arguments as complementary. In fact, 
the “export-sector domination hypothesis” and “the pattern bargaining hypothesis” 
shall be thought of as two facets of the same overarching dynamic. More precisely, 
institutionalist works in CPE have, through the study of labour market institutions, 
worked out the alleged institutional mechanism through which interests-based CPE 
accounts claim the dominance of the export sector elite in the German political 
economy. In fact, both arguments would buy into the fact that, export sector 
domination in the German economy takes place in the industrial relations arena via 
inter-sectoral coordination of wage bargaining. According to this line of argument, 
negative inflationary spill overs in the public sector are prevented via inter-sectoral 
wage co-ordination led by the export sector. Through this institutional mechanism, a 
self-interested cross-class coalition in the export sector constitutes a sort of “dominant 
social bloc” capable of imposing its export-related interests over processes and 
outcomes of public sector wage setting. Thus, pattern bargaining shall the understood 
as the instrument (or the mechanism) through which a dominant elite in the export 
sector yields control over the Germany political economy. 
While thoroughly informative, a key drawback of this literature is that the segments of 
the service sector which they refer to are the “low-end services” (retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants, other personal services) (Baccaro and Benassi 2016, 102). The dualization 
literature tends to either fully neglect the public sector or to treat it in the same way as 
the “low-end services”. This neglects the fact that the public sector is the biggest sector 
of the economy which remains under more or less direct control of political employers. 
It is a sector which features on average more skilled employment, high collective 
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bargaining coverage and trade unions’ density rates (Bordogna and Pedersini 2013). 
Besides, millions of public workers, next to providing essential public goods to the 
community, have also the capacity to sanction their political employers’ decision 
through the ballot box. Thus, the public sector is not akin to the low-end services. 
3.3 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Industrial relations is a field characterised most prominently by a concern for the 
classic subject matter of trade unions. It is a discipline with a natural tendency to focus 
most prominently on the labour/unions’ side
15
. Actor-centred studies have focused on 
topics like the formation and reproduction of trade unions, their internal and external 
structures, unions’ strategies and their effect on business, the economy and society 
(Boxall 2008; Fiorito and Jarley 2008). Another dominant topic has been the study of 
industrial conflict, its origins, its explanatory factors and the implications for the 
political and economic system (Crouch and Pizzorno 1978). Scholars have tried to 
measure the number of industrial disputes, the number of workers going on strike and 
the total number of working days lost during conflicts with the employers (Edwards 
and Hyman 1994; Shalev 1992). Unions’ collective identity and its political 
significance in the context of industrial conflicts has been analysed by Pizzorno (1978). 
Other significant topics in the literature include the effects and determinants of 
collective bargaining structures (Flanagan 2008) and patterns of institutional change 
therein (Glassner, Keune, and Marginson 2011; Marginson 2015; Sisson and 
Marginson 2002). Surely, employers’ strategies, resources and organisations have been 
analysed both from a theoretical and comparative perspective (Traxler 2004; 2008). Yet 
rarely can one find industrial relations scholars interested in the public sector, let alone 
the public employers. Most of the studies analyse developments in the nature and 
evolution of actors, organisations and institutions in the private sector, taking 
predominantly the trade unions’ side as central focus of the analysis. As argued by 
Keller (2005a), labour relations in the public sector is a “traditionally ignored topic” in 
German industrial relations studies, and beyond. 
The classic and most influential industrial relations model, the one developed by 
Dunlop (1993 (1958)), was a system which conceived of three actors, namely the 
collectively organised workers, employers and state bureaucracies. These actors would 
interact within a “web of rules” governing their relationships under the influence of 
three key external factors: technology improvements, product and factor markets and 
the distribution of power in the wider society. The model has been highly criticised for 
two reasons which, exactly for present purposes, make it unfit for the study of public 
sector industrial relations. Dunlop’s critics have pointed at his model’s determinism 
and have rejected his hypothesis of technological change as the primary driver of 
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convergence of industrial relations systems across countries. Furthermore, scholars 
have criticised his understanding of the industrial relations system as a “discrete sub-
system” detached from politics and governments’ policies (Heery 2008). Indeed, a 
model based on technological change as a key factor structuring industrial relations 
appears immediately unfit to study the public sector. The essential services-to-the-
people (e.g. education, care, social work, etc.) which are produced by public 
employees, in fact, necessitate human interactions that cannot easily be the object of 
major productivity-enhancing technological change (Baumol and Bowen 1965; 1966). 
Furthermore, a discrete distinction between the industrial relations system and the 
political arena cannot, by definition, be made if the public employer is the state’s 
sovereign authority. 
The role of the state in industrial relations has without doubt interested industrial 
relations scholars. It has been argued by some that States are not neutral actors in 
industrial relations (Howell 2005). In his study of the British trade union movement 
Howell argues that unions’ power, membership and strategies were primarily shaped 
not by technological change or the market context but rather from the policies of the 
British government. On a similar vein, in a more recent work, Howell (2016) argues 
that States have become more interventionist in industrial relations so as to favour the 
liberalisation of employment relations institutions. The way in which the state 
intervenes in industrial relations has been theorised by different scholars. Traxler 
(1999, 57) identifies three ways through which the state intervenes in industrial 
relations: it is itself an employer in the public sector; it makes the laws which regulate 
working conditions; it defines and regulates the formal framework for industrial 
relations. Hyman (2008, 264) classifies seven key respects in which the state affects 
national industrial relations regimes: as an employer in its own right; through defining 
and delimiting the status of other actors and the rules of the game; by legislating 
individual employment rights; by shaping the labour market through macroeconomic 
management; through supply-side labour market policies; through the maintenance of 
the welfare state; through the matrix of ideas of citizenship and the rights linked to it.  
Thus the role of the state as a public employer has been acknowledged in the literature. 
Masters et al. (2008) develop a theoretical framework for the study of the state as an 
employer. They point at the central role of public financing as mediating factor in 
public sector industrial relations and the fact that environmental contexts of different 
sorts (economic, political-legal, social-demographic, technological) influence public 
employers’ governance decisions. However, they mainly focus on privatisations and 
outsourcing dynamics as drivers behind the downsizing of the public sector, i.e. they do 
not put their framework into action. Similarly, Ferner (1994) concentrates on the state 
as employer but mostly in the context of state restructuring along the lines of NPM 
reforms. Empirical studies on public employers have not followed. A noteworthy 
exception is the comparative study of public sector employment regimes by Gottschall 
et al. (2015). They provide both a cross-country statistical analysis and in-depth 
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comparative case studies of various sub-sectors (Energy Regulatory agencies, waste 
collection and the Police) in Germany, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Their 
findings are interesting. In terms of public employment, contrary to the usual claim of 
state downsizing, they find only minor reductions in both common law and civil law 
countries while even a slight increase in public employment in the Scandinavian 
countries. Governments’ employment compensation as percent of GDP is found to be 
on a slight declining path overall, indicating that many governments have been able to 
contain wage increases and stabilise public employment. Regarding employment 
regulation and personnel policies, they find that the three countries analysed have been 
reforming in the direction of the UK model based on private law regulation of public 
employment, position-based recruitment and performance-related pay and promotion – 
although with cross-country and cross-sectoral variations. 
These types of analyses focused especially on trajectories of institutional change and 
state transformations have been at the core of a sub-field within industrial relations 
studies. Here scholars have extensively focused on public sector employment and 
industrial relations. What this literature rightly stresses is the distinctiveness of the 
public sector and its own logics and historical trajectories. A central theme revolves 
around the study of reforms inspired by the NPM agenda. Similar to debates taking 
place in private sector industrial relations (Katz and Darbishire 2000) and CPE (Crouch 
and Streeck 1997; Yamamura and Streeck 2003), researchers in comparative public 
sector employment relations began to ask whether patterns of convergence across 
national institutional systems can be observed also in the public sector (Bach and 
Bordogna 2011; Bach et al. 1999; Bach and Della Rocca 2000; Pollitt 2005; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2017; 2011; Pollitt and Dan 2011). 
As a reform agenda, NPM emerged out of a more general shift from a Keynesian to a 
monetarist macroeconomic regime which brought with it a shift toward market-driven 
public services (Bach and Bordogna 2016, 6). Given pressures from producers to 
maintain lean taxation regimes under the now-credible threat of relocation (Schäfer and 
Streeck 2013) and due to the decline of the spectacular rates of economic growth which 
had characterised the Golden Age of post-war capitalism (Crafts and Toniolo 1996; 
Eichengreen 2008, Ch. 9), nation States found themselves increasingly confronted with 
the crisis of the tax state (Streeck 2011) and concerned with the sustainability of public 
finances. The incapability of raising sufficient revenues to meet the requirements of 
generous welfare States and the need to avoid harsh political confrontation with the 
recipients of these services made the politics of the welfare state a matter of great 
salience (Pierson 2001). Although originating in liberal market economies (UK, USA, 
Australia and New Zealand), during the 1980/90s the NPM paradigm spread among 
policy makers across the advanced world, sponsored by the OECD and consulting firms 
(Bach and Della Rocca 2000). Needless to say, the idea of making the public sector 
more efficient and effective by simply making it more similar to the private sector, 
found fertile soil with policy makers in need to reduce the size and control the cost of 
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the public sector. NPM was hailed as a way to cope with the fiscal crisis of the state 
(Barzelay and Gallego 2006) and as a “useful myth” to underpin processes of 
institutional isomorphism (Pollitt 2001).  
The key tenet of the NPM reform agenda is to eliminate the distinctiveness of the 
public sector through the adoption of techniques, practices and values prevalent in the 
business sector (Hood 1995). In terms of public sector employment relations, national 
systems came to be challenged by dynamics of privatisation and marketization which 
aimed to make public employment similar to the private sector and expose public 
organisations to competition, incentive structures and accountability for results. 
Notwithstanding similar pressures for convergence, scholars in comparative public 
employment relations continue to highlight the resilience and distinctiveness of public 
sector employment systems. Variation across countries and in different parts of the 
public sector continues to remain (Alonso, Clifton, and Díaz-Fuentes 2015), even with 
regard to dynamics of public services outsourcing (Mori 2017) and in spite of the 
pressure exerted on public sectors by the austerity measures which followed the 
financial crisis (Bach and Bordogna 2016). In general terms, thus, scholars seem to 
agree that legal, institutional and administrative factors have exerted – and continue to 
exert – a considerable impact on national trajectories of reform. These reforms have 
been mediated by national path dependencies and have, at best, resulted in processes of 
institutional change though layering whereby new elements of the NPM agenda were 
added to old structures (Bach and Bordogna 2011), often with perverse unintended 
consequences (Bordogna 2008). 
By way of conclusion, the study of British public sector industrial relations by 
Beaumont (1992) must be mentioned as the queen exception in the field. It is the first 
and foremost study of public sector industrial relations in a meaningful sense. It 
included the study of political and fiscal factors shaping the adoption of wage policies, 
while analysing the government as a public employer. Beaumont highlighted the 
political environment and the role of strategic choice by the government in public 
sector industrial relations. Public employers, he argues, are motivated not only by 
concerns for employment relations, but especially by values and macroeconomic 
considerations. Beaumont argued that the state should not be seen as “just a neutral 
representative of the public or social interest in industrial relations” but rather as a 
“separate, self-interested party in the industrial relations arena” with a degree of 
“relative autonomy which increases considerably in periods of economic crisis” (1992, 
15). Emphasis was put on the fact that, during the 1980s in Britain, major changes in 
public sector industrial relations and wage policies resulted from governments’ 
strategies for macroeconomic stabilisation. In fact, Margaret Thatcher’s fight against 
inflation, of which public sector wage restraint was part, had little to do with narrow 
labour-related considerations. In this context, the government sought to enforce wage 
restraint via restrictive public sector incomes policies with the purpose of deflating the 
economy and to provide an example of wage restraint to the private sector. When 
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studying in detail the institutions and processes proper of the British public 
employment Beaumont thus concludes that “the direct role of economic forces in 
public sector wage determination is fairly limited” (1992, 142) due to the remoteness of 
product market forces, the difficulty of measuring productivity in many parts of the 
public sector and most importantly the different ability to pay which characterises 
public and private employers. The precious insights of Beaumont’s work will be 
embraced in the analytical framework developed in chapter 4. I now turn to works 
within the tradition of institutionalist CPE. 
3.4 INSTITUTIONALIST COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY  
Institutions-oriented explanatory approaches in CPE tend to assign the primary causal 
factors behind given phenomena to the organisational structures of the political 
economy. The attention to political institutions is a longstanding feature of the study of 
politics and, also in comparative analysis of capitalism, it has constituted the mainstay 
of the CPE discipline (Clift 2014 Ch. 5). Scholars in the institutionalist tradition 
emphasize how institutional differences across national, regional, or sectoral systems 
result in distinctive patterns of economic performance and policy (P.A. Hall 1997, 
180). Thus, key to the institutional approach is the necessity to show both “which 
institutions matter and how they matter” (P.A. Hall and Taylor 1996) in order to 
demonstrate how structural variables or organisational features play a causal role in 
shaping the strategies and goals actors pursue and the decision making process (Thelen, 
Longstreth, and Steinmo 1992). 
Institutionalist approaches to the study of wage policies have been at the core of CPE 
since its very inception, in the 1960s. The link between CPE and wage bargaining 
institutions was established already in Andrew Shonfield’s “modern capitalism” who 
conducted a comparison between the Swedish and the Dutch experiences with 
centralised wage bargaining (Shonfield 1965, Ch. 9, Sections 2-3). Shonfield noticed 
that centralised wage bargaining between peak organisations in Sweden was conducive 
to egalitarian practices of wage solidarity which reduced wage dispersion across 
different sectors of the economy. In the Netherlands, the government purposefully 
intervened in wage bargaining by setting artificially low wage ceilings (by decree law) 
aimed at keeping wages below those of their Western-European competitors. 
Since then, various theoretical innovations have been developed by scholars working at 
the crossroad between CPE and industrial relations. During the 1970/80s, scholars 
focused on neo-corporatist wage bargaining institutions capable of incorporating 
responsible organised groups in processes of centralised economic policy making 
(Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1979; Schmitter 1974; Streeck and Kenworthy 2005). This, 
it was found, was conducive not only to lower inflation and unemployment rates 
(Bruno and Sachs 1985; Crouch 1990a; Tarantelli 1986), but also to the quiescence of 
the labour force (Cameron 1984). Calmfors and Driffill (1988) added at a later stage 
 
 
56 
that better macroeconomic performances could be obtained not only via centralised 
wage bargaining between peak associations, but also in fully decentralised systems 
with firm-level bargaining in atomistic labour markets. In his critique of wage 
bargaining centralisation, Soskice (1990) influentially maintained that rather than the 
locus of wage bargaining, what matters for successful macroeconomic policy making is 
effective inter-sectoral wage co-ordination across different bargaining units in the 
economy. Garrett and Way (1999) then suggested that when public sector unions 
capture peak level confederations, wage bargaining tends to create inflationary 
externalities that are conducive to worse economic performance. On a similar vein it 
has been argued that economy-wide wage coordination, when led by the sectors 
exposed to international competition, outperforms other wage bargaining arrangements 
under a system of fixed exchange rates (Traxler and Brandl 2012; 2010). This is 
because trade unions in the sheltered sector do not immediately bear the consequences 
of above-productivity wage gains. Given that employers in these sectors are shielded 
from international competition, they can pass wage increases on to consumers in the 
form of higher prices without losing market shares (Crouch 1990b). 
During the 1990s, wage bargaining started to be studied also in conjunction with 
monetary policy and the role of independent and conservative
16
 central banks. These 
were the days in which delegating monetary policy to a non-majoritarian institution 
ranked high among economists’ policy proposals to curtail politicians’ opportunistic 
behaviour at the expense of the taxpayers’ community (Alesina and Gatti 1995; Alesina 
and Tabellini 1988; Cukierman 1992; Persson and Tabellini 1993). While joining the 
debate, political economists argued that independent central banks could produce lower 
inflation, without the cost of higher unemployment, only in interaction with co-
ordinated wage bargaining across the economy (P.A. Hall 1994; P.A. Hall and Franzese 
1998; Scharpf 1991; Soskice and Iversen 1998). The rationale behind the argument 
built on the institutionalisation of a particular signalling game between wage setters and 
the central bank. The model example on the basis of which the argument was originally 
formulated was the German Bundesbank, yet the general logic runs through the 
following elements. Independence enhances the credibility of the central bank by 
freeing macroeconomic adjustment from electoral considerations. Conservatism is 
required so that the central bank reacts directly and decisively to deviations from its 
inflation target. Signalling is necessary to communicate the central Bank’s intended 
strategy and it is made more effective in interaction with co-ordinated wage bargaining 
because the central bank engages in interactions with just one economy-wide 
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inflation aversion of the central bank in the central bank loss function). An inflation-averse central bank 
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coordinated wage settlement to which the other wage setters in the economy are 
subdued.  
Thus, given that the wage settlement applies to the whole economy, wage setters are 
not left in much doubt that in case of inflationary wage setting the independent and 
conservative central bank will act as gate keeper and react by tightening monetary 
policy prompting higher unemployment and the appreciation of the exchange rate. 
Since export-oriented wage setters are particularly damaged by such reaction, by 
conducting the pilot agreement in the economy they internalise the effects of an 
inflationary behaviour and frame their wage requests in such a way to avoid the 
reaction of the central bank. This is usually done, they claimed, via exchange of 
information on the fundamentals of the domestic and international economy between 
the principal negotiators and with the central bank. 
In terms of the interaction between traded sector and public sector’s wage setting vis-à-
vis monetary policy, Franzese (2001, 105) argued that “central-bank independence, 
coordinated wage/price-bargaining, dominant traded sectors and dominated public 
sectors are generally substitutes in producing low inflation and complements in 
producing low unemployment”. In other words, “(C)oordinated bargaining most 
reduces unemployment when traded-sector actors dominate public-sector actors, 
especially when monetary policy is controlled by a conservative and credibly 
independent central bank” (Franzese 2001, 141). One can clearly see how interests-
based and institutions-based approaches mingle together within the Varieties of 
Capitalism inspired research agenda of CPE. 
At any rate, a theoretical problem then emerged when, with the creation of the EMU in 
1999, monetary policy was delegated to the supranational level. Given the incapability 
of the ECB to selectively punish domestic wage setters, scholars questioned the 
capacity of the new monetary regime to produce wage restraint in the absence of pan-
European wage coordination (P.A. Hall and Franzese 1998; Soskice and Iversen 1998). 
During the 1990s, in fact, two mechanisms had been at work to ensure that wage setters 
would internalise the inflationary effects of their actions (Hancké and Soskice 2003). 
The first was related to the signalling game between central banks and wage setters, as 
described. The second was the process of monetary integration in Europe and the hard 
fiscal constraints the Maastricht treaty imposed on wage setters and governments. As a 
matter of fact, candidates were required not to exceed the average inflation rate of the 
countries with the three lowest inflation rates plus 1.5%. This challenge was met by 
countries via lower nominal wages increases engineered either via coordinated wage 
bargaining or via tripartite social pacts (Hancké and Rhodes 2005). Unions, employers 
and governments converged behind the common goal of deflating their economies to 
join the EMU. In the single currency, however, both incentives and constraints 
disappeared, institutionalizing a new idiosyncratic wage setting environment with no 
incentives for restraint. 
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As a result, the shared expectation emerged that EMU would institutionalise a more 
inflationary setting due to three factors: the breakdown of the domestic interactions 
between central banks and wage setters; the lack of a pan-European infrastructure 
capable of replicating wage coordination at the supranational level; the unlikelihood of 
significant structural reforms which would decentralise wage bargaining to the firm 
level and make labour markets more flexible. The predictions of CPE scholars, 
however, did not become reality during the first decade of the EMU. Across-the-board 
inflation did not occur and the Eurozone taken as a whole has shown an orderly decade. 
The ECB was able to meet its inflation target (see also Carlin and Soskice 2014, 432-
33) and, ironically, Germany has gone through an unprecedented trajectory of wage 
restraint in the private and especially in its public sector (Müller and Schulten 2015).  
During the good times of the Euro the study of wage setting dynamics was somehow 
side-lined only to acquire again centre stage again after the crisis, when scholars 
identified structural divergence of wage setting as one of the main culprit behind the 
sovereign debt crisis. Rather than across-the-board inflation, in the monetary union the 
policy problem became the intra-EMU divergence in wage setting outcomes. Two 
blocs have emerged whereby the Northern countries, capable of maintaining wage 
restraint after EMU accession, have enjoyed REER competitiveness and trade 
surpluses. The countries of the EMU periphery, due to inflationary wage setting, have 
gradually lost competitiveness vis-à-vis their trading partners and accumulated trade 
deficits until the sovereign debt crisis hit them (P.A. Hall 2012; Iversen and Soskice 
2013; Scharpf 2011). Some have maintained that the very functioning of EMU is 
endangered by the divergence of ULCs and the resulting trade deficits, denouncing the 
poisonous pattern of wage restraint in Germany (Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2015; 2013). 
In effect, Germany has undergone a sustained internal devaluation vis-à-vis its Euro 
partners. Surprised by the unexpected restraint and by the overall pattern of wage 
divergence between the two blocs, scholars have brought the old institutionalist insights 
on wage bargaining back to life. 
Johnston and Hancke (2009) adopted a dual-sector approach to re-consider the 
interactions between exposed and sheltered sector wage setting in the absence of 
national monetary policy
17
. In explaining structural divergence among EMU members 
they point at the key role of heterogeneous wage bargaining institutions. Countries 
which have successfully managed to tame wage inflation in the sheltered sector also 
avoided negative spill overs on the competitiveness of the exposed sector. By enjoying 
lower inflationary pressures, these countries benefitted from a more advantageous 
REER, gaining competitiveness and piling up trade surpluses as a result. The key of the 
argument is that core countries of EMU enjoy an institutional comparative advantage in 
the production of wage restraint. This is thanks to wage bargaining institutions which 
                                                                
17
 Several other works have developed very similar arguments. See e.g. Johnston (2012), Johnston and 
Regan (2014). 
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ensure effective inter-sectoral wage coordination needed to tamper inflationary 
pressures in the sheltered parts of the economy. 
Hancké (2013) argues that in the export sector wage setters are prevented from opting 
for inflationary wage setting by concerns of competitiveness in the international 
markets. Thus, ULCs in the tradable sector remained stable. In the sheltered sector, for 
which the public sector is taken as a proxy, such pressures are absent, paving the way 
for unrestrained claims on wage settlements. The key intervening variable for the 
transmission of wage moderation from the exposed to the sheltered sector is the type of 
inter-sectoral co-ordination in the wage setting system. Two main mechanisms are 
identified. One is state led co-ordination and the other is export-sector led inter-sectoral 
co-ordination, i.e. pattern bargaining (e.g. Germany). In a similar analysis Höpner and 
Lutter (2014) agreed with the overall findings but pointed at the fact that there has 
actually been variance in ULCs also within the export sectors of the countries which 
lack effective intra-sectoral wage coordination institutions (e.g. Italy). 
So far, I have reconstructed the intellectual origins of the study of wage setting in CPE. 
The review of the literature demonstrates that CPE is mostly a discipline with the 
export sector at its core. Unfortunately, CPE is a discipline which suffers from a severe 
export-sector bias. The public sector, and the state, is either ignored or, to the extent 
that it is studied, it is merely looked at to show what types of institutional mechanisms 
have the export-sector wage setters devised to successfully dominate the rent-seeking 
actors in the sheltered sector. All the public sector actors can do in this world is merely 
to be undisciplined and extract rents. Seen from this perspective, CPE does not seem to 
differ much in scope from the public choice school in economics. 
3.5 TESTING THE RIVAL HYPOTHESIS: DOES EXPORT-LED PATTERN BARGAINING EXPLAIN 
WAGE RESTRAINT IN THE GERMAN PUBLIC SECTOR
18
? 
The explanation advanced in the literature to directly account for the pattern of wage 
restraint in the German public sector consists of the pattern bargaining hypothesis. 
According to this argument, unions in the export industries – usually the metalworking 
sector or the chemical sector – act as the first negotiators in the yearly bargaining 
season. Their wage settlements take concerns for export competitiveness into 
consideration. Wage requests are usually set so as to equal the increase in the labour 
productivity of the total economy plus projected inflation (Johnston and Hancke 2009, 
617). Once this competitiveness-oriented wage norm has been established at the 
beginning of the yearly negotiating round, the pattern is then transferred to the other 
bargaining units in the German economy, ensuring across-the-board wage restraint. 
Public sector wage setters “shadow” the wage increases in the export industry and this 
                                                                
18
 This section draws extensively from a paper of mine which I have published elsewhere. See Di Carlo 
(2018a).  
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prevents wage setting in the public sector from overshooting. A pattern of wage 
restraint, modelled on the needs of entrepreneurs and workers in the export sector, 
allegedly comes to be transferred exogenously into the wage-setting of public employees. 
To test the validity of the pattern bargaining hypothesis, I perform a battery of basic 
hoop tests. In the social sciences, hoop tests belong to the realm of testing theories 
through observation and case studies. The investigator infers predictions from a theory. 
She then observes the data and asks whether observations are congruent with 
predictions (Van Evera 1997). Hoop tests are particularly suited to verifying the 
validity of theories, given that they consist of predictions of necessary conditions with 
high certitude: if the predictions fail the test of empirical evidence, the theory should be 
rejected (Bennett 2010; Mahoney 2012). I construct the battery of tests in such a way 
that each test taken alone is meant to be necessary but not sufficient to reject the thesis. 
Instead, all the tests taken together should give us the high degree of confidence 
sufficient to reject it. I proceed by making explicit and clearly formulated predictions 
which I then test against pertinent empirical evidence. 
Prediction 1: If, as prescribed by the export-sector-driven pattern bargaining explanation, the 
contracts of the export industries act as the pilot agreement (the pacesetter), we should expect to 
see that, during yearly negotiations, the metalworking or the chemical wage contracts are 
signed before the public sector contract, which they are supposed to influence. 
To perform the most adequate observation for Prediction 1, I have collected the dates of 
the signatures of the wage agreements in three key sectors of the German economy: the 
public sector (öffentlicher Dienst), the metalworking industry (Metallindustrie), and the 
chemical industry (chemische Industrie). Unions in these sectors are the actors who have 
the capacity to be independent wage bargainers (Streeck 1994, 125) in the German 
industrial relations system. Also, taken together, these three sectors constitute the core of 
the export industry and of the sheltered services. The period analysed is 1991–2016. 
Data comes from the WSI’s Tarifarchiv and is organised in the table shown in appendix 
(B) at the end of the dissertation. During the period 1991–2016, for 11 years out of 26 
the public sector contract is, in fact, the first negotiated contract in the wage bargaining 
season. When taking into account years in which contracts were not negotiated because 
of the longer duration of previous agreements, the net years in which other contracts 
have preceded and possibly influenced the public sector contracts are three for the 
chemical contracts and six for the metalworking contracts. These are slightly too few 
instances out of the 26 years analysed to maintain that pattern bargaining is at work. As 
a result, this observation seems to be incongruent with the prediction from the pattern 
bargaining hypothesis. 
Prediction 2: If pattern bargaining were present in Germany and followed the logic of similar 
percentage increases, we should expect to find the concatenation of the wage agreements in 
the export and public sectors. 
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I operationalise such a test by expecting co-variation in the percentage change in export 
and public sector wage-setting. What can be observed is that the co-variation of wages 
in the manufacturing and public sectors – in terms of similar percentage increases – has 
weakened decisively in Germany. Interestingly, over the long run (1971–2007) the 
correlation holds (r² = 0.85). The colour gradation of the dots in figure 6 (shading from 
darker to lighter grey) also indicates the gradual shift over time from a regime of high 
wage increases (1970s and 1980s) to a regime of very modest ones through the 1990s 
and early 2000s (bottom left side in panel a). A careful look at the decade 1997–2007, 
shown in panel b, indicates the collapse of pattern bargaining in Germany (from r² = 
0.85 to r² = 0.18). In fact, the correlation breaks apart from 1996 onwards. The 
observation appears incongruent with the prediction of the theory. Furthermore, since 
pattern bargaining unravels right before the start of the EMU, and correlations are 
extremely weak during the first decade of the EMU, I arrive at the conclusion that 
pattern bargaining, as a specific type of inter-sectoral wage coordination observable 
through similar patterns of wage increases in manufacturing and the public services, 
was not present. Hence, it cannot possibly account for wage restraint in the German 
public sector during the first decade of the EMU. 
Figure 6: Correlation between wage increases (% change) in manufacturing and public services in 
Germany (1971-2007) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, September 2017 release. 
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Prediction 3: If pattern bargaining were to tame inflationary pressures from the public sector, 
we would expect to observe, over a two-decade time horizon, that the trajectory of wage 
increases in the public sector tends to outstrip – or at least closely follow – that of the 
manufacturing sector. This damaging dynamic is exactly what the pattern bargaining type of 
inter-sectoral wage-setting institution is allegedly supposed to repress. 
To make the observation on this prediction, I construct indexes of the trajectories of 
wage increases in manufacturing, the chemical sector and public services. I plot them 
against a so-called pattern bargaining benchmark. I also add the trajectory of wage 
growth in the total economy. As explained in the literature, wage-setters in the export 
industry would opt for a wage request calculated on the basis of labour productivity in 
the total economy plus projected inflation. I construct the pattern bargaining benchmark 
through a composite index of labour productivity in the whole economy (from EU 
KLEMS data) and the consumer price index (from World Bank data).  
Figure 7 shows the growing dualization of the German economy taking place since the 
mid-1990s. On the one hand, wage increases in the chemical and manufacturing sectors 
have kept up with the long-term trend of average productivity and inflation. On the 
other, the trajectory of wage growth in the German public sector starts to diverge 
downwards since approximately 1994/1995. By the mid-2000s the trajectory of public 
sector wage growth has significantly fallen behind that of average wages in the 
economy. Indeed, if originally pattern bargaining in Germany worked to redistribute 
productivity gains from the most productive industries in the economy to the least 
productive ones (Streeck 1994), this seems not to be the case anymore after 
reunification. Wage increases in manufacturing and the chemical sector have 
consistently outstripped those across the whole economy. Industrial wages, it seems, 
were not so much anchored to average productivity in the economy but, most likely, 
benchmarked to their own higher industrial productivity gains. Growth in public sector 
wages, on the other hand, is severely penalised – even more than the average wage 
growth in the total economy.  
There is, in other words, a marked and steady compression in the growth of public 
sector wages. Over the period 1991-2010 workers in public services have been barely 
compensated for the change in the cost of living (figure 8) and increasing disparities 
have emerged among the different sectors of the German economy. This is in line with 
the findings of the dualization literature reviewed above. To that, this exercise has 
added the observation that the increasing dualization process has affected also the 
German public sector and not only the low-end services. 
In all, it can be concluded that the pattern bargaining hypothesis cannot account for 
wage restraint in the German public sector. Since the mid-1990s a decoupling of wage 
setting between manufacturing and the public sector has occurred. The marked 
divergence between the two sectors can certainly not be attributed to the exuberance of 
undisciplined public sector wage setters – which a pattern bargaining type of inter-
sectoral wage coordination is supposed to repress. Rather to the contrary, public sector 
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wages have been subjected to a substantial downward adjustment. Data signals that this 
adjustment starts in the mid-1990s and is prolonged throughout the 2000s. In the 2000s 
the index of public sector wage growth flattens out.  
Figure 7: Indexes (1991=100) of nominal hourly wages in Germany in the export industries, the total 
economy, and the public sector, vis-à-vis the pattern bargaining index (1991-2010) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, September 2017 release. 
These observations suggest that there must have been other factors which the pattern 
bargaining theory has missed and which have contributed to produce this pattern of 
restraint. Indeed, when getting familiar with the economic history of post-reunification 
Germany, one cannot avoid hypothesizing that the observed pattern is more likely to 
resemble a real fiscal adjustment rather than a process of inter-sectoral wage 
coordination. On the basis of the performed hoop tests I reach the final judgement that 
the pattern bargaining theory cannot be deemed valid to explain wage restraint in the 
German public sector during the period at stake. I thus move toward the search for an 
alternative explanation. 
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Figure 8: Cumulative wage gains* of workers in selected macro-sectors of the German economy vis-à-
vis price inflation (1991-2010) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, September 2017 release. 
*Gains expressed as cumulative percentage wage increases as of 2010 vis-à-vis 1991. 
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CHAPTER 4. Toward a state-centred institutionalist framework for 
the study of public sector wage setting 
This chapter is theoretical nature. Its function is to introduce a state-centred 
institutionalist approach to the study of public sector wage setting. It builds on actor-
centred institutionalism in political science. In sub-section 4.1 I present the key features 
of this theoretical approach and discuss why it is to be preferred to a comparative 
historical analysis (CHA) approach. In sub-section 4.2 and 4.3 I introduce the key 
policy actors engaged in the adoption of public sector wage policy and discuss their 
peculiarities vis-à-vis their private sector counterparts. I discuss first the nature and role 
of the public employers as “sovereign” state actors in their function of public sector 
wage setters. Subsequently, I deal with the labour side to understand the peculiarities of 
public sector’s trade unionism and their “political” power resources. Sub-section 4.4 
introduces a “static” analytical framework for the study of public sector wage setting 
which theorises the state as an institutional contextualisation within which these actors 
adopt wage policy. Lastly, sub-section 4.5 offers a more “dynamic” understanding of 
public sector wage setting by linking actors and structure to the politics of fiscal policy. 
Drawing on Gourevitch (1986, 54), it argues that “(T)o explain economic policy 
choices, we need to link policy outcomes to politics.” 
4.1 FOUNDATIONS OF THEORY-GUIDED PROCESS TRACING: STATE-CENTRED 
INSTITUTIONALISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACH 
Institutional approaches in comparative policy research may be divided into problem 
oriented and interaction oriented (Scharpf 1997b). Problem oriented research focuses 
on the analysis of societal problems which policy measures must resolve. Policy 
research of this kind analyses the nature and causes of problems and attempts to assess 
the potential effectiveness/appropriateness of given policy solutions. Interaction 
oriented policy research, instead, concentrates on “the interactions between policy 
makers” and the “conditions that favor or impede their ability to adopt and implement 
those policy responses that problem-oriented analyses have identified as being 
potentially effective” (Scharpf 2000, 763). This dissertation falls within the realm of 
interaction oriented policy research in CPE. 
The analytical framework developed here builds on the precepts of actor-centred 
institutionalism. This approach moves from the assumption that policies are to be 
explained as the outcome of interactions among intentional actors. Policies and actors’ 
interactions are structured by the characteristics of the institutional setting in which 
they take place (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1997b). Differently from Scharpf 
(1997b), the dissertation does not follow a game theoretical approach. I take a more 
 
 
66 
historical approach in line with Gourevitch (1986) and his ambition to uncover 
systematically the political/historical processes through which actors translate their 
material preferences into policy through power. With Gourevitch (1986) I share the 
interest in studying how actors mobilise resources and form political alliances to 
achieve preferred policy outcomes. With Scharpf (1997b) I share the concern to avoid 
merely descriptive historical reconstructions and the necessity to specify an analytical 
framework capable of generating systematic knowledge beyond the unique 
circumstances at hand. Like Gourevitch (1986, 17), I start from the assumption that if a 
governmental policy is to prevail, “it must obtain support from those who have political 
power.” Thus, the dissertation lies in between the interests-based and the institutions-
based approaches in CPE presented in the literature review. 
Actor-centred institutionalism shares various similarities and some differences with the 
comparative-historical approach (CHA) favoured by other scholars in CPE and 
comparative politics (Mahoney and Thelen 2015; Thelen, Longstreth, and Steinmo 
1992). Both tackle “real world puzzles” and aim to produce pragmatic knowledge with 
real world implications. Both share scepticism vis-à-vis the quest for general laws in 
the social sciences and privilege case-based research explaining outcomes which are 
particular in time and space. CHA scholars have made temporal explanations their 
forte. Taking seriously the “temporal structure” of their “temporally oriented” 
explanations is a distinctive feature of this research agenda (Mahoney and Thelen 2015, 
part III; Pierson 2004). While putting less emphasis on time, Scharpf (1997b, 5-10) 
does not ignore the phenomena’s temporal dimension. Temporal structures are 
theorised in the form of sequential non-cooperative games whereby after a first mover, 
other actors make choices in the knowledge of other actors’ previous choices. Both 
approaches share an interest for macro-configurational research in that they analyse 
aggregate cases (e.g. nation States, social movements) and complex organisational and 
institutional arrangements. CHA takes a configurational approach. It explains macro 
outcomes “by examining how variables work together in combinations or causal 
packages” under the assumption that “there is no alternative to analysing the effects of 
causes in light of the context in which they occur” (Mahoney and Thelen 2015, 7-8). 
The configurational approach is shared by actor-centred institutionalists where great 
care is paid to theorizing the characteristics of actors’ constellations and modes of 
interaction which structure the process of policy adoption. 
CHA’s explanations rely prominently on specifying the causal mechanisms “through 
which causes and causal configurations exert effects within particular cases” (Mahoney 
and Thelen 2015, 15). This has worked hand in gloves with the use of a process tracing 
methodology in which the researcher traces systematically the intervening steps 
through which an initial cause leads to a final outcome (P.A. Hall 2013; Mahoney 
2012). While Scharpf (1997b) relies on a game theoretical approach, his famous study 
on the economic policies implemented by social democratic governments during the 
1970/80s demonstrates that actor-centred institutionalism can be combined successfully 
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with the use of causal-process observations and a more historical approach to case 
studies (Scharpf 1991). 
What in my understanding distinguishes the two approaches is the way in which they 
conceive of the relationship between agency and structure – although this separation 
may be less accentuated in practice than it seems in theory. CHA gives explanatory 
predominance to contextual structural features. According to these scholars, the validity 
of macro-level arguments “does not require that they be broken down into individual-
level behaviours” (Mahoney and Thelen 2015, 6). Case studies revolve around 
aggregate cases at the macro and meso-level where structural features of the context not 
only shape the outcomes but also the strategies of individual agents. Actors are not seen 
as all-knowing rational self-oriented maximizers but more as ecologically rational rule-
following satisfiers. Historical empirical analysis then tells us what are actors trying to 
maximise and why they emphasize certain goals over others (Steinmo and Thelen 1992, 
9). Actor-centred institutionalism, as the name suggests, brings actors to the fore. Yet 
actor-centred analysis does not preach methodological individualism. Quite to the 
contrary, it maintains that: 
“public policy is not usually produced by a unitary actor with adequate control over all required 
action resources and a single-minded concern for the public interest. Rather it is likely to result 
from the strategic interaction among several or many policy actors, each with its own 
understanding of the nature of the problem and the feasibility of particular solutions, each with 
its own individual and institutional self-interest and its own normative preference, and each with 
its own capabilities or action resources that may be employed to affect the outcome” (Scharpf 
1997b, 11).  
Actors are not understood as omniscient and fully informed. They form preferences 
through a combination of basic self-interest, normative orientations and identity-based 
factors. Given their understanding of policy as being the result of intentional action, 
actor-centred institutionalists urge researchers to focus on the actors controlling the use 
of policy instruments. However, actors do not act in a vacuum. Policy actors interact 
with other key actors engaged in the policy process and have to mobilise “action 
resources” that enable them to influence the outcome “in certain respects and to a 
certain degree” (Scharpf 1997b, 43). Actor-centred institutionalism requires a thorough 
analysis of the capacity of policy systems to enable/constrain the adoption of policy 
choices. As such, scholars point to the fact that actors’ action resources and the overall 
institutional capacity vary according to the type of policy problem at hand and the 
policies actors strive to adopt. Actor-centred institutionalism thus explains policies via 
actors’ intentional mobilisation of resources for controlling policy instruments, in 
interaction with competing actors and within policy systems. CHA emphasizes more 
the structural side of the process. Actor-centred institutionalists treat institutional 
conditions only as remote causes and actors’ interacting choices as proximate causes 
(Scharpf 2000, 764).  
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In preferring actor-centred institutionalism over CHA I do not wish to suggest that the 
one is better than the other. CHA is a promising theoretical approach for the study of 
macrosocial phenomena. However, the objective of the dissertation is to explain the 
adoption of specific policies in the realm of public sector wage setting, for which a 
purely macro-perspective has little to offer. Actor-centred institutionalism, with its 
policy orientation, seems better equipped for the purpose. Given its focus on actor’s 
interactions, it is especially useful to analyse how the dividedness among policy actors 
is overcome in the implementation of public sector wage policy.  
The type of approach I develop here could be thought of as state-centred. This means 
that, in the analytical framework, I theorise on the state as the arena within which wage 
setting in the public sector takes place. To explain public sector wage policy, I 
emphasize the strategic choices and the interactions of actors within the contours of the 
state and study how the public employers interact among each other and with policy 
actors across civil society (i.e. the trade unions). In aiming to explain public sector 
wage policy from the perspective of state actors, I am most interested in shedding light 
on the conflicts of interest which occur among various types of public employers and 
the trade unions within the institutional architecture of the state.  
One may surely criticise the choice of giving greater emphasis to the public-employers’ 
side. The straightforward criticism to be made, I acknowledge, is that it risks leaving 
the labour side somehow in the background. In making this choice, by no means I wish 
to suggest that trade unions do not matter. They do. Other sub-sections will try to pay 
justice to their peculiarities and during the case study I will analyse when and how 
trade unions and their resources come into play. The choice to focus most prominently 
on the role of the public employers in the determination of public sector wage setting is 
motivated by the central asymmetry of power which characterises public sector 
industrial relations, namely the public employers’ sovereign authority. The 
“unassailable right” of the state to act unilaterally creates a fundamental asymmetry in 
wage bargaining. In theory, state sovereignty means that the public employers have the 
legal capacity to implement legislation to override unions’ opposition. This is an action 
resource which is absent in the private sector and whose use in the public sector has 
been often mentioned by academic works but rarely studied in practice.  
Furthermore, research has been showing the decline of European trade unions (Visser 
1994) and their incapacity to hold out against the employers’ liberalizing offensive in 
the realm of private sector industrial relations (Baccaro and Howell 2011; 2017). 
Unions have been almost everywhere on the defensive. Private employers’ discretion 
has been long on the rise. But what do we know about the public employers? After all, 
the state remains the single biggest employers in every advanced economy (Hyman 
2008). Since the 1980s, all over Europe governments have been very active and directly 
engaged in reforming the state’s collective bargaining machinery to shrink public sector 
labour costs. They have done so by restraining pay and benefits and by curtailing 
employment in concomitance with processes of state restructuring and public 
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management reforms (Ferner 1995). Rolling back the state in the provision of essential 
services to cut public expenditures has been a major preoccupation of virtually all 
governments since the 1980s in the face of fiscal and economic crises (Ferner 1994; 
Oxley et al. 1991). Yet, with the only exception of public sector employment relations 
scholars, the various strands of literature reviewed in this dissertation are silent about 
the role of public employers as state actors. 
Thus, giving the “state” centre stage seems to me justified by the necessity to right 
these gaps in the literature and bring the public sector proper within the radar of CPE 
scholars. Public sector employment relations studies do consider the structure of the 
state in their works. However, these scholars generally study descriptively how 
personnel is employed within the public administration and how wage setting takes 
place within the boundaries of the legal system. Influenced by a Weberian 
understanding of the state, they understand it merely in terms of its modus operandi 
(Hay and Lister 2006), which is to say mostly from an organisational point of view. 
The state is studied only as the administrative employer instead of the governing 
authority of the polity in the exercise of its functions. Furthermore, the whole fiscal 
edifice through which the “continuous operations” of the administrative organisation 
are made possible is often ignored. The public administration – as well as the salaries 
of the staff employed therein – is funded through taxation. This means that the money 
governments spend to fund personnel policies ultimately has to be earmarked in budget 
laws. This is a crucial aspect to which these scholars have paid scant attention. While 
rightly following Weber in the organisational understanding of the state, these scholars 
have forgotten a nuance in Weber’s work: the Steuerstaat (the tax state). Weber was 
well aware of the necessity for the state to acquire the financial resources needed to 
ensure the continuous operations of the administrative machinery through taxation 
(Weber 1978, 351-53). Public sector employment relations scholars have instead 
neglected that public sector wage policy is shaped by the fiscal structure of the state as 
well as the political conflicts revolving around the budget process. 
In this respect, CPE does comparatively worse. Here the state is surprisingly absent. 
The “Varieties of Capitalism” perspective influentially advanced by P. Hall and 
Soskice (2001) and the more recent turn toward “Growth Models” popularised by 
Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) are prominent examples. Both assume that competitive 
pressures facing large firms in the country’s dominant economic sector constitute the 
major factors shaping the institutional setting of the political economy as well as the 
choice of production strategies/growth models pursued. Due to the dominance of firm-
centred and export-sector-centred perspectives, political economists have often negated 
an independent role for the state, both in the polity and in industrial relations. The 
public sector and its political dimension have been ignored. Arguably, both the 
Varieties of Capitalism tradition and the Growth Models approach leave the state in the 
background and assume it as a mere perpetrator of the interests of dominant productive 
classes. In the VoC tradition, it is the interests of firms in the economy that dominates 
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the scene. In the new Growth Models perspective, it is the interests of dominant social 
blocs in key economic sectors that guide overall economic policy. 
This understanding of the state (or worse its neglect) falls prey to the statists’ critique. 
In an attempt to “bring the state back in”, in the 1980s, political scientists emphasized 
the importance of the state as both an actor and a set of institutions (P. Evans, 
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). Skocpol (1979) has rejected the Marxist 
assumption that state actors cannot act in contrast to the material interests of the 
dominant class. On the contrary, she has prominently assigned an autonomous role to 
the state, implying a demarcation between the state – as a self-standing actor and 
structure in the polity – and societal/producer groups. Most importantly, Skocpol 
recognised that the basis of state power lies within its administrative and coercive 
organisations; that the state has its own distinct interests vis-à-vis the dominant social 
groups; and that state organisations have independent agency which is potentially 
autonomous from direct dominant class control (M. Evans 2006, 47-48). 
Thus, with the framework developed, I aim to shed light on the importance of public 
employers as state actors in the determination of public sector wage policy. This 
dissertation embraces fully the statists’ critique according to which the state cannot be 
reduced to the status of a puppet at the mercy of producer’s groups in dominant 
economic sectors of the economy. This is especially so because the state is composed 
of a set of heterogeneous actors and institutions. The set of heterogeneous actors which 
operate within the state are not neutral and indifferent to the determination of wage 
policy. So the state is not a monolithic bloc capable of frictionless unitary action. To 
the contrary, I contend that what characterises the state is rather its internal 
dividedness. The fragmented nature of today’s States creates scope for administrative 
and political conflicts of interest within the public employers’ camp (Ferner 1988). 
While entering wage setting interactions with the labour counterpart, the public 
employers have to manage simultaneous coordination problems among the plethora of 
state actors involved in the process of fiscal and wage policy. How intra-state conflicts 
of interest are resolved depends on who these state actors are and how they interact 
within the institutional setting which shapes - without fully determining - strategic 
choices by providing incentives and constraints to the wage setters.  
In sum, it can be said that by putting explanatory emphasis on how the structure of the 
state, its rules and institutions exert substantial causal effect on policy outcomes, this 
dissertation advances what is generally understood in the literature as a “state structure 
explanation” (Gourevitch 1986, 61). The explanation I advance through this state-
centred approach runs in opposition to the “economic ideology explanation” based on 
Germany’s obsession with Ordomerkantilismus (see sub-section 3.1); to the 
“production profile explanation” based on the supremacy of the economic interests of 
Germany’s export sector elites (sub-section 3.2); and to the “institutionalist 
explanation” based on the effect of institutions for the coordination of wage bargaining 
across the economy (section 3.4 and 3.5).  
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In the following two sub-sections I now introduce the two sets of policy actors which 
take part in processes of public sector wage setting. I begin by discussing the nature 
and role of public employers as state actors to then move to public sector trade unions. 
4.2 TOGETHER WE RULE, DIVIDED WE STAND: PUBLIC EMPLOYERS AS SEMISOVEREIGN 
STATE ACTORS 
The industrial relations literature has acknowledged “the role of the state” as a public 
employer intervening directly in industrial relations. But what and who is the state? 
And how do public employers stand in relation to the state? In the industrial relations 
literature and in political science debates we read that the state is the sovereign 
authority in the polity. For public sector wage setting this means that the state is the 
sovereign employer. It is lawfully capable of overriding labour’s resistance through 
legislation upheld by the legitimate use of coercion in the polity. In political science 
parlance, the state’s hierarchical authority creates a capacity for “hierarchical 
direction”, i.e. “a capacity to override the preferences of other actors” on the basis of 
the “superior capacity to offer rewards or to threaten severe deprivation” which may 
also “rest on legitimate hierarchical authority” (Scharpf 1997b, 172). This capacity 
depends on the fact that the state is the employer in the public administration but it is 
concomitantly the sovereign authority which defines and manipulates the rules of the 
game in the polity (Traxler 1999). In other words, the state in public sector employment 
relations is simultaneously what Streeck and Thelen (2005) would call a rule taker and 
a rule maker. 
If, following Weber, we understand power (Macht) as the “probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance” (Swedberg and Agevall 2005, 205) and if the public employers are 
sovereigns, then it must follow that, in case of conflicts, the probability that the public 
employers will carry out their own will against labour’s resistance is one, i.e. certainty. 
But this reasoning only holds true if public employers’ sovereignty were absolute. It 
appears to me that much of the literature – inspired by a Hobbesian vision – treats state 
sovereignty as being “unified” and “unconditional” (Baumgold 2017). While in legal 
terms it is certainly true that the state is the sovereign authority, in the practice of public 
sector wage setting, sovereign power (i.e. hierarchical direction) can instead be 
deployed only under some circumstances and not in others. This shall mean that the 
“probability to carry out the public employers’ will despite resistance” is not fixed but 
varies according to heterogeneous institutional, political and environmental conditions. 
This may be because of the following reasons.  
Firstly, public employers as state actors in modern democracies also operate within a 
variety of institutional arrangements (checks and balances) which limit the state’s 
hierarchical authority (Scharpf 1997b, Ch. 8). Thus, public employers are not “free 
spirits” capable of easily shaping the political reality according to their volition. 
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Institutional mechanisms exist within the contours of the state which establish the “rule 
of law” to which public employers are bound. Most prominently, through the presence 
of an independent judiciary in modern States, the sovereign power of the public 
employers is kept within the principle of legality. 
Secondly, public employers are actors within the state, they are not the state. In other 
words, public employers are just a sub-set of actors within the state institutional setting 
which includes a multitude of other institutional actors (themselves sub-sets) with their 
own organisational interests. Their policy prerogatives are most often shared with other 
centres of political authority within the polity with whom the public employers must 
coordinate to enact wage policies. This makes them “semisovereign” policy actors 
within the state’s institutional configuration. The constellation of actors within the state 
creates scope for “inter-role conflicts” (Beaumont 1992), especially because public 
sector wage policy requires coordination among actors within two policy spheres of the 
state: fiscal policy and public sector wage policy. To be able to deploy sovereign 
authority public employers must first come to terms with their internal dividedness. 
4.2.1 THE DIVIDEDNESS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYERS WITHIN THE STATE  
The very conceptualisation of the state and its sovereignty, Hay and Lister (2006) 
remind us, has undergone several transformations over the last centuries. In its pre-
modern formulation, state and sovereignty were synonymous and the sovereignty of the 
state resided in the body of the ruler. With Machiavelli, the state became synonymous 
not only with the prince himself, but also with the wider political regime, the 
geographical territory over which the state claimed and maintained sovereign authority 
and with the set of institutions of government necessary to enforce such authority. It 
was with the rise of the absolutist state in Europe and the writings of Hobbes and Bodin 
that in its modern conceptualisation the state came to be seen as a distinct form of 
authority independent of those individuals who act in the execution of its powers. In the 
modern formulation of the state, influenced by Hobbes’ thought, individuals are 
subjects of the state to which they owe their allegiance. The authority of the state is 
singular and absolute and the state is the highest form of authority in all matters of civil 
government (Skinner 1989, 90).  
This Hobbesian formulation continues to yield a great influence on contemporary state 
theory, itself the result of the works of Max Weber. The Staat, Weber argued, is “a 
compulsory political organisation with continuous operations” whose “administrative 
staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force in the enforcement of its order” (Swedberg and Agevall 2005, 265). From the 
modern Weberian definition, thus, three aspects of the state need to be discussed in the 
context of public sector industrial relations: the state’s organisational characteristics 
(the political organisation in Weber’s definition), its functions (the continuous 
operations) and its sovereign authority.  
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From an organisational perspective, the state should be thought of as an “institutional 
contextualisation” (Hay and Lister 2006) within which political actors are embedded in 
the execution of their governing functions. The state thus consists of the set of 
institutions whose continuous operations ensure the functioning of the polity. The state 
forms the institutional, legal, procedural and authoritative landscape within which 
actors interact. The state is therefore a “strategically selective” contextualisation in that 
its structured institutional setting presents actors with opportunities and constraints 
which shape their strategies and preferences (Jessop 1990). Political actors act within 
the contours of the state while never fully coinciding with its totality. State actors are in 
every moment bits of the state`s institutional contextualisation. Within this institutional 
setting they execute functions. As a result, those state actors in charge of wage 
determination for the public personnel execute but one function among the n other 
continuous operations of the state. However, nothing ensures us that, within the 
institutional contextualisation of the state, the “state as an employer” is a unitary actor 
who has the means and the will to pursue a given wage policy.  
When industrial relations theory speaks of the role of the state as a public employer, it 
is (erroneously in my view) conflating the state as an institutional contextualisation 
with the public employers’ wage setting function. Hyman (2013, 109) famously 
explains to us that “the simple notion of ‘three actors’ in industrial relations – workers, 
employers and government – is inadequate, since the state so to speak occupies two 
seats at the table. Thus, what the literature must mean instead is that, within the 
contours of the state’s institutional setting, those state actors who execute the wage 
setting function for the public personnel also govern the polity. However, the fact that 
in modern States political authority is dispersed suggests that, if there is no single 
government within the state, there can hardly be one single public employer. Where 
this is the case, nothing ensures us that the interests and strategies of different 
governments and therefore of different public employers will be aligned and conducive 
to unitary state action in public sector industrial relations. The dispersion of political 
authority within the politico-administrative system of the state occurs along two basic 
dimensions (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017, 48-53).  
Vertical dispersion of authority refers to the degree of political authority shared 
between different levels of government within the state. Thus, with highly centralised 
States most of the significant political decisions are taken within the central 
government while in States with federal constitutions political authority tends to be 
dispersed in favour of lower levels of government (regional, local). Similarly, also 
unitary States with no constitutionally guaranteed division of power may de facto be 
extensively decentralised when key powers are statutorily delegated to local 
governments. Where vertical dispersion of authority exists (and if each level of 
government has the legal competence to act as the wage setter for its own staff) then 
unitary state action in public sector wage setting is undermined by problems of vertical 
coordination among different levels of government. Thus, policy capacity in public 
 
 
74 
sector wage setting depends not only on the legal competence to set wages – which is 
the results of other employment regulations – but also on the structure of polity.  
Horizontal dispersion of authority pertains to the political power shared among 
different institutional actors (e.g. ministries, agencies, etc.) within one level of 
government. Within the context of horizontal dispersion of authority, unitary state 
action is undermined by problems of horizontal coordination, i.e. the capacity of 
executives to ensure that all actors “pull in the same direction”. Given the 
heterogeneous types of continuous operations which different institutions carry out 
within the state, their institutionalised responsibilities and their financial endowments, 
nothing ensures us that different ministries in public sector wage setting will “pull in 
the same direction”. We should rather expect different administrative agencies to be in 
conflict within the state contextualisation (Ferner 1988). Regarding public sector wage 
policy, this is extremely likely given that the execution of wage policy coincides 
simultaneously with fiscal policy. Most prominently, in public sector wage setting we 
should expect a crucial tension between finance ministries and auditing agencies whose 
institutional role is that of controlling governments’ expenditures vis-à-vis the interest 
of politicians or other ministries. It is in fact recognised that crucial conflicts of 
interests may emerge between the treasury, in charge of ensuring the soundness of 
public finances, and political actors who may be tempted exploit the public purse for 
private political gains (Dell’Aringa 2007). 
A third source of public employers’ dividedness stems from the nature of the executive 
government. This creates problems of intra-governmental coordination between 
different parties. The nature of the executive government refers to structural 
characteristics of the government and the set of conventions and habits which shape the 
governing mode of given executives. These range from less adversarial, consultative 
and consensus-based to more adversarial and majoritarian-like (Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2017, 53). Since public sector wage policy is fiscal policy, the structure of the 
executive government shapes the politics of fiscal policy and therefore the capacity of 
the policy system to adopt public sector wage policy. The more majoritarian decision-
making is, the higher the capacity of the party in government is to set legislation and 
implement a desired course of action in wage policy. The more consultative and 
consensual the nature of the government becomes, the more likely it becomes that 
public employers will be, in fact, divided. Where this is the case, partisan veto players 
(Tsebelis 1995) may block governmental action or require modifications 
to/compensation for a given course of action in fiscal/wage policy. 
What complicates matters further is the heterogeneity of purposes for which political 
actors act. While (simplifying) private employers undertake the entrepreneurial risk for 
the sake of the profit-making motive, governments are concurrently bound to 
administrative, political and economic considerations other than problems of wage 
determination. Governments bear responsibilities not only to the staff they employ in 
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the public administration. In democratic systems, they are confronted with the wider 
citizenry which funds the state machinery, makes use of the public services which the 
state provides and ultimately chooses the political identity of the public paymaster 
through elections (Bryson and Forth 2008, 504). The complexity of studying the role of 
the government in public sector employment relations stems from the fact that, at any 
time, governments may be weighting different concerns of administrative, political and 
economic nature. These considerations to which the public employers are bound may 
interfere and affect processes and outcomes of public sector wage setting. 
As administrative managers, in fact, public employers execute management functions 
within the context of the organisations for which they are legally responsible. As such, 
they are bound by constitutions to guarantee the ongoing provision of public services to 
the community by ensuring the efficient functioning of the public administration under 
their responsibility. Within this context they are directly responsible vis-à-vis the staff 
they employ. As the political authority, however, public employers have also a wider 
responsibility vis-à-vis the citizens-customers to act according to the principle of buon 
governo (good governance). They must guarantee a thrifty yet adequate use of 
taxpayers’ money for the provision of public services.  
On the other hand, through the political parties of which they are expression, 
governments fulfil representative and governing functions in the polity (Mair 2009). 
They aggregate and represent citizens’ interests to the state (government by the people) 
and perform governance functions, implementing policy that would serve the interest of 
their supporters and possibly the common interest of the polity (government for the 
people). Given the symbiotic interdependence between the democratic state and the 
capitalist organisation of today’s economic systems, to secure their survival in office, 
governments have to strike a delicate balance between the need for political 
representativeness in democracy and responsible and efficient economic policy making 
in capitalist systems (Scharpf 1999). This induces governments not only to act 
prudently and responsibly in conformity with external constraints and legacies (Mair 
2009, 10-13) but also to intervene in the economy through macroeconomic policy to 
mitigate the impact of markets on voters’ lives.  
Public employers therefore are at any time a political and economic entity. Actors of 
the state hold various responsibilities beyond the industrial relations system (Beaumont 
1992, 15-19). They always act in a political environment but bear responsibility for the 
efficiency of the economic system as a whole, not only the state machinery. When 
acting public employers may be simultaneously subjected to different types of calculi. 
These may or may not be coherent among themselves and with the interests of other 
social groups in the country. 
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4.2.2 THE REGULATION OF THE ROLE OF STATE IN PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE SETTING 
States’ involvement in public sector wage setting occurs through the group of people 
having management responsibility for personnel in the public administration. As I have 
argued, it is not a given that the functions of administrative employer and governor of 
the polity must coincide within one single organisational entity.  
Different legal arrangements exist that regulate employment and industrial relations in 
the public sector. Understanding their characteristics is crucial to comprehend how the 
sovereign authority of the state is confined within the legal structure of the state and 
how it interacts with its counterparts in matters of wage setting. Different dimensions 
of public sector employment relations need to be considered (Beaumont 1992; 
Bordogna 2007; Ozaki 1987; Traxler 1999), namely the mode of employment 
regulation, the level of regulation and the characteristics of public employers’ 
representation. 
In general terms, three forms of state regulation have been recognised (Jessop 1991) 
and applied to the study of industrial relations (Traxler 1999): statism whereby the state 
resorts to its authoritative exercise of power to impose binding provisions; corporatism 
whereby the state parts its “public-order function” with organised business and labour 
through concertation with social partners or by granting them associational self-
regulation rights; neoliberalism whereby the state externalises onto the market 
mechanism the task of regulating the relationship between labour and business. 
While in the private sector collective bargaining is generally the standard mode to 
regulate industrial relations, in the public sector the principle of joint regulation is 
affected by the sovereign authority of the state. The mode of employment regulation in 
the public administration thus depends on the degree to which the state is entitled to 
unilaterally dictate the terms of employment. The mode of employment regulation can 
be thought of as a continuum ranging from unilateral determination by the sovereign 
employer on the one extreme and full joint regulation through collective bargaining on 
the other. In the former type of regulation, the state unilaterally fixes the terms of 
employment (e.g. for the Beamte civil servants in the German system) even though, in 
practice, consultations and negotiations may occur informally with the unions. 
Unilateral determination of employment conditions generally comes with a special 
legal status attached to the requirement to act as a servant of the state and in respect of 
the public interest.  
In the form of collective regulations, the public employers bargain with the trade 
unions to define the terms of public employment, although often some special groups 
performing key state functions (e.g. judges, armed force, police) may be exempted 
from collective bargaining rights and subjected to unilateral regulation. Various hybrid 
forms exist in between. Examples are government’s unilateral regulation based on 
recommendations made by ad hoc commissions (e.g. in India and Malaysia); 
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government’s determination on the basis of institutionalised comparability surveys, like 
in Japan where the National Personnel Authority issues recommendations on the basis 
of employment conditions in comparable jobs in the private and public sector; 
government’s unilateral determination on the basis of institutionalised joint 
consultations with the unions (e.g. the Netherlands).  
Mixed systems can exist in which some segments of the public administration’s labour 
force are regulated via state’s unilateral authority and others are subjected to joint 
regulation via collective bargaining with the unions. Germany is a notable example 
where the civil servants (Beamte) are subjected to the state’s sovereign authority while 
the rest of the public employees are regulated via collective bargaining. Where joint 
regulation through collective bargaining exists between the public employers and the 
trade unions, institutions for conflict resolution acquire importance to the extent that 
resolutions to disputes can be legally enforced on both parts. 
The level of regulation acquires enormous importance because it refers to the question 
as to who management in the public sector is. Public sectors of parliamentary 
democracies are characterised by the dispersion of competencies and management 
responsibilities which are determined by constitutional divisions (Beaumont 1992). As 
already mentioned, political authority can be divided horizontally between political and 
non-political (e.g. state agencies) centres of power and vertically between the central 
government and subnational authorities (e.g. regions or municipalities). The result of 
varying state structures is generally a shared management authority with 
responsibilities differing across the institutions of the state and regarding the subjects of 
regulation. It is thus key to discern who is in charge of determining employment 
conditions and whether regulations apply to all employee groups jointly or separately to 
different occupational or sectoral groups (Traxler 1999, 60-61). Responsibility for 
regulation of public employment and wage setting can thus lie with the central, 
regional, local or departmental level of the state apparatus. Responsibility for public 
employment can be shared across state levels and departments. Different groups of 
employees may be subjected to different authorities and different types of regulation.  
Moreover, the authorities representing the state as an employer of labour are diverse 
across countries. Since public personnel’s pay, like any other government’s 
expenditure, must eventually be voted by parliaments, parliaments retain a special 
position in the process of pay determination (Ozaki 1987, 283). In some countries, this 
has given parliaments centre stage in the determination of public sector pay which is 
understood as a duty of the parliament. In others, however, parliaments have explicitly 
or implicitly delegated this responsibility to executive organs of the government. The 
form and extent of such delegation varies. In some countries it is the Ministry of 
Finance, as gate-keeper of the treasury, to oversee employers’ representation in the 
public administration. In others (e.g. Italy or Sweden), specialised agencies have been 
created to represent public employers in matters of employment relations. Mixed 
patterns are also possible. In some countries the system of public employers’ 
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representations entails the involvement of a wider range of ministries or departments, 
like in Germany where, in practice, the finance and Interior Ministers are both 
responsible for wage determination in the public administration. There may also be 
cases in which each employing authority is directly responsible for employment 
determination and interest representation vis-à-vis its own employees, or mixed 
patterns where some authorities act joint within institutionalised forms of cooperation 
while others act separately outside them. 
4.2.3 PUBLIC EMPLOYERS’ SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY RECONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF 
THEIR DIVIDEDNESS AS STATE ACTORS 
This section on the public employers has taken off from the concept of States’ 
unilateral power in public sector wage setting. Sovereign employers, it is usually 
argued, have the capacity to override the preferences of opponents by virtue of their 
hierarchical authority in the polity. However, I contend that, while in theory political 
sovereigns surely maintain their sovereign prerogatives, in practice the capacity of the 
state to deploy its sovereign authority in wage setting is contingent on two factors: the 
legal context and the capacity of public employers to overcome internal collective 
action problems. 
As a necessary condition, the legal arrangements which regulate public sector 
employment and industrial relations must guarantee to public employers a legal 
competence to act unilaterally in wage bargaining. Otherwise, failing to act within the 
boundaries of the rule of law will cause the public employers to be challenged before 
an independent judiciary. Whether public employers have the legal capacity to 
determine wages unilaterally in the public sector depends on the mode of regulation of 
public sector employment relations. 
Having the right to act unilaterally however is not sufficient for sovereign authority to 
be deployed. If public employers are internally divided, to successfully deploy 
sovereign authority as a unitary policy actor they must first overcome their intestine 
coordination problems and/or political conflicts. These emerge from the fragmented 
nature of the state. Public employers may be divided along three dimensions within the 
state contextualisation. They may be divided vertically among different public 
employers located at different levels of government. Secondly, public employers may 
be divided horizontally across different departments/ministries/agencies. This division 
may be augmented by conflicts of interest between institutional actors in charge of 
fiscal policy and those in charge of wage policy, if the competence for the execution of 
the two policies does not lie within the same institutional entity. Thirdly, even within 
governments, political parties may be divided on the merits of a given public sector 
wage/fiscal policy to be pursued. 
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The implication of this reasoning is that: while all sovereign employers are public 
employers, not all public employers can and wish to act as unilateral sovereigns. They 
can act as sovereign employers only when the two conditions hold, and they may wish 
to act unilaterally only when they deem it politically wise. 
4.3 PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE POLITICAL DETERRENCE POWER 
Organised labour constitutes the counterpart to public employers in the process of wage 
determination. While the previous sub-section has focused on the public employers as 
state actors, this section discusses the specificities of trade unionism and industrial 
action in the public sector. In general terms, industrial relations are profoundly affected 
by the nature of the markets in which firms compete (Brown 2008). Although the 
public sector does not produce goods and services which are for sale in markets - or 
perhaps exactly because of that - it is appropriate to begin from the peculiar nature of 
the services public employees provide. This has implications for what the “capital-
labour nexus” means in public sector industrial relations. It has also relevance to 
understand the legal terms of an employment relationship with the state and the very 
distinctive nature of industrial conflict in the public sector. All these factors shape the 
type resources available to public sector unions to assert the interests of the workforce 
within the context of the state. 
4.3.1 THE NATURE OF THE SERVICES PROVIDED 
Some distinctive features characterise the public labour and differentiate it from the 
private sector. Although fees may occasionally apply, most of public services are not 
for sale in markets and are instead financed via public budgets, themselves the result of 
tax receipts or borrowing. This means that, in the absence of a market exchange and a 
price mechanism, there are neither “traditional” producers nor customers – at least in 
the narrow sense one can think of in the context of the market sector.  
As a result, from the employers’ side, the decision on the type and quantity of services 
to be produced is primarily a political decision. Public employers’ choices regarding 
production are inferred indirectly through “voter expressed demands for government 
services” rather than “through a marginal revenue product curve” (Fogel and Lewin 
1974, 414). Citizens thus determine “through the ballot box” the quantity of public 
goods and services on the basis of their perceived needs (Gill-McLure 2007). Given the 
absence of a motive for profit maximisation in governments’ services provision, there 
cannot be a “capital-labour nexus” akin to the private sector. In fact, the act of availing 
oneself of the publicly provided community services constitutes a “non-market 
transaction” which produces use-value instead of exchange-value (Gill-McLure 2013). 
The essential services provided by the state cater to the public needs not to private 
demand. In so doing, they also produce externalities in that they benefit society at a 
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large rather than the individual user. This has, in the first place, induced societies to 
collectively organise and fund the provision of public goods and services and entrust 
their management to political decision-making rather than the markets (Stiglitz 1988). 
Thus, while the production process in the private sector is mostly a twofold relation 
between capital and labour, the provision of public services involves also the wider 
public – the taxpayers’ community - which funds and makes use of the publicly 
provided services. These considerations mean that the production process of public 
services is always a three-dimensional one whereby the wider public has a stake in the 
provision of services which shall be adequate to the needs of the community and 
efficiently realised at the minimum fiscal cost possible. 
Most yet not all the public services which the state provides are essential services to the 
community. ILO regulation categorises as “essential services in the strict sense” all 
those services whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or health of 
the whole or part of the population (ILO 2006; art. 586 and 587). These services are 
healthcare services, fire-fighting, air traffic controls, police and armed forces, public or 
private prison services, water and electricity supply, etc. Other services, like postal 
services, refuse collection and the education sector are not considered essential services 
in the strict sense. However, these also constitute key services for the wellbeing of the 
community. 
Furthermore, public services are – par excellence – labour intensive. This is to say that, 
in the process of producing public services, the labour factor is disproportionally more 
important – and costly – than capital goods (e.g. machinery). These are mostly services 
to the people performed through non-routine tasks that require human interactions. This 
is part of the reason why the economic literature has spoken of a cost disease which 
characterises the provision of public services (Baumol and Bowen 1965; 1966; 
Johnston 2011). The Baumol’s cost disease implies that the wage rates in public 
services are decoupled from their rate of labour productivity. Baumol and co-authors 
noted long ago that labour productivity in the kind of activities performed in the public 
sector (e.g. public administration, education, security, culture, etc.) does not rise (if it 
does rise at all) as fast as the industrial sector where productivity-enhancing 
technological change is the norm. Yet the public employers’ need to compete with the 
private sector for the recruitment of personnel forces public wages to rise in line with 
those in the private sector where labour productivity grows faster. This is where the 
market operates, indirectly, in public sector wage setting. In the long run, the supply of 
labour in the public sector labour market is a function of the wages paid by the public 
employers relative to those paid in the private economy. This forces public managers to 
remain attractive employers and ensures public employees will not be paid too little 
(Wellington and Winter Jr 1968) – in relation to their lower productivity rates. 
The implications of these public services’ peculiarities are manifold. First, the formal 
allocation of fiscal resources to produce particular services and the determination of 
personnel’s pay rates therein is primarily political in nature and not economic – in the 
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narrow sense of a profit-making enterprise. It is a political decision on the merits of the 
quantity and quality of services to be produced and the extent to which the public 
personnel should be remunerated. Labour costs in the public sector do not endanger 
profit margins but rather constitute fiscal costs for the taxpayers. As such, these 
political decisions cannot but involve, directly or indirectly, the citizenry. They are, in 
other words, decisions on alternative uses of public money. For a private employer, in 
fact, in the face of any given fixed price of a product, an increase in unit labour costs 
must be compensated by an equal decrease of the profit margins hence of the 
employer’s mark-up. The calculus in the public sector is of a different nature. Wages 
represent fiscal opportunity costs in the sense that benefits of other sorts are being 
missed by the community when a given amount of fiscal resources is earmarked for 
public sector wage setting. Public employers could instead direct these resources to 
alternative uses (e.g. public investment, social services, etc.) or to hoarding (i.e. 
creating a budget surplus) or to reducing the fees (if any) of public services provision. 
4.3.2 THE REGULATION OF EMPLOYMENT, TRADE UNION REPRESENTATION AND 
INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
In theory, legal arrangements which regulate public workers’ rights to form and join 
unions may vary between two extremes (Ozaki 1987). On the one hand, both public 
employees and status civil servants may be denied associational rights altogether. On 
the other, these rights may be granted to the whole of the public sector workforce. In 
between these two extremes, intermediate situations may be found in which 
associational rights are granted to some groups of public employees while denied to 
others based on the essential public functions they perform. Generally, since the 1970s 
associational rights have been increasingly granted to public sector workers and today, 
the right of association is almost universally permitted to both status civil servants and 
contractual public employees (Bordogna 2007, 21). This is similar to the private sector. 
Where the public sector differs is in the nature of the employment relationship with the 
state and the types of trade union representation. Following Keller (1981), two variants 
of employment relations have been distinguished in the public sector: the bargaining 
model and the legislation model. These have already been described above (see sub-
section 4.2.2 for a thorough discussion). Suffice it to say here that in the bargaining 
model public employees enjoy a legal status akin to that of private employees. In the 
legislation model, the civil servants are instead subjected to a public law labour 
relationship with the state which is meant to rule out the possibility of a conflict of 
interest between the public employer and the employees. The latter are required to act 
as loyal servants in the pursuit of the common good. Central to the legislation model is 
the denial of collective bargaining rights in favour of unilateral determination of 
employment and wage conditions through legislation and, often, the denial of the right 
to strike. These two types of employment regulation give rise to two models of trade 
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union representation in the public sector. Depending on the legal capacity to use strikes 
as a deterrence weapon, one may distinguish between public stage bargaining and 
political stage bargaining (Schmidt and Müller 2018).  
When unions lack the legal capacity to strike, they will have to advance public 
employees’ interests through political stage bargaining. This mode of interest 
representation is specific to the public sector given its double nature of political 
employer. Since employment and wage terms for status civil servants are determined 
unilaterally through legislation, to advance their claims unions will have to interfere 
with this process to try to influence legislators in their favour. Differently from 
industrial disruption in the private sector, this public-sector-specific strategy is subtler 
and relies on lobbying and networking, often behind closed doors and within policy 
circles. On the one hand, the fact that public employers are political agents empowers 
civil servants’ unions, whose members and their families vote, to threaten to sanction 
elected officials at the next elections (Keller 1981). On the other, professional civil 
servants’ unions generally rely on very qualified lawyers, trained to defend their 
members in legal complaints vis-à-vis the state on the basis of the constitutionally-
guaranteed status of the civil service and its very nature of public law. A prominent 
example is the alimentation principle enshrined in the German Grundgesetz 
(Germany’s Basic Law) which ensures civil servants a constitutional right to adequate 
remuneration. 
When public employees have the legal capacity to strike, “industrial action” is an 
option on the unions’ menu. They can apply pressures to employers in a way that is 
similar to that of the private sector. In fact, this is also a mode of advancing public 
employees’ interests vis-à-vis employers by causing some sort of disruption. Yet public 
sector industrial action works differently in that it is always aimed at affecting 
primarily the wider public and, through it, apply political pressure on the public 
employers. The unions’ deterrence mechanism in public stage bargaining works 
through the political pressure which citizens or other organised groups of customers 
will apply toward the public employers for a quick resolution of the conflict 
(Wellington and Winter Jr 1968). This involves a triangular political relationship 
between the public employers, the unions and the citizens who fund and avail 
themselves of the services being disrupted. This public-sector-specific type of political 
collective action follows from the nature of the public services described above. 
Differently from the private sector where surplus-value is produced, strikes in the 
public sector do not disrupt the process of profits accumulation. So, while in the private 
sector strikes constitute a deterrence instrument of an economic nature, in the tax-
financed sector, strikes which interrupt the provision of public services may instead 
even lower the production costs public employers face (e.g. personnel and other 
production costs such as lighting and heating of childcare facilities, schools, etc.). Thus, 
a strike in the public sector is a risky strategy for the unions which, to succeed, depends 
necessarily on the capacity of the unions to mobilise the public behind its strategy – or 
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at a minimum to avoid its hostility. But nothing ensures that the public will align with 
the public employees. Quite to the contrary, since public sector strikes disrupt crucial 
services to the community, rather than the employers, it is the citizen-customer that is 
primarily inconvenienced by a public sector strike. Thus, the capacity to strike 
successfully in the public sector depends also on the prevalent mood of the public 
opinion and people’s perception of the public service and its employees. The unions 
must convince the public about the legitimacy of their demands and the citizenry must 
approve of the unions’ cause. But while this may be an empowering condition for 
unions to strike, in case of conflicts, the success of public sector unions depends on 
their power resources. 
4.3.3 PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS’ POWER RESOURCES 
The literature on trade unions’ power resources is premised on the assumption that the 
workforce successfully advances its interests through the collective mobilisation of 
power resources. Power is thus intended as “power to” successfully assert, within a 
given institutional context and social relationship, the interests of the workers despite 
resistance. In fact, different from the public employers, who are sovereign legislators, 
the workforce and their associations do not dispose of the legal capacity to deploy 
unilateral “power over” opponents. Four types of power resources can be identified 
(Lévesque and Murray 2010; Schmalz and Dörre 2014; Silver 2003; Wright 2000) 
whose successful use increases the probability that workers and/or their associations 
will be in a “position to carry out (their) will despite resistance” (Swedberg and 
Agevall 2005, 205) from the employers. 
Structural power is linked to the position of workers in the production system. It can be 
intended as workplace bargaining power or as marketplace bargaining power. The 
former is available at the level of the individual worker at the workplace and depends 
on the capacity to cause disruption in the process of capital accumulation thus creating 
direct economic losses to the employers. In the context of the public sector, as 
described above, disruptive power should be analysed not in relation to the public 
employers per se, but rather vis-à-vis the wider public. Disruptive power depends on 
the capacity to create disruption in the everyday life of the citizens-customers who 
make use of public services. Marketplace bargaining power depends on the strength of 
the worker’s position in the labour market. The basis for this strength is given by 
certain rare skills or qualifications which the worker possesses. Power results from the 
fact that the public employer needs the worker’s skills more than the employee needs 
that particular employer to be employed. The skilled worker is in a position to negotiate 
better terms of employment while threatening to find a job somewhere else. 
Associational power is the result of workers forming political or trade union’s 
associations. It is collective rather than individual and rests on the capacity of the 
collective actor to elaborate and execute strategies to advance their interests. 
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Associational power can be deployed at the workplace level through staff councils, at 
the sectoral level generally via trade unions’ action, or at the political level. Differently 
from the private sector, in the public sector, the sectoral and the political cannot be 
disentangled and associations’ attempts to deploy power resources in public sector 
wage setting are always also a way to deploy power in the political arena. Associational 
power may rest on different factor besides the mere number of members. Associations 
need infrastructural resources (financial and building capacity, human resources, etc.) 
to be able to carry out their work. Furthermore, associations need the capacity to 
mobilise their members in collective action. This requires a “willingness to act” by the 
workers and some forms of internal cohesion and solidarity. 
Institutional power depends on legal provisions which define unions’ participation, 
rights and duties in given circumstances. Legal provisions grant both legal rights and 
constraints to the unions and thus institutionally enhancing/reducing their power to act 
in order to assert their interests. This type of legalistic power resource acquires great 
importance in the context of civil servants’ wage determination whereby the status of 
civil servants – who may lack the right to strike – is protected by constitutional 
provisions which specify the rights and duties of both the sovereign employer and the 
“loyal servant of the state”. Professional unions require trained lawyers to challenge the 
behaviour of public employers which they retain detrimental to the workforce they 
represent before constitutional or administrative courts. 
Societal power is understood as the capacity for the unions to enter coalitions and join 
forces with other societal groups or to mobilise society’s support for the union 
demands. Thus, societal power can be understood as coalitional power and discursive 
power. This type of power resource too acquires a genuinely political character and 
retains extreme importance in public sector wage setting. Coalitional power means the 
capacity for unions to pursue common goals with other social actors by entering into 
mutual commitments. Successful coalition building by one trade union organisation 
consists of boosting the latter’s associational power by either mobilizing in its favour 
the allied actor’s resources or by receiving from her material, political or discursive 
support. As for discursive power, the reasons are straightforward. As discussed above, 
in the public sector the mode of trade union interest representation is a public and a 
political stage bargaining depending on the workers’ legal right to strike. In the former, 
for public strikes to succeed the unions need discursive capacity to convincingly talk 
the citizenry behind their cause. Otherwise, public hostility will undermine unions’ 
mobilizing capacity and, instead, empower the public employers to resist the unions’ 
demands. In political stage bargaining, given the lack of the strike option, unions need 
the discursive capacity to successfully convince those politicians acting within the 
policy network charged with drafting legislation on civil servants’ employment 
conditions. 
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After having introduced the two sets of wage setting actors in the public sector, in what 
follows I introduce the institutional setting within which wage setting interactions take 
place.   
4.4 THE STATE AS AN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTUALISATION: A FOUR-TIER ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE SETTING 
To explain policies through structured political interactions, I develop an analytical 
framework that provides guidelines for the search of explanations in real situations. The 
framework is meant to provide a static representation of the state as an institutional 
contextualisation. It theorises the institutional factors which structure the capacity of 
public employers and unions to make strategic choices during processes of public 
sector wage determination. It is meant to guide us in the empirical research through a 
theory-based understanding of how to identify the actors involved in the policy, their 
salient characteristics and action resources, the institutional setting in which they 
interact and their modes of interaction. This means, in other words, to have 
theoretically-grounded institutionalist working hypotheses that define which institutions 
matter and how they matter in structuring political interactions that produce policy 
(Scharpf 2000). 
The analytical framework for the analysis of public sector wage setting which I develop 
is composed of four building blocks: public sector employment relations, the politico-
administrative structure of the state, the fiscal constitution of the state, legal and fiscal 
watchdogs. To preview, the diagram in figure 9 provides a visual simplification of the 
analytical framework. 
Public sector wage policy constitutes an ongoing policy problem (left-side square in the 
diagram) for governmental authorities. This has to do with governments’ fundamental 
responsibility for the maintenance of the state’s public administration. To the extent 
that the state must survive, it needs to execute its functions. Since Montesquieu (1748) 
we know that governments engage with three sorts of powers, namely the legislative (to 
make laws), the executive (to implement and administer these laws) and the judiciary 
(to lawfully judge upon controversies in societies). To execute these tasks, the state 
requires a staff. If the staff is to provide manpower, it needs to be remunerated. 
Compensation, like in any other sector of the economy, must be adjusted according to 
macroeconomic developments in the economy. This is what constitutes the wage 
setting problem in the public sector. To ensure services provision, public employers 
continuously re-negotiate the terms of public employment through wage bargaining 
and/or unilateral legislation (depending on the legal setting). For this purpose, they 
must engage in interactions with their respective labour counterparts (central circle in 
the diagram). These interactions are aimed at producing wage policy (right-side square) 
which, by adjusting the terms of pay and employment to current economic and social 
developments, solves the wage setting problem.  
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Figure 9: A four-tier analytical framework for the study of public sector wage setting 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. Adapted for current purposes from Scharpf (1997b, 44).  
Who the specific counterparts are depends on those actors whom the legal system 
attributes the competence to take part in the specific set of policy interactions. What 
these actors can/cannot do and how they do depends on the legal/institutional setting 
within which these interactions take place. As mentioned already, the state should be 
understood as a “strategically selective” contextualisation (large external square) in that 
its structured institutional setting presents state actors with opportunities and 
constraints which shape their strategies and preferences (Jessop 1990).  
I have identified four key institutional domains which concomitantly structure 
processes of public sector wage setting. The system of public sector employment 
relations and interest representation (upper-left square within the institutional setting 
square) tells us who is in charge of determining/negotiating what, with the 
institutionalised involvement of whom and how. The politico-administrative structure 
of the state (bottom-left square) tells us what the structure of the polity is, how is the 
public administration organised within it and how political authority is dispersed within 
the contours of the state. The fiscal constitution of the state (bottom-right square) 
informs us about the capacity of public employers to raise the revenues necessary to 
meet the fiscal costs of public sector wage setting. Lastly, legal and fiscal watchdogs 
(upper-right square) represent other state actors next to the public employers who may, 
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within the state’s legal contours, constrain or block altogether public employers’ 
intended wage policy. After this brief preview, I discuss in greater detail the theoretical 
aspects of each building block. 
The system of public sector employment relations and interest representation is 
determined by country-specific legal provisions. A more thorough analysis is not 
necessary here for the regulation of public employers and trade unions’ involvement in 
public sector wage determination and employment relations has been already 
introduced in sub-sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. Suffice it to say that, when 
analysing wage policy we need to comprehend how legislation regulates employment 
relations in the public sector. Legislation defines the actors involved in wage setting 
(who is management and who is labour); determines the modes of interest 
representation; regulates whether wage determination occurs via unilateral legislation 
or collective bargaining and as a result the structure and the level of wage bargaining. 
In so doing, legislation also shapes the mode and the extent to which public employers 
can deploy their sovereign authority in the processes of public sector wage 
determination.  
The politico-administrative structure of the state is a crucial institutional domain for the 
study of public sector wage setting. Understanding the institutional architecture of the 
state and its public administration is necessary to comprehend the organisational 
features of the administrative machinery. What requires an understanding is the type of 
state we are analysing; how political authority is distributed within it and how the 
state’s public administration is structured and functions. This enables us to understand 
who has the legal competence to do what within what type of state administration. 
Understanding the distribution of legal competences within the state is in fact a 
precondition to disentangle conflicts of interests which cause state actors to be 
internally divided. This is because the distribution of legal competences shapes the 
distribution of public personnel within the state’s institutional entities. On the first 
aspect, the structure of the state defines how the polity is organised and functions in 
terms of vertical levels of government (e.g. central vs sub-national governments) and 
horizontal administrative entities (e.g. ministries, agencies, etc.). Policy actors within 
the state contextualisation act as institutional representatives of their respective 
organisations. Some of these state actors may or may not be involved in processes of 
public sector wage setting depending. This depends on how the system of public sector 
employment relations regulates public sector wage bargaining in the polity. Yet the 
actions as well as the preferences of those actors that are indeed involved in public 
sector wage setting will be tied to the administrative entities they represent. 
On the second aspect, the distribution of legal competences (vertically and 
horizontally) shapes the distribution of personnel within the various administrative 
units of the state. This is a fundamental aspect to derive public employers’ preferences 
which pave the way to intra-state conflicts of interests. Each administrative unit of the 
state must employ a varying number of employees depending on the entity and the 
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nature of the tasks it is charged with. Of the three core functions of the state, it is 
executive/administrative powers that necessitate a disproportionally higher 
concentration of manpower. As a result, labour costs will be much higher for those 
public employers whose administrative units are charged with these types of functions. 
Public services such as education, health and social services require much greater 
manpower to be accomplished than legislative and judiciary powers. The division of 
powers within the political system thus roughly determines the distribution of public 
personnel employed within its administrative units. This in turn defines the stock of 
labour costs which a public employer is confronted with. The implication is that, the 
more an administrative unit is charged with the provision of labour-intensive public 
services, the higher its stock of labour costs will be, due to the greater manpower 
required for the execution of the assigned competencies. From this we can derive that 
the greater the initial stock of labour costs is, the more salient the problem of setting 
wages becomes for that public employer. For the books of a given administrative unit, 
personnel costs represent, at any given point in time, a stock of outlays which needs to 
be financed. Wage bargaining is nothing else that negotiating over the flow of fiscal 
resources which will have to be added to the initial stock of personnel costs. When in 
charge of earmarking the fiscal resources to finance wage setting, employers facing 
higher labour costs have a strong structural incentive to minimise wage increases. If the 
distribution of competencies is asymmetric within the state (e.g. between the central 
and the regional level), diverging material preferences for wage setting are likely to 
emerge among the public employers. 
In all, the more concentrated employees are within a specific administrative unit, the 
higher the personnel costs which that employer will have to come to terms with. This 
has to do with the distribution of political authority within the state. In this context, the 
wage bargaining preferences will be different for different employers largely depending 
on the percentage of personnel costs in their total expenditures: 
public employers with a higher stock of labour costs are likely to have a stricter preference 
for a public sector wage policy which minimises the flow of additional fiscal resources to be 
earmarked for personnel expenditures  
However, this reasoning only sheds light on the expenditures’ side. To be complete, 
one must look also at the public employers’ financial ability to pay, i.e. the revenues’ 
side. This is where the fiscal constitution of the state comes into play in that it consists 
of the set of legal provisions which regulate public financing within the state. The fiscal 
constitution of the state refers to the regulation of governments’ competences to raise 
revenues through taxation and borrowing. It is generally defined by the constitution and 
other legal provisions. Taxing and borrowing powers, together with exogenous factors, 
determine the fiscal space available to each public employer. While fiscal powers are 
regulated by tax legislation in the polity, exogenous factors may also intervene which 
are beyond governments’ control. They are contingent on the policy environment, e.g. 
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economic cycles tend to generate fiscal cycles due to patterns of higher/lower returns 
and lower/higher social spending in good and bad times. All else being equal: 
the more constrained the capacity to manipulate revenues at will is (through tax revenues 
and/or borrowing), the more an employer’s fiscal space is constrained in the face of a given 
level of structurally increasing outlays for personnel expenditures.  
Similarly, the more an exogenous factor reduces/increases the government’s 
revenues/outlays, the tighter the fiscal space becomes. There is here an asymmetry 
between the expenditures and the revenues side of the public employers. The former 
tends to grow structurally over time. Revenues’ growth, instead, is constrained by the 
difficulty of imposing higher taxation on private capital in a context of global markets 
and on citizens who, by voting, determine whether or not the elected public employers 
retain their job in office (Spizman 1980). Labour costs have an inherent tendency to 
increase. They tend to increase exponentially for those public employers with an 
initially higher stock of personnel costs (because the % increase is multiplied by a 
higher base). To cope with increasing costs, public employers can rely neither on 
market prices nor on significant productivity enhancing measures. They depend 
inexorably on the capacity of the state’s fiscal system. This system needs to generate 
increasing revenues in order to meet rising expenditures so as to escape a crisis of the 
tax state (O'connor 1973; Schumpeter 1918; Streeck 2014, 70-78). When this is not the 
case, the fiscal space will become ever tighter over time. Expenditures will have to be 
reduced and/or covered by deficits, if possible. 
In all, the contention here is that a public employer’s ability to pay the stock of labour 
costs depends crucially on the fiscal space at her disposal, i.e. the ability to pay the 
personnel costs is higher the looser the fiscal space is and vice versa. The fiscal space 
of each public employer is determined by two factors. The first is the employer’s fiscal 
autonomy, i.e. the legal capacity to manipulate revenues at will, either through the 
taxation system or via borrowing. The second relates to environmental factors, i.e. 
favourable/unfavourable economic cycles and/or exogenous shocks which 
enlarge/diminish an employer’s fiscal space beyond her control. Booming economic 
phases tend to produce higher tax revenues and lower social expenditures thus 
enlarging the fiscal space to manoeuvre in public sector wage policy. The opposite 
occurs when the economy slows down. In this sense, Gourevitch (1986) would 
distinguish between implementing policy in good and hard times. 
Combining the employers’ revenues and the expenditures dimensions yields a fruitful 
two-by-two table, from which we can discern the micro-foundations of public 
employers’ preferences in public sector wage setting. These can be derived from the 
interaction between the stock of labour costs which employers face (expenditures side) 
and their available fiscal space (revenues side).  
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Table 2: Micro-foundations of public employers’ preferences for restraint in public sector wage setting 
 
Employers' stock of labour costs 
  High Low 
Employers' 
fiscal space 
Loose 
Weak preference  
for restraint 
No need  
for restraint 
Tight 
Very strong preference  
for restraint  
Moderate preference  
for restraint 
The urgency for a public employer to contain labour costs depends on the interaction 
between the expenditures and revenues sides of public employers’ budgets. On the 
revenues’ side, employers’ ability to pay depends at any point in time on the available 
fiscal space, which can be tighter or looser. Employers’ fiscal space is the primary 
driver in this mutual interdependence for the incapacity to meet financial needs may 
threaten the very survival of the organisation. In this context, the tighter the fiscal space 
becomes, the more salient the problem of containing additional personnel costs will be 
for public employers. By the same logic, the higher the stock of labour costs of a given 
administrative unit, the more urgent the need to minimise the financial burden of wage 
setting is in the first place. The combination of these insights gives us four abstract 
scenarios.  
In situations in which employers’ fiscal space is loose and labour costs are high (upper 
left quadrant), containing additional costs ensuing from wage bargaining constitutes a 
problem of moderate saliency. We can reasonably expect public employers in such a 
situation to have a weak preference for restraint, i.e. governments do not have the need 
to forcefully push through a policy of cost containment since the fiscal resources 
available are somehow adequate to meet personnel expenditures. In other words, a 
looser fiscal space increases public employers’ ability to pay. Disposing of a loose 
fiscal space in conjunction with low labour costs (upper right quadrant) is the best 
position for a public employer. This removes the preconditions for a policy of wage 
restraint altogether. In such a scenario, public employers have little or nothing to fear 
from wage setting in terms of fiscal costs. We should in theory expect no need for a 
policy of public sector wage restraint. 
It is tighter fiscal space instead which brings troubles because it decreases the 
employers’ ability to pay. The need for restraint increases the more the employers’ 
fiscal space tightens up. So, when the fiscal space shrinks, we may expect a relatively 
stronger preference for a policy of wage restraint to emerge even among public 
employers with a relatively low stock of labour costs (lower right quadrant). However, 
being in a situation of tight fiscal space within an administrative unit which is 
 
 
91 
confronted with high labour costs (bottom left quadrant) is the worst scenario, both 
financially and politically. This is because the urgency to pursue cost-containment 
measures is strong and the political backlash will be high given the wide constituency 
which will be affected by the austerity measures. In this case, containing the increase of 
personnel expenditures acquires extreme saliency to the point that the very 
organisational survival may be threatened. We should expect public employers in such 
a situation to have an extreme preference for a policy of public sector wage restraint 
which minimises the flow of additional fiscal spending for personnel. When both 
confronted with tighter budgets, the difference between employers with a high stock of 
labour costs and those with a smaller one is that for the former, the urgency to 
implement restraint becomes exponentially urgent due to the higher base of labour 
costs by which the wage increase will be multiplied. Given the exponential costs of 
wage setting, for these employers restraint may become a matter of financial survival 
for the organisation. This is the difference between a very strong preference for wage 
restraint of the former and a moderate preference for wage restraint of the latter. 
At any rate, it is during situations of financial strain that we should expect public 
employers to be more likely to try to deploy their sovereign authority in public sector 
wage setting. Through their state power, public employers in dire straits are likely to try 
to enforce restraint via hierarchical coordination (Scharpf 1997b, 171):  
primarily out of fiscal considerations, public employers will try - if necessary and legally possible - to 
make use of their sovereign authority to override unions’ opposition and contain if not eliminate 
altogether the fiscal costs of wage setting.  
Among the cost-containment measures which can be taken during these situations, it 
should be noted, squeezing wages is but one among the possible options on the menu. 
When in need to reduce the fiscal costs of public sector wage setting, public employers 
can pursue a combination of the following cost-cutting measures: 
 Negotiate or impose unilaterally low wage increases. In extrema ratio negotiate or 
impose a wage freeze (Δ = 0). 
 Resort to a so-called “zero months” strategy. This means public employers strategically 
delay as much as possible the entry into force of the new wage agreement. The more 
“zero-months” can be extracted, the more the fiscal savings. This is also part of a “wait-
and-see” strategy. For the employers it is convenient to wait as much as possible until the 
labour part takes the lead in the renewal of the contract.  
 Resort to an extension of the contract duration. The longer the duration of the contract 
signed the more convenient and predictable it is to the employers because pay 
adjustments drift apart from developments in the real economy. 
 Curtail qualitative aspects of the public employment relations which have quantitative 
costs (e.g. the right to access thermal treatment and other care-related provisions). 
 Curtail fringe benefits attached to the employment relation. 
 Reduce the size of the public sector by scaling down employment if legally possible or 
freeze turnover and let employment shrink due to the lack of replacement.  
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 Privatise and outsource public services contracting them out to private agencies 
 Extend working hours. 
After having analysed the three key institutional domains, I conclude now with the last 
important aspect of the analytical framework, the presence of legal and fiscal 
watchdogs, organs of modern democracies, charged with the task of counterweighting 
governmental authority within the polity. These are generally determined by 
constitutions and other legislation. Public employers, although maintaining their 
sovereign prerogative to act unilaterally to coerce societal actors, do not act in a 
vacuum. Modern liberal democracies are founded on systems of checks and balances, 
enshrined in constitutions and meant to keep sovereign authority under legal and 
institutional control. Prominent examples are constitutional or administrative and 
labour courts or parliamentary budgetary offices. Another important example is the 
presence of an independent central bank, capable through the determination of 
monetary policy of imposing lines of conduct on governments’ actions. What needs to 
be assessed is whether such bodies impose legal and institutional constraints on 
governments’ policy action. In other words, it needs to be assessed whether these 
organs hold the status of institutional veto players, i.e. institutional entities whose 
agreement is required for the implementation of a given policy (Tsebelis 1995). In this 
respect, constitutional courts could impose on the government given courses of action 
in public sector wage policies which, if unconstrained, the government would have 
refrained from. On a similar vein, fiscal watchdogs, common in parliamentary systems 
may retain the ability to act as institutionalised veto players, constraining governments’ 
capacity to enact discretionary fiscal policy, i.e. its ability to pay. 
4.5 WAGE POLICY REQUIRES FISCAL POLITICS 
The previous sub-section has introduced the state as an institutional contextualisation. 
Within this state contextualisation made of rules and institutional entities, policy 
outcomes are produced by the interactions of intentional policy actors who mobilise 
resources and assemble political coalitions necessary to transform their preferences into 
outcomes. The central contention of this dissertation is that public sector wage policy is 
fiscal policy. This constitutes the departing point from the state of the art of public 
sector wage studies in CPE. Taken seriously, this claim implies that one cannot 
understand wage determination in public services without entering the realm of 
budgetary politics. This is because the one follows from and is dependent on the other. 
This means that the employment relations arena, in which wage negotiations take place, 
cannot be analysed separately from the fiscal arena, in which financial decisions are 
taken: their relationship is dialectical. Public sector wage setting, in other words, 
shapes and is shaped by fiscal policy.  
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There is hardly anything more political than fiscal policy. The adoption of a given wage 
policy in the public sector is thus ultimately a political decision taken also - and 
sometimes primarily - in the realm of fiscal policy and for budgetary reasons. I concur 
with Gourevitch (1986, 19) that to understand policy choices “we must understand the 
politics that produces them.” Since the state’s financial resources are limited, 
discretionary decisions are to be made as to how to divide funds among alternative uses 
for which political parties, interest groups and administrative agencies (etc.) compete. 
Indeed, the size and shape of the budget is a matter of serious contention in political 
life: it is the mirror image, expressed in monetary terms, of governmental activity. As 
Wildavsky (1964, 4) has vividly put it “(i)f politics is regarded in part as conflict over 
whose preferences shall prevail in the determination of national policy, then the budget 
records the outcome of this struggle. If one asks, “Who gets what the government has 
to give?” then the answers for a moment in time are recorded in the budget. If one 
looks at politics as a process by which the government mobilises resources to meet 
pressing problems, then the budget is a focus of these efforts”. 
To investigate the politics of public sector wage policy requires an investigation of 
societal political developments and class relations through the lenses of public finance 
and fiscal policy. Schumpeter had it right with his plea for looking at the state, “its 
nature, its forms (and) its fate, as seen from the fiscal side” (1918). In fact, utilizing the 
lenses of fiscal policy to study public sector wage setting facilitates the research 
endeavour in two crucial ways (Schumpeter 1918). Fiscal policy has causal 
significance insofar as fiscal events are an important element in the causation of public 
sector wage policy in that the state is the ultimate political paymaster. Fiscal policy has 
symptomatic significance for everything that happens in public sector wage policy must 
have its fiscal reflection in the budgets. Differently from the private sector, in fact, the 
fiscal nature of wage policy in the public administration implies that to be enacted 
lawfully a wage policy will always have to go through a budget law. 
To understand the adoption of wage policy in the public sector we thus must 
understand the politics of fiscal policy. This means to understand what type of action 
resources do state actors mobilise and which coalitions they assemble in the political 
process of determining the fiscal resources which will have to be earmarked in budget 
laws. It is through fiscal policy which the public employers will ultimately pay for the 
additional flows of personnel costs. Determining the fiscal resources which will pay for 
wage policy is the central political process in the adoption of public sector wage policy. 
Either decreed by unilateral legislation or through collective bargaining, a wage policy 
in the public sector, to be adopted, must obtain the support of those state actors who 
have the political authority to eventually enact it.  
Within the state-centred institutionalist framework developed here, as recommended by 
Scharpf (1997b, 43), we need to first identify the set of interactions which produces the 
policy outcome to be explained. This allows us to identify the actors involved and to 
study their specific preferences and capabilities as shaped by the institutional 
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configuration introduced above. While actors will have preferences for certain policy 
outcomes, the translation of their preferences into policy outcomes depends on the 
successful mobilisation of resources that allow an actor to overcome conflict and 
competition with rival actors in the policy process and within the institutional setting. 
Capabilities, similar to the concept of power resources (Korpi 1985), refer to all “action 
resources that allow an actor to influence an outcome in certain respects and to a certain 
degree” (Scharpf 1997b, 43) (see section 4.2 for the employers’ side and 4.3 for the 
unions). These may consist of physical resources such as money, technological 
capabilities or asymmetric access to information. Most importantly for policy research, 
capabilities may originate in the very institutional setting. These are actors’ capabilities 
of legal nature which define competencies, specify the terms of actors’ participation in 
given processes or bestow veto rights in certain phases of particular policy processes.  
In public sector wage setting there is a central asymmetry of power between “capital 
and labour” which cannot be ignored. Public employers are political sovereigns who, in 
principle, have the legal authority to give course to unilateral action and override the 
decision preferences of other actors. Yet coercive power and physical sanctions run 
also the risk of creating alienation and a sense of illegitimacy (Korpi 1985; Scharpf 
1997b) which endangers the survival in office of public officials. It is thus not so clear 
a priori that the public employers will be always willing and capable to exercise 
unilateral action in public sector wage setting. Furthermore, the suggestion of this 
dissertation is that the very capacity of public employers to deploy sovereign authority 
is de facto undermined by the fragmented and decentralised nature of modern States. 
Public employers are not unitary actors. They are policy actors which partake of their 
policy prerogatives with a constellation of other policy actors within the state’s 
configuration. Conflicts of all sorts may thus emerge when it comes to the 
determination of budgetary and wage policies. This has implications for their capacity 
to mobilise action resources. Public employers must overcome their own collective 
action problems before being capable of adopting wage policies.  
What matters in public sector wage setting is not so much States’ sovereign authority 
per se but rather to what extent and under which conditions do public employers deploy 
their sovereign power. I have hypothesized that the capacity of the public employers to 
deploy their sovereign power in public sector wage setting is contingent on the 
following two conditions. First, the legal system must necessarily grant public 
employers the capacity to act unilaterally in wage setting. Without this legal capacity, 
or if the state is constrained in its actions by a third-party legal institution (e.g. 
constitutional/administrative/labour courts), no sovereign power can be mobilised in 
public sector wage setting through unilateral legislation. Secondly, when they are 
internally divided, to deploy their sovereign authority as a legal action resource, public 
employers must first overcome their collective action problems. To do so, a process of 
coalitional formation within the public employers’ camp will have to occur so as to 
assemble the political support necessary for enacting wage policy unilaterally.  
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If, instead, the legal system determines that the regulation of public sector employment 
relations occurs through collective bargaining, the public employers will have to 
engage in negotiations with the unions within the legal framework of independent 
bargaining. To “act” as wage setters thus the public employers need to form a united 
front through which to enter the process of wage negotiations. In this process, they will 
have to act as unitary actors in opposition to the labour front. The outcomes of public 
sector wage setting through collective bargaining negotiations is thus contingent on the 
participants’ power resources and environmental factors.  
Thus, both in order to act unilaterally and to enter collective bargaining, there will have 
to be a process of coalition building within the public employers’ camp. Public 
employers will have to forge political coalitions among themselves and/or with other 
state actors to push for desired policies within the contextualisation of the state. 
Studying these processes of political mis/alignments and coalition formation among the 
public employers is the empirical task which is now undertaken in the case study. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE GERMAN INSTITUTIONAL SETTING IN THE EARLY 
1990S 
This chapter sets the stage for the second part of the dissertation, which is empirical in 
nature. While the following chapters will deal with the historical reconstruction of 
public sector wage setting since Germany’s reunification, this chapter describes the 
characteristics of Germany’s institutional setting. The chapter is structured along the 
lines of the analytical framework introduced in chapter 4. Thus sub-section 5.1 
elaborates on the features of Germany’s politico-administrative system. Sub-section 5.2 
describes the system of public sector employment relations and interest representation. 
Sub-section 5.3 discusses the fiscal constitution of the German state and, lastly, sub-
section 5.4 deals with legal and fiscal watchdogs which may constrain governments’ 
actions. 
5.1 THE POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE 
Germany is a civil law country. The creation of the current political system results from 
the approval of the 1949 Basic Law, the constitutive act giving birth to the Federal 
Republic of Germany. After the destruction of the Nazi regime, Germany was 
subjected to military occupation by the allied powers. Its state was crafted in the 
territorial zones occupied by three victorious nations: France, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. A convergence of preferences had emerged among the allies on the 
necessity to institute a territorially decentralised political and administrative system. 
This was meant to protect the country’s democratic institutions and prevent the re-
emergence of centralizing and totalitarian political movements (Katzenstein 1987, 16). 
The type of federal system designed made sure a decentralised system be put in place in 
which Länder’s governments would obtain key important powers vis-à-vis the 
Federation. After all, the German States existed before the Federation was set up and 
their representatives played a key role in negotiating the Basic Law’s final text with the 
allies (Gunlicks 2003, 53-54).  
Germany’s constitutive act created a “democratic and socially conscious federal state”, 
formally composed of two tiers of government, the Federation (Bund) and the States 
(Länder). The States joined the Federation while retaining their statehood. 
Municipalities (Gemeinden) and Counties (Kreise) constituted the local self-
government. They form a constituent part of the Länder by whom they are directly 
supervised (Wagener and Blümel 2001, 95). Germany has three administrative levels: 
the central government represented by the Federation and two levels of subnational 
government, the States and the municipal governments. There exist three types of 
Länder: the larger territorial Länder, the smaller Länder and the city-States. Both the 
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States and the municipalities are guaranteed the right to organise their administrations 
as they see fit. 
Executive authority in the Federation rests on the Chancellor and her cabinet of 
ministers. Similarly, at the Länder level executive authority belongs to the minister-
president, the secretaries of state and the cabinet (Frank 2001). Local governments’ 
constitutions are a matter subjected to the Land’s authority. Länder have the 
responsibility to regulate the organisation of their municipalities. As a result, different 
arrangements exist that define the role and status of executive officers across the States. 
In general, executive power is hold by the leader of the city council (generally the 
mayor) or can be shared with other administrative figures (Lehmann-Grube and 
Dieckmann 2001). 
The Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the Chancellor all participate in the legislative 
process at the federal level and can introduce bills to the lower chamber. Legislative 
power is unequally shared between the Federation and the States. The Federation holds 
exclusive power to legislate on specific subjects as well as concurrent legislative 
powers which are shared with the States. Yet Länder’s legislative competencies are 
mostly residual. In matters where the Federation holds exclusive powers, States can 
legislate only when expressly authorised by the Federation. In matters of concurrent 
legislative power they can legislate only if and to the extent in which the Federation has 
not already made use of its power to legislate on a given issue. In the practice of 
government, this means that most of important legislative powers are exercised by the 
Federation (Federal Ministry of Finance 2009). Gunlicks (2003, 56) argues that in 
today’s Germany “there are relatively few legislative powers that have not been granted 
to the federal level by various means”. 
To the contrary, the power to implement and administer most federal legislation is 
assigned to the States and through them delegated
19
 to the local municipal governments 
who bear the lion’s share of administrative tasks (Wollmann 2001). This implies that 
the Federation’s executive powers and administrative capacity are extremely weak. A 
minority of public employees are thus employed at the federal level. The Federation 
has to rely on the subnational governments’ administrations for the implementation of 
federal legislation. As a result, the vast majority of public personnel - either with the 
legal status of civil servants (Beamte) or that of public employees (Tarifbeschäftigte) – 
are employed by the States and the municipalities. Most of administrative functions 
performed by municipalities are imposed on them by the laws of the Federation and, 
especially, the Länder. Few remaining decisions are taken by the local representative 
assembly. 
All Länder have unicameral legislatures. Instead, the federal legislature is bicameral. It 
comprises the Bundestag (the lower chamber) whose representatives are directly 
                                                                
19
 For an informative overview on the distribution of tasks and responsibilities across governmental 
levels see Thieme (2001). 
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elected and the Bundesrat (an upper chamber) composed of representatives of the 
States’ governments. Since the composition of the Bundesrat changes repeatedly 
according to election results at the Länder level, there is often the possibility of a 
divided parliamentary control of the two chambers. This occurs when majorities in the 
two chambers are held by different party coalitions. Since most of the important federal 
legislation requires two-thirds majorities in both chambers, divided majorities pose a 
challenge to the legislative process. Opposing parties can veto/amend legislation by 
using their majority to block or force changes in several government initiatives. The 
logic of voting differs across the two chambers. Voting in the Bundestag occurs along 
party lines whereas voting in the Bundesrat mostly follows from States’ interests 
(Timmins 2000, 80). Around 85 to 90 percent of all votes cast in the Bundestag are 
expression of party votes, while decisions in the Bundesrat are generally reached 
through political compromise among Länder governments (Langenbacher and Conradt 
2017, Ch. 7). The Basic Law assigns to the Bundestag primary legislative functions. 
Yet it also stipulates that around 50 percent of federal laws require the approval of 
Länder’s governments in the Bundesrat (Benz 1999, 56). This is the case particularly 
for federal legislation which affects Länder’s financial interests and requires their 
implementation. Hence, the enactment of federal legislation depends crucially on the 
agreement of Länder governments who have for this reason become a powerful and 
sometimes disruptive veto player in national policy making (Thelen and Karcher 2013). 
Scharpf (1988) has famously spoken of a joint decision trap to describe Germany’s 
legislative system as an institutional setting in which unanimity decision-making leads 
to the adoption of suboptimal policies and a status quo bias. 
The financial architecture of the system (described at length below) is also determined 
by federal tax legislation but revenues are shared by Länder and municipal 
governments and through a system of predetermined vertical transfers from the 
Federation and horizontal transfers among the States. Thus, while most of the 
administrative responsibilities fall upon subnational governments, Länder’s fiscal 
autonomy is severely curtailed by the centralised regulation of public finance. In terms 
of federal fiscal policy, the Finance Ministry is responsible for drafting the federal 
government’s budget and monitor spending by the various departments. It acts as the 
financial watchdog over the state’s agencies. Since the Finance Ministry must approve 
all government proposals dealing with money, it has de jure and de facto a veto power 
over any spending program regardless of whether they are favoured or not by the 
Chancellor (Langenbacher and Conradt 2017, 241). This power is grounded in the 
constitution which legally makes the Finance Minister the most important member of 
the government after the Chancellor. In the course of the case study, we shall see how 
the federal Finance Minister Theo Waigel played a crucial role in enforcing public 
sector wage restraint before the fiscal year 1997 to enable Germany meet the provisions 
of the Maastricht Treaty. 
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Scholars have described Germany as a centralised society with a decentralised 
“semisovereign” state (Katzenstein 1987). It is an asymmetric federal system (Benz 
1999) characterised by a “vertical decoupling” between the Federation’s legislative 
functions and the States’ administrative responsibilities (Wollmann 2001, 154). The 
Basic Law confers substantial political authority to the States in three ways 
(Langenbacher and Conradt 2017, 306-07). First, it assigns to the States legislative 
powers on key matters such as education, police and internal security, administration of 
justice, media and communication and the organisation and regulations of the 
bureaucracy. Second, it charges the States with the responsibility for the administration 
of federal law and the collection of the taxes being levied across the country. Third, it 
ensures the political representation of States’ interests via the upper chamber of the 
German federal legislature. 
Of great importance for the functioning of the German political and economic system is 
also a network of “para-public” institutions which have historically played important 
policy functions, inducing political and economic stability in the country (Katzenstein 
1987, 58-80). Social security funds administer the provision of insurance against 
illness, accidents and old age, while health funds are the financial backbone of the 
Healthcare system. Funds are financed largely through social contributions paid equally 
by employees and employers and are organised by economic sector, occupational 
groups and territory. In the course of the case study we shall see how this feature of the 
German political economy was crucial in the politics of fiscal policy in the aftermath of 
German reunification. In fact, over time, the funds have repeatedly played the role of 
political stabilisers. Governments have tended shift the fiscal costs of economic 
adjustments in hard times to the funds’ independent budgets. This has caused a 
troublesome increase of social insurance contributions which had to substitute for 
legislated tax hikes (Manow 2005; Manow and Seils 2000). The federal employment 
agency administers social insurance around the labour market and governs 
unemployment insurance and retraining schemes.  
5.2 PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AND THE SYSTEM OF INTEREST 
REPRESENTATION 
The “direct” public sector in Germany comprises all employees located at the three 
governmental levels, the federal, state and municipal. The indirect public sector 
consists of personnel employed in public law institutions such as the central bank, the 
social insurance funds and the federal employment agency. This dissertation looks only 
at the direct public sector. 
Public sector employment relations feature a hybrid system characterised by two sets of 
related regulation (Jacobi, Keller, and Müller-Jentsch 1992). On the one hand, 
conditions for employees under the status of civil servants (Beamte) are of public law 
nature and determined by special legislation (Bundesbesoldungsgesetz, BBesG). On the 
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other, public employees hired with the status of white- (Angestellte) and blue-collar 
workers (Arbeiter) are subjected to private labour law (Tarifvertragsgesetz) and enjoy 
collective bargaining rights similar to those granted to the private sector. The 
distinction between white and blue collar workers has existed until 2005 when the 
reform of the collective bargaining system created a new unified professional figure 
under the status of Tarifbeschäftigte. Unions and employers’ associations in the public 
sector negotiate through collective bargaining the terms of employment for the public 
employees with no special restrictions on industrial conflict. 
Keller (1981) has described the two distinct types of employment regulation as the 
bargaining model (regulating public employees) and the legislation model (for the 
Beamte). In fact, civil servants’ legal status finds its roots in the eighteenth-century 
Prussian civil service (Kuhlmann and Röber 2004). According to this tradition, the 
state’s professional civil servants enjoy the right to join unions, life-long employment, 
an adequate salary calibrated on the basis of the constitutionally guaranteed 
“maintenance principle” (Alimentationsprinzip) and generous tax-funded pension 
provisions managed by a separate social insurance scheme (Federal Ministry of the 
Interior 2014). Under the maintenance principle, public employers are obliged to 
provide an adequate remuneration to civil servants, commensurate to the position they 
occupy. This principle includes disability payments and pension, for which they pay no 
social contributions. In exchange, they are expected to respect the principles of loyalty, 
political neutrality, moderation and dedication to the public service. Civil servants are 
committed to ensure the public interest impartially and are entrusted to secure and 
safeguard the functions of the public administration. On the basis of this special 
relationship with the state, they are not allowed to bargain collectively nor to go on 
strike (Weiss and Schmidt 2008).  
Employment and pay conditions for civil servants are set through legislation. The 
procedure to increase wages is generally initiated after the collective bargaining for 
public employees has been concluded. The Federal Government submits a draft bill to 
the parliament for approval. The draft is prepared the Ministry of the Interior and it 
generally adheres to the terms agreed in collectively bargained contract for the public 
sector. In the process, the position of the trade unions representing civil servants is 
communicated to parliaments in the annex of the draft bill. Trade unions do not 
negotiate but merely exchange their view with the legislators (Federal Ministry of the 
Interior 2014, 99). The decision to determine the employees’ legal status (whether that 
of civil servant or salaried employee) of newly-hired personnel falls on the employers’ 
side and is arbitrary and often accidental. This has led to a situation in which 
employees performing similar jobs can have a different legal status most (notably in the 
education sector), with different economic conditions and legal rights (Keller 1999). 
In the past, the legislative power to regulate civil servants’ employment conditions and 
pay had initially been divided between the Federation and the Länder depending on the 
level at which they were employed. Federal civil servants would be regulated by 
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federal law. Civil servants employed at lower levels would instead be regulated by a 
federal level framework law. The framework law passed by the federal parliament 
dictated only general guidelines whose legislative details needed to be completed by 
the Land legislator. This granted States some leeway and enabled some differentiation 
in civil servants’ economic treatment. In 1971 the Basic Law was amended in order to 
have the federal government legislate on employment and pay conditions of all civil 
servants across all levels of government. This centralised regulation of civil servants’ 
employment conditions in the hands of the federal legislator. The reform occurred with 
the approval of the Länder in the Bundesrat. The States gave their consent because 
centralisation would have helped them to homogenise conditions in the public service 
across the country. They were strongly interested in reducing the salary competition 
which had emerged across States notwithstanding the little leeway that the civil service 
framework law of 1957 granted to Länder legislators (Gunlicks 2003, 123). In the 
course of the case we shall see how the status quo ante 1971 will be re-established 
through a reform of the German constitution driven by the richer German Länder. The 
federalism reform passed in 2006 redesigned the distribution of legislative powers. In 
the event, the Länder asked and (re)obtained the sole competence on setting the 
remuneration, pensions provisions and career structures of their civil servants (Benz 
and Sonnicksen 2017, 145). 
The distribution of public employment within the state’s governmental levels is 
significantly shaped by the clear division of powers between the Federation and the 
subnational levels. In the latter, the high shares of public employment depend on the 
fact that the administration of most of the labour intensive services are constitutionally 
assigned to the Länder and the municipalities (Bosch et al. 2012). This has relevant 
financial implications. Figure 11 (panel a) shows the asymmetric distribution of public 
employment within the three levels of the German public administration. As a result of 
this asymmetry, the Länder spend around 40% to 35% of their total expenditures on 
personnel costs, the municipalities around 30% to 25%, while the Federation spends 
only less than 10% on personnel costs (figure 10, panel b). In the course of the case 
study, we shall see how this asymmetry will play a crucial role in the political 
misalignment between the Länder and the two other levels of government in the early 
2000s.  
Employment levels in the German public sector went down dramatically through the 
1990s. The downsizing slowed down during the 2000s and since the crisis the public 
sector is being slowly expanded (figure 11). It was mostly employment of public 
employees which went down drastically, especially at the municipal level. Employment 
of both civil servants and public employees increased instead in the indirect public 
sector (social insurance funds, federal employment agency, etc.). Atypical forms of 
employment have become widespread also in the public sector over time (Keller and 
Seifert 2015). As with the civil servants, they generally do not occupy merely position 
in core state activities (e.g. police, army, ministries), but are employed widely in other 
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sectors, most notably the education sector. After the privatisation of the German 
railway system and the postal system, from the mid-1990s onwards, employment in the 
German civil service remained rather stable (figure 11 panel b). 
Figure 10: Distribution of personnel costs across the levels of the German public administration 
 
Both civil servants and public employees have the right to organise collectively. The 
structure of trade union representation in the public sector does not follow the principle 
of industrial unionism like in the private sector. Until 2001, when the creation of the 
United Services Union (Ver.di) redefined the trade unions landscape, various 
independent professional organisations represented different groups of public sector 
workers on the basis of status or ideology. Similar to the private sector, employment 
relations in the public sector are based on a dual structure. This includes interest 
representation through staff councils at the establishment level. Collective bargaining 
and industrial action on the other hand occur at the sectoral level under the aegis of 
trade unions and employers’ association. Possible disputes between the parts can be 
subjected to a process of external mediation by a third party, whose results, however, 
are not binding.  
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The Public Services, Transport and Communication Union (Gewerkschaft öffentliche 
Dienste, Transport und Verkehr, ÖTV) was the dominant public sector trade union and, 
with approximately 2 million members in the early 1990s, was the second largest 
German union after IG Metall. ÖTV represented service sector workers beyond the 
public services, but its focus was predominantly on the public sector whose employees 
constituted 90% of its membership (Keller 1999). The other unions were much smaller. 
The Union of German Railway Employees (GdED) and the German Postal Union 
(DPG) were hardly hit by the privatisation of the railway and postal services during the 
1990s. The Union for Education and Science (GEW) and the Police Union (GdP) had a 
membership ranging from approximately 300.000 and 200.000 members respectively. 
All of these organisations were part of the German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB), the predominant umbrella organisation of the German trade 
unions. The German Union of Salaried Employees (Deutsche 
Angestelltengewerkschaft, DAG) instead became an independent union and decided to 
remain outside the DGB since 1949. It organised around 500.000 public employees. 
The German Civil Servants’ Association (Deutscher Beamtenbund, dbb), a peak level 
conFederation acting parallel to the DGB, includes more than fifty unions representing 
around 1.1 million members, mostly although not only with the status of Beamte.  
Figure 11: Public sector employment in Germany, total and by administrative level (1991-2015) 
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Due to a loss of membership throughout the 1990s and decreasing organisational 
strenght, in spring 2001 five service sector unions merged into the United Services 
Union (Ver.di) (the process is described in sub-section 5.3). The German Postal Union 
(DPG), the Commerce, Banking and Insurance Union (HBV), the Media Industry 
Union (IG Medien), ÖTV and the DAG merged into what became the largest trade 
union in any industrialised country (Keller 2005b). 
Trade unions represent public employees in the regulation of employment relations 
through collective bargaining with the public employers. Beamte do not have the right 
to bargain collectively but the protection of their interests during the legislative process 
determining employment relations is ensured through their associations’ (dbb and 
DGB) lobbying and networking activities (Schmidt and Müller 2018). Civil servants’ 
representative organisations have established ties in the political arena and, in 
procedural terms, have gained the right to hold consultations with the Ministry of the 
Interior twice a year (Keller 2010, 127).  
The German public employers are organised around the three main administrative 
levels of the federal state (Keller 2011). There are no independent agencies 
representing the government in employment relations in Germany. At the federal level, 
the Minister of the Interior - in coordination with the Finance Minister - is the figure 
responsible for the regulation of employment conditions and for drafting pay legislation 
for civil servants. At the Länder level, States’ interests are represented by the 
bargaining association of the Länder (Tarifgemeinschaft deutscher Länder, TdL), to 
which States generally send their Finance Ministers. At the local level an umbrella 
organisation (Vereinigung der kommunalen Arbeitgeberverbände, VKA) groups 
together the different employers’ association (Kommunalen Arbeitgeberverbände, 
KVA) present in each state. 
Until the overhaul of the wage bargaining system in 2005, collective bargaining in the 
public sector has been centralised and encompassing. Bargaining has been the sole 
mode of pay determination for public employees covering all the three administrative 
levels and all the trade unions. Wages and employment conditions were generally 
settled jointly during yearly rounds of negotiations between the unions and the 
employers. Prior to the reform, most of public employees were regulated by three main 
collective contracts (Dribbusch and Schulten 2007, 159): the Federal Collective 
Agreement for white-collar workers (BAT), the Federal Collective Agreement for blue-
collar workers (MTArb) and the Federal Collective Agreement for blue-collar workers 
at the local level (BMT G II). 
On the unions’ side, ÖTV used to be the dominant actor in negotiations and 
coordinated requests from the smaller unions. Until 1976, the ÖTV bargained jointly 
with the public sector wing of the white collars’ union DAG (outside of the DGB) but 
differences over pay structures led the ÖTV to end the arrangement (Markovits and 
Silvia 1992, 178). On the employers’ side, TdL and VKA were part of a bargaining 
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coalition (Tarifgemeinschaft) in which the three employers bargained jointly under the 
leadership of the Minister of the Interior. The employers’ bargaining coalition had 
meant to reach a single national collective agreement in order to avoid differences in 
the public sector. Until the reform, the unions’ bargaining cooperation (led by ÖTV) 
and the public employers’ bargaining coalition (led by the Federal Minister of the 
Interior) ensured the centralisation of wage bargaining in the public sector. This has led 
to great homogeneity of pay and employment conditions in public services across the 
country (Keller 1999). 
5.3 THE FISCAL CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE 
Most of the taxes in Germany are collected by the States who act as administrative 
agents for the Federation. A system of both separate (Trennsystem) and joint 
(Verbundsystem) taxes co-exists. Under the system of separate apportionment of 
revenues, each governmental tier appropriates the revenues from specified taxes. For 
instance, the Federation enjoys the yields of fiscal monopolies and other taxes (e.g. 
custom duties, road freight, some excise taxes, etc.). The States collect own revenues 
from inheritance tax, bee duties and taxes on motor vehicles while municipalities 
collect revenues from trade tax and real property tax. These are however minor taxes. 
The major taxes, which together form more than 80% of total revenues (Buettner 2006, 
217), are subjected to the regime of shared apportionment (joint taxation) among the 
three governmental levels. These are the personal and corporate income taxes and the 
VAT. The Basic Law legally restricts federal and Länder borrowing only to investment 
spending, while borrowing at the local level is allowed only for cash-flow reasons and 
is subject to Länder’s control (Spahn and Fottinger 1997). 
Germany disposes of an intricate system
20
 of vertical redistribution among the 
administrative units of the Federation (vertikaler Finanzausgleich) and horizontally 
across the Länder (horizontaler Finanzausgleich). The system, constituted of five 
stages of fiscal equalisation, is meant to equalise each state’s per capita governmental 
revenues in order to allow the States to preserve the “equivalency of living conditions” 
(art. 72(2) Basic Law) across the country. In the first stage, both separate and joint 
taxes are vertically redistributed from the Federation to the Länder in order to provide 
the primary resources to carry out their administrative responsibilities. In stage two and 
three, joint tax revenues are redistributed horizontally across the States. Personal and 
corporate income taxes are distributed according to the residency principle (örtilisches 
Aufkommen) while 75% of the Land share of the VAT is distributed on a population 
basis. Subsequently, in stage three, the remaining 25% of VAT revenues is distributed 
from more affluent States to poorer ones in order to lift their per capita revenues up to 
92% of the average of all Länder. In stage four resources are redistributed from rich to 
                                                                
20
 A thorough technical analysis of the system is beyond the scope of this dissertation. A good overview 
is given by Gunlicks (2000), Gunlicks (2003, Ch.5) and the Federal Ministry of Finance (2009). 
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poor States on the basis of their fiscal needs. States whose fiscal capacity exceeds their 
fiscal needs redistribute resources to poorer States so as to bring their fiscal capacity up 
to 95% of the average. In stage five, federal supplementary grants are given to the 
poorer States so that their fiscal capacity reaches 99.5% of the average.  
The salient trait of this complicated system is that, despite the federal system of the 
country, the tax system is highly centralised, creating cleavages and political tensions. 
In fact, the system creates an asymmetry between the Federation and subnational 
governments, making the latter structurally dependent on the former. For instance, in 
2014 the Federal government collected about 42% of all tax revenues while being 
responsible only for about 28% of all public expenditures. On the contrary, States and 
local communities’ expenditures constantly outpace their revenues, making them 
reliant on the federal government to cover the difference (Langenbacher and Conradt 
2017, 322). 
The German fiscal constitution (Finanzverfassung) is thus characterised by two sorts of 
tensions. On the one hand, the Basic Law requires the Länder to sustain a unitary 
welfare state in order to avoid regional disparities across the country and ensure 
“nation-wide expectations of fairness and equality” (Gunlicks 2003, 163). On the other, 
it ensures that the Länder remain autonomous and independent of each other and of the 
Federation as far as the management of their budgets is concerned (art. 109(1) Basic 
Law). The second source of tension stems from the centralisation of tax legislation at 
the federal level and the decentralisation of administrative tasks to subnational 
governments. This is a core peculiarity of the German fiscal federalism system. 
Concerning the first source of tension, given large disparities in States’ economic 
development and thus tax capacity, a system of intergovernmental transfers is needed to 
redistribute revenues and enable States to meet the constitutional principle of 
“equivalency of living conditions” across the country. With regard to the second, the 
result is that the complex architecture of the German fiscal constitution structurally 
constrains the fiscal autonomy of the Länder. States do not dispose of the autonomous 
legal capacity to manipulate revenue arrangements at will. In fact, while they bear most 
of the burden of administrative responsibilities, each Land taken alone has virtually no 
influence over federal tax legislation. This specificity puts enormous pressures on the 
Länder and the municipalities to rein in expenditures given the lack of fiscal autonomy 
on the revenues side. 
Financial arrangements are defined by the Basic Law. Lack of fiscal autonomy stems 
from the fact that major revisions of tax legislation require a constitutional change 
which can be implemented only through a two-thirds majority in both chambers of the 
federal parliament (Spahn and Fottinger 1997). This implies that nearly all significant 
changes to the tax regime necessitate a broad consensus, if not unanimous agreement, 
between the governing majority at the federal level and the governments of the Länder. 
However, this system of “joint decision-making” can morph into a “joint-decision trap” 
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when Länder governments control a hostile political majority in the upper chamber 
(Scharpf 2005). In hard-core financial issues, States’ prime ministers naturally tend to 
prioritise the Land interest over party loyalty when voting in the Bundesrat. This means 
that asymmetric interests between poor and rich States further increase the rigidity of 
the system and diminish the likelihood of compromised reforms. The situation has 
grown ever more problematic after reunification has considerably increased the 
disparity between rich and the poor States of Eastern Germany. 
Gunlicks (2003, 164) provides an apt depiction of the system, useful to understand how 
the different tiers interlock with each other:  
“the federal government does not control the tax system, but the Federation does. … (T)he 
government and its majority in the Bundestag can pass legislation that also binds the Länder, 
but the Bundesrat, which represents the Land governments, must approve such legislation as 
long as the tax revenues accrue at least partially to the Land or local governments. The result 
is that the Länder … have about as much power collectively as the federal government and its 
majority in the Bundestag in passing finance legislation, but the individual Länder, especially 
if they are in the minority, have little influence. The Land parliaments, which are not 
represented in the Bundesrat, have even less to say.” 
Given the interlock of the Bundestag’s veto power within a system of shared taxes and 
fiscal equalisation among unequal States, a two-dimensional conflict line exists in the 
system of public finance in Germany. The centralisation of tax powers at the federal 
level has left the States with no fiscal autonomy and the municipalities with very little 
autonomy (on property and business taxes). This produces a “vertical” cleavage 
between the Federation (whose taxing powers have grown over time) and the Länder, 
whose expenditures are predominantly funded by centrally regulated taxes (and grants) 
over which they exercise no control except for the collective action in the Bundesrat. In 
the latter, however, consensus-based decisions are hampered by a “horizontal” cleavage 
between rich and poor States, who can outvote them. The situation leaves everyone 
unsatisfied (Gunlicks 2003, 190-99). Richer States (i.e. Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, 
Hamburg and Hessen) would like to retain a larger share of tax revenues on their 
territory and break free from the costly system of fiscal equalisation (in which they are 
net contributors) in order to obtain fiscal autonomy. This would introduce a system of 
competitive federalism. The overhaul of the system however is blocked by the veto 
power of poorer Länder who depend structurally on the fiscal equalisation system to 
continue ensure the equivalence of living conditions across the countries.  
Needless to say, the poor States fear losing intergovernmental revenues: with a reform 
of the equalisation system their spending capacity would be curtailed further. Given 
economic disparities and structural factors beyond their control, poor States would be 
net losers in a system of competitive federalism. In the course of the case study we 
shall see how these features of the German system of fiscal federalism have had crucial 
implications for the constitution of the new institutional equilibrium in public sector 
wage setting. 
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5.4 LEGAL AND FISCAL WATCHDOGS 
German law has the character of codified law influenced by the tradition of Roman 
legal codes and the Napoleonic code. This means that there exists a written legal 
system with no judge-made laws, like in the Anglo-American common law systems. 
Judicial review, i.e. the authority of highest courts to nullify legislative or executive 
acts on constitutional grounds, was included in the Basic Law in line with the desire to 
check and balance governmental authority. An administratively independent and 
financially autonomous Constitutional Court was set up in 1951 charged with the 
functions of judicial review, the adjudication of disputes between States and federal 
institutions, the protection of individual rights and the safeguarding of the 
constitutional and democratic order (Langenbacher and Conradt 2017, 293).  
Similarly, government auditing is provided in Germany by the Federal Court of Audit 
(Bundesrechnungshof) and each Land’s auditing Court (Landesrechnungshöfe). The 
court is charged with the task of “auditing the account and examine the performance, 
regularity and compliance of financial management” of all financial operations and 
transactions of the federal and States’ governments (Von Wedel 2005). Yet their 
mandate is limited to recommendations and their function is not a judicial one. Hence, 
their decisions and suggestions are not binding. 
The German Bundesbank constitutes a fundamental centre of power within the German 
political economy. The Bundesbank served as the central bank of the country until the 
ECB took over the responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy in 1999. The 
Bundesbank is legally independent from the federal government, the Länder and, 
differently from other para-public institutions, also from socio-economic organised 
interests. The Bundesbank is not accountable to the parliament and it has been 
generally seen as one of the most independent and conservative (inflation-averse) 
central bank in the world. Frequent have been the contrasts between the Central Bank, 
the government and social partners around the Bundesbank’s assertive anti-inflationary 
behaviour. According to its constitution, the Bundesbank is obliged to support the 
government’s economic policy only to the extent to which accommodation does not 
conflict with the bank’s primary objective of safeguarding the currency (Langenbacher 
and Conradt 2017, 285-86). These conflicts have often put it in a structural position to 
successfully impose on the social partners the conduct of moderate fiscal and wage 
policies under the threat of severe monetary tightening (Marsh 1992). Thus through the 
legal capacity to control monetary policy independently, the Bundesbank could use its 
power to severely affect or even impose U-turns in both fiscal and wage policies. This 
dynamic is famously demonstrated by the example of the 1973-1974 critical juncture 
when the bank completed its turn toward monetarism. In the event, the Bundesbank 
tightened monetary policy to punish the loss of wage discipline (hence of fiscal 
discipline too) by the public sector trade union ÖTV which had managed to extract a 
12% wage increase during the 1974 bargaining round (Scharpf 1991, 128-39).  
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CHAPTER 6. THE 1990S. DIE BLÜHENDEN LANDSCHAFTEN HIT THE 
VINCOLO ESTERNO 
This chapter takes the reader through a historical analytical reconstruction of public 
sector wage setting in Germany during the 1990s. In Sub-section 6.1 the aftermath of 
reunification is analysed as a period in which both fiscal and wage discipline were lost. 
This triggered the reaction of the Bundesbank which, by tightening monetary policy, 
induced a U-turn in both fiscal and wage policy. Sub-section 6.2 thus covers the period 
1994-1997 in which public sector wage restraint began in relation to the public 
employers’ necessity to pursue a policy of fiscal consolidation. Lastly, sub-section 6.3 
provides a critical analysis of the historical reconstruction in light of the alternative 
explanations derived from the literature review. 
6.1 REUNIFICATION AND THE LOSS OF FISCAL AND WAGE DISCIPLINE (1990-1993) 
In Germany, the 1980s was a decade of steady but not drastic fiscal consolidation. 
After a coalition between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Free 
Democratic Party (FDP) took power in 1982, a trajectory of moderate fiscal austerity 
was sold to the electorate as an exercise in “social balance” and as a necessity to revive 
the “social market economy” (Zohlnhöfer 2007, 1128-29). Consolidation was pursued 
regardless of the SPD-led opposition which, while being in disagreement, did not have 
a majority in the Bundesrat to obstruct it. In 1984, a savings package (Sparpaket) was 
implemented to continue the trajectory of fiscal consolidation and avoid undermining 
business confidence. Deficit reduction was achieved entirely through spending cuts. Of 
the entire amount of spending cuts (11.8bn DM or 0.6% GDP), more than half of the 
savings were obtained through legislated cuts on civil servants’ salaries and 
unemployment benefits, which were reduced from 68 to 63% of net earnings (Devries 
et al. 2011, 39).  
After the civil service had paid its toll to ensure the consolidation of German finances, 
the 1980s developed fairly smoothly. When reunification approached, Germany was in 
a relatively good fiscal shape. On 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell and conjointly 
the GDR’s borders with West Germany were opened. Millions of East Germans 
flocked to the Bonn Republic, asking for freedom and prosperity. The Socialist Unity 
Party, which had maintained a forty-year monopoly of power in the GDR, had begun to 
crumble. In an attempt to seize control of the process, the CDU Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl presented before the Bundestag a ten-point program aimed at gradually unifying 
the two States over the course of the following decade. Yet history moved faster. 
Deteriorating economic conditions and the incoming of Eastern Germans into the West 
accelerated the necessity to anticipate elections in the GDR to mid-March 1990. A pro-
unification grand coalition of CDU, Liberals and SPD took power with the mandate to 
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guide the assimilation process of the GDR into the Federal Republic of Germany. On 1 
July 1990, the First State Treaty entered into force which set the terms for the 
Currency, Economic and Social Union. The East German economy was on the brink of 
collapse. The Deutschemark, together with the FRG’s welfare and social provisions of 
the Social Market Economy, were introduced wholesale in the East. Eventually, 
political unification was achieved on the condition that elections would be immediately 
held in the new unified Germany. On 3 October 1990 Germany was reunified and the 
GDR became “nothing but a footnote in world history”
21
 (Paterson and Smith 1992). 
On the day of currency unification, during a televised speech addressed to his fellow 
Germans, Chancellor Kohl had pledged to turn the new Länder into blossoming 
landscapes (Blühende Landschaften) through a joint effort to equalise Eastern 
Germany’s living conditions on a par with those in the West. Over the process, he 
pledged, “no one will have to do without anything”, “No one will be worse off than 
before”, “and many will be better off”. The first general elections in the reunified 
Germany were held in December 1990 and, thanks to the determined stewardship of the 
unification process, resulted in an overwhelming success for Kohl. A CDU/CSU/FDP 
coalition government was subsequently formed under the assumption that the costs of 
reunification would be met mostly thanks to budget cuts and increasing tax receipts as a 
result of an economic boom (Poguntke 1992). Further revenues would ensue from the 
privatisation of Eastern Germany’s companies entrusted to the newly created Treuhand 
agency
22
.  
Public policy in the immediate aftermath of reunification was driven by the objectives 
of minimizing social conflict and ensuring a rapid and smooth convergence between 
the East and the West. The herculean task the government was confronted with was that 
of integrating a command economy into a capitalist market economy. For the purpose, 
a “big bang” approach was eventually adopted. The hope was that the shock to which 
Eastern Germany was about to be exposed to would be mitigated by the institutional 
and financial support of Western Germany. The entry into force of the currency, 
economic and social union meant that, as of July 1990, property rights were 
reintroduced in Eastern Germany and a regime of tariff-free internal trade was adopted. 
Monetary unification brought the D-Mark to the East. Against the will of the 
Bundesbank, a political decision was taken to convert wages, salaries and other 
recurring payments at a par, while the conversion of assets and liabilities into the new 
currency was set at 2:1. West Germany’s regulations on competition, corporate and 
social issues were extended to the new States. These included a common legal 
                                                                
21
 This quote is attributed to the German writer Stefan Heym. 
22
 The Treuhandanstalt was a public agency owned by the Federation which was set up on 1 March 1990. 
It took over, as an institutional trustee, the nationalised economy of Eastern Germany with the purpose of 
managing the dismissal of the Eastern companies through privatisations. At the end of 1994 the agency’s 
operations were terminated. The agency closed with DM270bn of debt which, as of 1 January 1995 has 
been taken over by the Federal budget. For a more detailed analysis see (Czada 2000). 
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framework for the institutions and the regulation of the labour market and collective 
bargaining. In the process of institutional transfer, the unions of the DGB had agreed to 
resort to the Western jurisdiction in case of controversies on unions’ reorganisations. 
Yet they also orchestrated the dissolution of their Eastern counterparts to then recruit 
members from the East within their ranks. Only IG Chemie merged with its Eastern 
sister (Markovits and Silvia 1992, 173). To facilitate adjustment in the Eastern labour 
market, early retirement benefits were granted to workers over the age of 55 and the 
civil servants which became redundant in the course of administrative reorganisation 
were put on a waiting list, pending future replacement (OECD 1991, 36).  
As it turned out, the economic boom on which political promises and economic 
projections were based occurred only partially and disparities widened between the 
West and the East. While the expansion of fixed investments and private consumption 
generated faster growth and declining unemployment in the West, throughout 1990 and 
1991 different factors brought the Eastern economy to its knees. The sudden full 
exposure to international market competition, on a par with strong socio-political 
pressures for wage convergence to the Western levels, led to the collapse of a 
structurally-weak industry in Eastern Germany. The collapse of the COMECON 
common market reduced Eastern German exports to Eastern Europe and the USSR, 
while the old goods of the GDR were being repudiated at home as a sign of a breach 
with the past. As a result, industrial production fell abruptly over the course of 1990 
(with peaks of output losses of 70% in the metalworking sector) and unemployment 
skyrocketed (OECD 1991). 
Economic hardship in the East scaled up the challenge of financing reunification and 
support incomes and living standards in the new States. In line with election promises, 
no major taxes were initially announced to finance reunification. For the major part, 
this meant that, throughout the process, the government strategically shifted the 
financial burden onto the German contribution-based welfare state. Social security 
levies and higher telephone charges served as functional equivalence to increase 
revenues for the federal budget (Poguntke 1992). In fact, given that Germany’s social 
insurance schemes enjoy fiscal autonomy and are financed out of contributions levied 
on wages, the government avoided introducing major taxes. It instead raised 
unemployment insurance contributions by 2.5% in 1991 and exploited the health 
insurance and pension schemes to indirectly cover parts of the ensuing social 
expenditures for the East (Manow and Seils 2000). Over the course of 1991 it became 
clear that higher pressures on spending had to be met with higher taxation. The 
government provided support to strengthen investments in the East through a package 
of subsidies named “Upswing East”, some fuel and energy taxes were increased and a 
7.5% solidarity surcharge on income and corporation tax was introduced.  
For the other part, until 1993 when the first effort to retrench was pursued, in the 
aftermath of reunification the government tolerated sharp increases in budget deficits 
(Zohlnhöfer 2007, 1130). The costs for the budgets of the old States were modest while 
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the Federation footed the bulk of the reunification bill. The German Unity Fund was 
created to finance the deficits of the new Länder until 1995 when they would 
eventually join the Western Germany’s fiscal equalisation scheme. Allowing from the 
beginning the new States into the system would have meant an increase in horizontal 
transfers to the poor Eastern Länder from DM3.5billion in 1989 to DM 20 billion. This 
would have made all the old Länder but Bremen and Saarland net contributors to the 
system (OECD 1993, 88-89). Before unification in 1990, the West German States had 
therefore exploited their veto in the Bundesrat to block the extension of the equalisation 
scheme to the Eastern States. Furthermore, in the context of negotiations for a 
“solidarity pact” in 1992, the reform of the fiscal equalisation scheme was negotiated 
between the federal government and the States in order to incorporate the new East 
German States. The Länder united managed to extract an increase in the States’ share 
of VAT revenues from 37 to 45% to finance new transfers to the East (Sally and 
Webber 1994). 
Next to the loss of fiscal discipline necessary to subsidise the East, the loss of wage 
moderation contributed further to inflate the economy. The wage agreements which 
were conducted in the second half of 1990 led to substantial increases in basic wages, 
improvements in working condition and clauses to protect or compensate redundant 
employees against dismissals. Wage agreements in the metal and electrical industries 
became the pilot agreements to equalise gradually, despite remarkable productivity 
differentials, Eastern wages to Western levels by 1994 (D. Goodhart 1991). Wage 
equalisation was welcomed by both unions and employers in order to sedate east-to-
west labour migration and avoid wage dumping. Overall, in 1990 wage increases 
throughout the economy averaged 6% and agreements in the metalworking sector also 
envisaged special reductions in working hours (OECD 1991, 51-54). 
To punish the government and the wage setters for their lack of moderation (Lange and 
Pugh 1998, 168-69) and to snap off an intensifying cost-price spiral which had become 
clear by summer 1991 (Fisher 1991b), the Bundesbank raised its Discount rate and 
Lombard rate to unprecedented levels.
23
 By pursuing a policy of extraordinarily tight 
money, which lasted for a prolonged span of time, the Bundesbank imposed on the 
wage setters the necessity to moderate their claims and, on the fiscal authorities, the 
pursuit of a strict policy of fiscal consolidation at any price (Jörg  Bibow 2003). In the 
meantime, in December 1992, the German Parliament approved the ratification of the 
Maastricht treaty which set the German political economy on its “Road to the EMU”. 
This meant that the criteria of sound public finances and price stability had to be met at 
last by 1999, with the first verification test being the 1997 fiscal year.  
                                                                
23
 The discount rate was increased from 6% on November 2
nd
 1990 up to its peak of 8.75% on July 17
th
 
1992. The Lombard rate was increased from 8.5% to 9.75% during the same time span (Bundesbank, 
Interest rates statistics). 
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1991 
While the other contracts in the private sector were being negotiated throughout 1990, 
public sector wages were still regulated by the previous contract which envisaged a 
1.7% increase due to terminate by the end of the year. Trade unions’ requests for the 
1991 public sector contract were advanced in the second-half of November 1990, when 
ÖTV claimed a pay increase of 10% for 4.6m employees in the public sector (Marsh 
1990). The demands were openly against the recommendations of the Bundesbank 
which had suggested a corridor in between 1% to 2% due to budgetary and inflationary 
concerns (Fisher 1990). 
The December 1990 elections led to the formation, in January 1991, of a Christian-
liberal coalition government which, however, at the Hessen land election on January 
20
th
 immediately lost its majority in the Bundesrat in favour of the SPD-led opposition. 
Negotiations between the employers and the unions took place in March with the 
employers offering a 4.2% rise, highlighting the difficulty of the budgetary situation. 
Against this, ÖTV called for a one-day warning strike claiming that public employees 
had not experienced real wage increases since 1975 and that public sector pay was 
lagging behind that in the private sector by 16.5% (D. Goodhart 1991). Amidst 
expectations by economic commentators of a pay settlement around 5%, negotiations 
were concluded quickly in the second half of March with the government conceding a 
6% pay increase. With the agreement, the legal framework for collective bargaining in 
the public sector was extended to the Eastern German public sector with Eastern wages 
starting at a 60% level of those in the West. Similar provisions were then extended to 
the civil servants via legislation (Bundesbesoldungsgesetz) effected in February 1991 
but valid retroactively from March 1
st
 1991, thus two months in delay with regard to 
the entry into effect of the collective bargaining contract. 
1992 
The autumn of 1991 was presented in the economic press as the “autumn of discontent” 
(Peel 1991a). Indeed, the ensuing wage-price spiral had become clear during the 
summer when inflation reached a peak of 4.3% in the populous state of North Rhine-
Westphalia (Fisher 1991b). By the end of 1991 the cost of living index was rising at a 
21% pace in Eastern Germany in the face of an unemployment rate of around 15% 
(OECD 1992, 56). The Bundesbank raised interest rates in mid-august 1991 right in 
advance of exploratory meetings between the engineering employers and the IG Metall. 
This was intended to send a strong signal that the Bank would no longer tolerate further 
“irresponsible” pay settlements like those which were hitherto averaging around 7% 
(Fisher 1991a). The 1992 “hot” negotiating cycle took place against the background of 
steepening “home-made” inflationary pressures and the collapse of output and 
employment in Eastern Germany. 
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Ignoring appeals for moderation from the government, the Bundesbank and the 
employers, in late October 1991, IG Metall staged a request for a 10% wage increase 
(Parkes 1991) and ÖTV followed suit advancing a 9.5%. On 20 December the 
Bundesbank again raised both the discount rate from 7.5 to 8% and the Lombard rate 
from 9.25% to 9.75% as a direct attack on the wage negotiations rounds. Trade unions 
reacted furiously to what they perceived as an unjustified interference in the wage 
bargaining process to the point that Monika Wulf-Mathies, the leader of ÖTV, accused 
the Bundesbank of acting as “an agency of war” (Peel 1991b). 
During his end of the year speech, Kohl urged the trade unions to lower their wage 
claims but, in early January, tensions emerged within the government when the FDP 
economics minister Jürgen Möllemann advanced a proposal to impose a statutory pay 
limit of 5% on the civil servants. In order to send a signal to the private sector and to 
influence wage negotiations for the public employees, the German government, he 
argued, “should use its legislative powers to limit civil service pay rises … to less than 
5%” (Parkes 1992b). In reaching beyond his ministry’s competence, the economics 
minister had intended to turn the logic of the public sector negotiations on its head. In 
fact, the usual procedure envisaged that, after a wage agreement for the public 
employees was reached with the trade unions, similar provisions would subsequently 
be adopted through legislation and applied to the civil servants. This procedure has 
been in the interest of both parts to avoid tensions between two distinct legal spheres 
within the public workforce. Möllemann intended to reverse the procedure and, by 
imposing an ex ante statutory wage ceiling on the civil servants, he hoped to force 
restraint upon the public sector settlement with ÖTV. Needless to say, the dbb, the 
DGB and all the other unions involved rebuked the proposal, denouncing it as an undue 
interference in free collective bargaining (EIRR January 1992). Upon the proposal, 
contrasts emerged between the economics and interior ministries, respectively under 
FDP and CDU leadership. The CDU Interior Minister Rudolf Seiters firmly rejected 
Möllemann’s proposal and publicly attacked him for interfering in matters of public 
sector pay, a prerogative of the Interior Ministry. While both Möllemann and the FDP 
chairman Otto Lambsdorff defended the proposal to act unilaterally as “a remarkable 
solution for a remarkable situation”, Seiters (flanked by the DGB the ÖTV and IG 
Metall) dismissed them arguing that in matters of civil servants’ pay determination 
“public suggestions from the economics minister are neither appropriate nor helpful” 
(Parkes 1992a). 
On behalf of the federal, state and local authorities, the Interior Minister Seiters tabled 
a pay offer of 3.5%. The offer was deemed unacceptable by the unions which were 
asking for a 9.5%. The government was unwilling to compromise and modify the offer 
because it wanted to impose a turnaround in the trend of excessively generous pay 
settlements. When talks collapsed in March, after four unsuccessful rounds of 
negotiations, ÖTV’s plan to call an immediate ballot to go on strike was neutralised by 
the employers’ call for arbitration (Peel 1992a). Arbitration imposes a six-week peace 
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period. Thus, in early April the arbitrators advanced a non-binding proposal for a 5.4% 
increase which both parts rejected (Parkes 1992c). Among the employers especially, a 
consensus emerged around a maximum final offer which should be not higher than 
4.8%. ÖTV found it unacceptable. 
As a result, both unions in the public sector cast internal ballots to launch strike action. 
After positive results in the internal ballots, the DAG the DPG the ÖTV and other 
smaller unions launched a full-scale strike which disrupted public services throughout 
Western Germany. Up to 330.000 public workers were mobilised, bringing chaos to 
road, railways, airports, postal and refuse collection services in what became one of the 
most disruptive public sector strike in the history of Germany (Keller 2017). Rather 
than a simple strike, the union’s move was a political action which enjoyed widespread 
public sympathy (EIRR May 1992). The unions were attacking principally the 
government’s proposal to pay for unification by imposing public sector wage restraint 
on the one hand and legislate tax increases which burdened wage earners on the other 
(Markovits and Silvia 1992, 182).  
Public employers were somehow split on whether to give up to unions’ claims. The 
SPD Finance Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, Heide Simonis, was signalling the desire 
on behalf of the Länder to reach a compromise beyond the 4.8%. The Interior Minister 
Seiters opposed any further improvement (Peel 1992c). Eventually, after eleven 
consecutive days, in early May, ÖTV achieved a pay settlement of 5.4% (including 
200DM extra holiday pay and extra lump-sums for the lower paid) in line with the 
arbitrators’ proposal which the employers had previously rejected. A compromised 
solution was favoured by the employers of the Länder who had signalled their intention 
to put an end to the unions’ disruptive strike actions.  
While the settlement was welcomed by all the other public sector trade unions, the 
grass roots of ÖTV, unsatisfied with the results after prolonged mobilisation, issued a 
formal complaint. This forced the union leaders to cast an internal ballot on the 
agreement’s result which eventually did not obtain a majority. As a result, the week 
after the victorious public sector settlement, ÖTV leader Monica Wulf-Mathies was 
asked to resign. At the same time, the Interior Minister Seiters ruled out any possibility 
to reopen negotiations for further improvements (Peel 1992b). The ÖTV leader refused 
the resign and called upon ÖTV’s members to show a “greater degree of political and 
economic realism” for what had been a successful bargaining round for the public 
sector (EIRR July 1992). The situation was resolved after the “pilot agreement” in the 
metalworking sector was signed on May 18
th
. This came to her rescue and helped to 
resolve the intestine conflict within the ÖTV. Of help to Mrs Wulf-Mathies was the fact 
that the powerful IG Metall too had to back down from initial demands of 9.5%. 
Against the metalworking employers which had offered a mere 3.3%, the IG Metall’s 
union leadership could point at the generous public sector settlement. This forced the 
employers to push up their initial offer. Eventually, to avoid industrial action 
metalworking unions and employers settled on a compromise crafted around the 5.4% 
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obtained in early May in the public sector (EIRR June 1992). Thus, the ÖTV 
bargaining commission argued that a better result could not be achieved with a renewed 
industrial action and refused to reopen negotiations in accordance with their internal 
statute.  
Similar provisions to those bargained collectively for the public employees were then 
transferred through legislation effected in March 1993 to the civil servants. 
1993 
With a fall in demand and output throughout 1992 and the beginning of 1993 (OECD 
1994), Germany had started to endure the recessionary effects of the Bundesbank’s 
monetary tightening. In December 1992 ÖTV advanced its requests for the 1993 
bargaining season. While Monica Wulf-Mathies acknowledged the country’s economic 
stagnation, she renewed her intention not to tolerate losses in workers’ real incomes. In 
fact, in early 1992 the government had managed to push through the Bundesrat an 
increase in the VAT tax with the support of the SPD-led Brandenburg government 
(Sally and Webber 1994, 24). With an inflation rate at 4%, ÖTV’s chair advanced a pay 
claim of 5% with a minimum increase of 150DM to favour lower income groups and 
reduction in the 38.5 weekly working hours. Furthermore, ÖTV firmly rejected the 
public employers’ proposal to slow down wage equalisation of Eastern to Western 
wages, due to rise to 80% as of 1
st
 July 1993 (EIRR December 1992). 
After three failed negotiating rounds, the public employers, led by the Interior Minister 
Seiters, made a 3% offer which paved the way to a smooth agreement in early February 
1993. As a result of two intense days of bargaining, on 4-5 February, the DAG and 
ÖTV’s negotiators recommended to accept the 3% offer which they regarded as a 
“responsible” deal, taking into consideration the deteriorating economic climate and the 
financial burden of reunification (EIRR March 1993). The agreement struck a mid-way 
between compensating employees for the inflation level without the possibility, 
however, to take into account the VAT tax hike. Similar provisions as those negotiated 
for the public employees were extended to the Beamte through legislation effected in 
December 1993. The entry into force of the pay increase for the civil servants, 
however, was delayed until May 1
st
, with four months of delay compared to the public 
employees. 
The public sector wage agreement was being closely monitored by the Bundesbank 
which had publicly recommended a 3.5% as the acceptable upper ceiling (Parkes 
1993). As a matter of fact, the moderate agreement paved the way, on the same day, to 
the Bundesbank gradually reversing its policy of tight monetary. After interest rates had 
reached historical peaks in mid-September 1992, the agreement between the public 
employers and the unions made it easier for the central bank to start lowering interest 
rates (Peel 1993). On the same day in which the public sector wage setters reached an 
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understanding which was deemed “responsible”, the discount rate was decreased by 
0.25% and the Lombard rate by 0.5%. 
6.2 PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF BUDGET DEFICITS (1994-1997) 
Throughout 1993 the inflation rate started to slow down thanks to decelerating wage 
growth and a rebound in productivity rates. After the loss of wage moderation which 
followed reunification, average wage increases across the private sector went down to 
3.5% in 1993 and 2% in 1994 (OECD 1994, 41). At the same time, due to the 
worsening of public finances, 1993 marked the year in which the government made a 
turnaround in fiscal policy. The deficit of the general government had breached the 3% 
threshold in 1993, eliciting a marked policy shift toward fiscal restriction to be 
achieved through ceilings on expenditures’ growth (OECD 1994, 119). With the 
economic crisis exacerbating and unemployment on the rise, the government reacted by 
reintroducing the surcharge tax (to be effective as of beginning of 1995) and by 
effecting cuts in social spending, particularly unemployment compensation (Zohlnhöfer 
2007). 
On the political side, 1994 was the “super election year” with Land, European and 
Bundestag elections taking place throughout the year. While at the Lower Saxony Land 
election in March it seemed that the SPD and the Greens were on an ascending path, at 
the June European elections the party suffered a serious setback. The CDU fared better 
than expected marking a turning point in the run-up to the Bundestag election in 
October. Kohl’s popularity was on the rise since May onwards and the Christian-liberal 
coalition eventually remained in power although the FDP was significantly weakened 
by having lost all seats at all Land elections and at the European election (Poguntke 
1995). 
1994 
The year 1994 began with the Finance Minister Theo Waigel on the offensive. In an 
editorial on the German economic daily Handelsblatt, Waigel reassured the public – 
especially the Bundesbank – that the government was firmly committed to decreasing 
the budget deficit by limiting expenditures to 3% of GDP. Hans Tietmeyer, the 
Bundesbank’s president, had made cuts in social security expenditures (“however 
painful”) and reducing the deficit a precondition for allowing the relaxation of 
monetary policy (Dempsey and Waller 1994). 
Public employers followed suit. After a first failure, the second round of negotiations 
ended without an agreement in sight. ÖTV and DAG were demanding a 4% pay to 
protect workers’ purchasing power against anticipated inflation and indirect tax hikes. 
The sub-national employers, however, took a confrontational stance. Heinz Scheussler, 
the Nord Rhein-Westfalen’s Finance Minister representing TdL, came into prominence 
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during negotiations for advancing a “zero pay round” needed to alleviate the severe 
strains on the public budgets. Indeed, both Länder and municipalities’ employers (led 
by the Duisburg mayor Richard Klein) started to raise their stake in wage bargaining. 
TdL proposed to reduce the pay grades in the public sector from 15 to 10 in order to 
save around 100 million DM per year. Municipal employers instead put forth a list of 
measures containing more flexible working time, the abolition of 2 holidays introduced 
in 1985 and a cut in bonuses for part-time employees doing shift work (EIRR March 
1994). 
Against the serious threat of a zero round and an employers’ “shopping list”, ÖTV and 
DAG opted for a concessionary bargain after acrimonious negotiations accompanied by 
warning strikes. The parts agreed on a 2% increase which however contained other 
pejorative aspects for the workers. First of all the contract was not retroactive to 
January 1994, thus granting to the employers several “improvements-free” months. 
Different provisions for different pay groups were made. For lower groups the contract 
would entry into force from July while higher pay grades would see the contract 
applied only from September. The “13th monthly-payment” was frozen for a period of 
three years. Eastern public sector wages were brought to 82% of the Western levels.  
The agreement was anyway welcomed as relatively positive by the unions who had 
managed to avoid the employers to push through their austerity demands, especially 
with regard to cuts in holiday entitlements (EIRR April 1994). The move toward 
concessionary bargaining vis-à-vis the employers eventually led to a realigned between 
the ÖTV and DAG. Until then, relations between the two unions had been cool due to 
competition for members in public services and transport. The unions were 
characterised by different strategies. With a membership skewed toward lower ranks 
and blue collar workers, ÖTV used to pursue a strategy of wage increases with a 
“social component”. This made it seek better improvements for lower-wage groups. On 
the contrary DAG, with the bulk of its members concentrated among the higher ranks 
and white collar workers, used to opt for linear wage increases. In July the two 
organisations made an agreement for future cooperation in order to better coordinate 
their wage demands. This signalled an improvement in the relations between the two 
unions (EIRR July 1994b). 
On the employers’ side, during the summer Berlin was expelled from the TdL for 
having enacted a full wage equalisation between the public employees working in the 
Eastern and Western part of the capital. In fact, reunification had led to the paradoxical 
situation that public employees working in the same city would be subjected to 
different pay levels depending on whether they would be employed in the former 
Western or Eastern part. A draft law was put before the chamber of deputies by the 
Berlin Senate which aimed at a three-stage wage equalisation by October 1996. Fearing 
that this would spark requests for a fast equalisation throughout the whole public 
sector, the TdL expelled the city-state from the Länder employers’ association for 
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having acted on its own in a way that is “grossly detrimental” to the association (EIRR 
July 1994a). 
With regard to the civil servants, the government did in fact pushed through a zero 
round. With legislation effected in August 1994 the government decided to grant a 2% 
wage increase, similar to that for the employees, only to the lower pay grades in the 
civil service (A1 to A8), effective as of October 1
st
. Civil servants in the grades above 
A9 were subjected to a wage freeze for the whole year 1994. Additionally, in 
November 1994 the government published a report on the reform of public services, 
putting forward a set of proposals to reform the structure of civil servants’ pay in order 
to bring it more in line with the private sector and with the NPM mantra. The report 
proposed the introduction of performance related pay and aimed at making job 
promotion subjected to a period of probation rather than automatic (EIRR November 
1994b). 
1995 
With figures reaching 14% in Eastern Germany and 8% in the West, unemployment 
became a key concern in German politics during 1995 (Poguntke 1996). The year was 
characterised also by a significant fiscal slippage which represented a serious 
deterioration vis-à-vis the government’s plan to rein in the budget deficit. In 1995 the 
deficit amounted to 3.5% as opposed to the 2.3% which the government had expected. 
These figures did not even take into consideration the debits (DM 204.6 billion) left by 
the closing (as of end of 1994) of the Treuhand agency charged with the privatisation of 
enterprises in Eastern Germany. Including these figures would have implied a deficit of 
around 9% of GDP in 1995. Overall, the fiscal slippage ensued from a shortfall in 
income and corporate tax revenues and the deficits of the social security system, mostly 
related to the health and pension funds. Additionally, in 1995 the new Länder were 
integrated into the fiscal equalisation scheme and this led to an increase of net transfers 
to Eastern Germany from 3.8% to 4% of GDP. With the entry into the system of the 
new States, the old Western Länder endured the reduction in the net transfers to their 
favour which led them to reduce investment and other expenditures (OECD 1996). 
The negotiations for the public sector contract in 1995 were heavily influenced by those 
in the metalworking sector. Interestingly, however, rather than serving as a “pattern” 
for moderation, the agreement reached in the export industry worked to push up the pay 
settlement in the public sector. In the latter, the public employers’ confrontational 
stance taken in 1994 had slowed down the trajectory of public sector wages’ growth. 
Contrary to the pattern of wage moderation which had been followed in 1993 and 1994, 
in autumn 1994, IG Metall’s national executive committee advanced a wage request of 
6% for the 1995 negotiations (EIRR November 1994a). With a cascade effect, the 
expensive “pilot” wage claim was immediately adopted by all major trade unions for 
the wage bargaining in other sectors of the economy (EIRR January 1995).  
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On March 7
th
, IG Metall sealed the pilot agreement for the metalworking industry in the 
Bavaria bargaining region which the union had singled out for a campaign of selective 
industrial action. The agreement envisaged lump-sums for the months from January to 
April and a subsequent 3.4% pay rise from May to October and a further 3.6% from 
November until the end of the year. Although well below the 6% request, the deal was 
criticised by the metalworking employers and, instead, was regarded by the unions as a 
victory. Indeed, IG Metall managed to breach the 3% which many economists had 
regarded as acceptable (EIRR April 1995a). After the “victorious” pattern was 
established, this set the pace for the negotiations and other sectors followed suit 
throughout March, namely the insurance sector, the chemical industry, the wood 
industry and the banking sector (EIRR April 1995b). 
Exploratory negotiations in the public sector started on March 30
th
. In line with the 
pattern set by IG Metall, also ÖTV broke with the 1994 moderation and, in asking for a 
6% increase, the union stressed that the public sector needed not to be decoupled from 
developments in the private economy. The public employers rebuked the request, 
highlighting their inability to pay in light of the “empty public coffers” (leeren 
öffentlichen Kassen) (WSI Tarifarchiv 1995). The Interior Minister Manfred Kanther 
specifically clarified that the public employers could not match the wage increases of 
the metalworking sector (Fisher 1995). In the second round of negotiations, at the end 
of April, the public employers submitted an offer of 2.5% for 15 months. 
After a tense two-day negotiation in Stuttgart marked by the unions’ threat to escalate 
the conflict, an agreement was eventually reached with the public employers improving 
their offer to bring it more or less in line with the pilot agreement in the metalworking 
sector. After an initial offer of 2.5% by the employers, the deal was closed at 3.2% and 
a 40DM lump sum for the month of April. However, employers managed to extract the 
freeze of the Christmas bonus which, as a result, decreased from 98% to 96% of the 
monthly pay. In the end, the contract satisfied both camps. ÖTV deemed it as “just 
about acceptable” while the Interior Minister Kanther labelled it a “sensible” agreement 
(EIRR June 1995).  
The provisions agreed in the public sector contract were applied to the civil servants 
with legislation effected in December 1995. 
1996 
Spring 1996 became a watershed moment in the history of Germany’s process of 
European integration. As envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty, in order to qualify for the 
single currency, a country’s general government fiscal deficit would have to be 
contained within the 3% of GDP target by the fiscal year 1997. Interestingly, on the 1
st
 
of June 1995 the German Finance Minister Theo Waigel had written an op-ed on the 
Financial Times to communicate his “personal views” to the political leaders across 
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Europe embroiled in the difficult process of convergence to the monetary union. 
Waigel bemoaned that “as things stand(ed), entry into the final stage of monetary union 
in 1997 is extremely unlikely because there seems scant prospect of a majority of 
member states fulfilling the Maastricht criteria by then”. “Public finance”, he went on, 
“is the area in which most action needs now to be taken”. Waigel championed the fact 
that only Germany and Luxembourg would by then qualify within the 3% deficit target 
and denounced that “nine of the fifteen member States” would fail in 1995 to meet the 
inflation and deficit criteria. As a result, he warned European leaders that “the 
monetary union will not be possible unless participants comply strictly with the 
convergence criteria” and that “there cannot and will not be any discounts or free 
tickets”. The Finance Minister thus recommended that “those (leaders) who seriously 
intend to achieve monetary union must now pursue a policy of fiscal consolidation” 
(Waigel 1995). 
Indeed, at the moment of writing, Waigel could capitalise on a rebound of economic 
growth which had taken place during the first semester of 1995, a converge of inflation 
levels toward the 2% level and a budget deficit which the government had projected to 
fall to around 2.3% of GDP by the end of 1995 (OECD 1996). Yet, while Waigel 
became an increasingly vocal defender of fiscal consolidation abroad, he also 
simultaneously sowed the seeds of his own “rhetorical entrapment” at home. In fact, as 
it turned out, by spring 1996 the economic situation in Germany turned sour. Economic 
growth started to slow down from the summer of 1995, especially due to a fall in gross 
fixed investment and exports. In the last quarter of 1995 and the first quarter of 1996, 
economic growth faltered, recording a -0.2% and a -0.4% change on the previous 
quarter respectively (EIU 1996a, 21). The slowdown in economic activity, in 
conjunction with lower employment levels, generated a marked drop in tax revenues 
and a sharp increase in the expenditures of the social security funds. As a result, a 
significant fiscal slippage ensued and the budget deficit increased to 3.8% of GDP in 
1996. With Waigel who had been insisting that the convergence criteria were not strict 
enough and that miscreants across Europe be fined, the overshooting of the German 
deficit came in as a severe embarrassment for the government at the beginning of 1996 
(EIU 1996b, 16). By the spring of 1996 it became clear that, as things were, Germany 
itself would have exceeded the 3% target. With the fiscal space shrinking, the 
government’s fiscal policy turned toward the firm short-term objective of achieving 
fiscal consolidation to meet the (irrevocable) Maastricht budget deficit criterion (OECD 
1997, Ch. II). 
Due to mounting economic difficulties, the whole 1996 was also characterised by fierce 
conflicts between the government, the employers and the trade unions. Throughout the 
year, the highest number of unemployed people since the war was registered: more than 
4.27m people were seeking jobs and the unemployment rate reached 11.1% in 
Germany (Poguntke 1997). At the IG Metall’s congress in early November 1995, the 
union leader Klaus Zwickel had announced his proposal for a “jobs pact” (Bündnis für 
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Arbeit). The leader proposed a controversial tripartite agreement which was received 
very critically by unions’ delegates. According to the plan, the metalworking union 
would moderate its wage claims in line with inflation while workers would pile up 
overtime into “time banks” thus foregoing direct payments for extra work. 
Additionally, the union would agree to allow newly-hired workers to start with pay 
rates below the minimum rate agreed through collective bargaining contracts, only for a 
“limited period”. In return, the leader asked the employers to avoid redundancies in the 
three years ahead and increase the number of training places by 5% a year. The 
government was instead asked to shelve plans to cut welfare and unemployment 
benefits (EIRR December 1995).  
On the basis of the Chancellor’s round-table discussions with the social partners, the 
government announced, at the end of January 1996, a fifty-point “Action Programme 
for Investment and Employment” which aimed at halving unemployment over the 
following four years. Above all, the plan intended to reduce public expenditures’ share 
in national GDP by 4% points (see OECD 1996, 142-43; Box 5). The program 
envisaged a reduction of non-wage labour costs, support for small and medium-sized 
enterprises through tax breaks and a reform of the tax system to reduce income and 
corporate taxes. Under pressure from the junior FDP coalition partner, the government 
also committed to gradually reduce the solidarity surcharge from 7.5% to 5.5% in July 
1996. The FDP was applying pressures within the coalition in light of the upcoming 
crucial Land elections in March. For the FDP, the three elections in Baden-
Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein on March 24
th
 constituted a 
matter of electoral survival. After previous weak electoral results, these were three of 
the last four States in which the party was represented. Failing to meet the 5% threshold 
necessary to be represented in the Länder would have called into question the survival 
of the whole Christian-liberal coalition at the federal level as well (EIU 1996a, 8). 
As a matter of fact, the March Länder elections constituted the political turning point 
which gave the momentum to Kohl’s coalition and its EMU agenda. Given the difficult 
financial situation and the necessity to meet the Maastricht deficit target, Theo Waigel 
had made clear the government’s intention to push through the fiscal measures needed 
at all costs. On March 14
th
 the Finance Minister had enacted a legal provision for 
expenditure controls (Haushaltssperre) for which any form of discretionary spending in 
the federal budget would require the formal approval of the minister of finance (OECD 
1997, 156). Given Kohl’s government firm intention not to delay EMU accession, the 
Länder elections acquired the significance of a “vote of confidence” in the 
government’s consolidation cum EMU-accession strategy. Most importantly, to 
challenge the CDU in one of its bastion region, in Baden-Wurttemberg the SPD had 
decided to campaign on the basis of a delay in the introduction of the single currency 
which constituted instead a non-negotiable objective for both Kohl and Waigel. The 
Land elections ended with considerable losses for the SPD which in Baden-
Württemberg scored their lowest result until then (25.1%) (Poguntke 1997). Thus the 
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main opposition party suffered heavy losses. The rejection of the SPD’s stance on 
EMU thus removed any questions on the political strategy of the federal government 
(EIU 1996a). Similarly, the FDP fared well and managed to increase its representation 
in the Länder. 
This reinvigorated the federal coalition which could finally set itself on a firm 
consolidation stance. The scope was to bring the deficit in line with the requirements of 
the Maastricht criteria. By March, the tripartite talks for the jobs pact between 
Gesamtmetall and IG Metall were going nowhere. The employers insisted on the 
priority to achieve a 20% cut in total wage costs (via flexible work, cuts in social 
contributions and wage moderation) in order to withstand international competitiveness 
while the unions insisted on a formal guarantee on job creation and a ban on overtime 
to ensure new jobs (EIRR April 1996). After a series of nine sessions of tripartite talks, 
in April, the FDP economics minister Guenter Rexrodt declared the end of the “alliance 
for jobs” and the government eventually announced it would push ahead with a 
package of reforms necessary to reduce unemployment and make Germany more 
competitive internationally. Upon his return from holidays in Austria, on April 13
th
 
Kohl met with his cabinet and party officials to discuss “a plan of action” to execute 
welfare changes, tax reforms and the spending cuts necessary to give the country a 
chance of qualifying for EMU from January 1999. In the event, Kohl and Waigel 
signalled drastic spending cuts for federal, state and local authorities, without any 
“taboo” in the items to be affected (Peter Norman 1996c). 
Rumours emerged that the coalition government intended to execute a savings plan of 
DM50bn to be shared between the Federation and subnational governments. Not only 
were Waigel and Kohl very determined behind the sparpacket, but also the senior 
ministers and leaders of the FDP were aligned with Waigel behind the planned savings 
measures (Peter Norman 1996b). Indiscretions came out that Waigel was planning to 
push strongly ahead for a two-year pay freeze in the public sector intended to be the 
bulk of the consolidation strategy. On April 16
th
, when asked by a journalist about his 
intention to pursue a wage freeze in the public sector, Waigel replied: 
“What was possible in Austria for two years, what was possible in Holland, what was possible in 
other countries, must also be possible in Germany in order to relieve the burden on public 
budgets, above all on the Länder and the municipalities, but also on the Federation” (ÖTV 
documental archive 1996). 
ÖTV’s reply was not put back. Herbert Mai, the union’s leader, immediately retorted 
that “a zero round is no offer, it is a diktat” and that they would resort to industrial 
action if the wage freeze remained on the table (Peter  Norman 1996). The Bundesbank 
weighed in on the debate with Hans Tietmeyer warning the social partners that “a 
concerted effort was needed if Germany was to meet the Maastricht public sector 
deficit criterion of 3% of GDP” and that the Bundesbank “emphatically rejected any 
idea of weakening the Maastricht criteria to facilitate the start of EMU” (Peter Norman 
1996d).  
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Eventually, on April 25
th
 the coalition government approved the DM50bn savings 
package required to cut expenditures to fill the gaps in the finances of the federal, 
Länder and municipal governments. The plan envisaged reduced cuts in departmental 
budgets, reduced support for unemployment and children allowances and reduced 
transfers to the Federal labour agency and the pension funds. Most importantly, out of 
DM 50bn, the bulk of the fiscal adjustment had to come, for DM23bn (about half of the 
package), from a public sector pay freeze. Of these, due to the distribution of 
employment within the German administration, DM3bn had to be achieved through a 
freeze on wages at the federal level. The vast majority of the remaining savings 
(DM20bn) were to be achieved via a wage freeze at the Länder and municipal level 
(Peter Norman 1996a; OECD 1997, 34-35). Furthermore, the package aimed to reduce 
employers’ payments for employees’ sick pay to 80% of the basic wage for the first six 
weeks and to decrease the solidarity surcharge on income and corporate tax to finance 
the East by 2% points in two steps during January 1997 and January 1998. 
However, the government had no legal right to impose the intended wage freeze on the 
public employees and needed to enter negotiations with the unions under the legal 
framework of independent collective bargaining. For sure, a wage freeze could have in 
theory been implemented through legislation for civil servants. This would have de 
facto also weakened ÖTV’s bargaining position in negotiations for the public 
employees. Yet, given that the FDP leader Wolfgang Gerhardt was against the 
possibility to impose such a sacrifice on the civil servants, the coalition was split on the 
issue and this possibility faded away (Handelsblatt 1996). The industry employers 
(both BDA and BDI) mildly welcomed the package arguing that, while in the right 
direction, the package was not bold enough and more needed to be done. The DGB 
voiced its concern that the government had fallen prey to the employers’ influence and 
had turned its back to the welfare state (EIRR June 1996b). The government intended 
to introduce the reforms as legislation before the parliamentary summer break in July. 
On the political side, however, the SPD immediately spoke against the package 
labelling it “socially obscene”. Similarly, a few left-leaning MPs within the 
CDU/CSU/FDP were unhappy with the austerity plan (Financial Times 1996).  
The fact that the SPD controlled the Bundesrat made it necessary for the Christian-
liberal coalition to look out for compromises with the opposition party in order to push 
through those parts of the package which required the approval of the upper chamber. 
However, given that the SPD’s veto in the Bundesrat would have necessarily slowed 
the reform process, shifting the extraction of fiscal savings onto the public sector wage 
setting arena represented a convenient way for the government to push through cuts as 
quickly as possible without going through the upper chamber. In fact, the Länder 
jointly rejected Waigel’s tax plan to reform the wealth tax, the inheritance tax and the 
surcharge needed to finance the East. In a statement which crossed party lines, the 
Länder’s leaders unanimously rejected the government’s tax plans which they saw as 
easing the burden of the federal government at their expenses. At the same time though, 
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the Länder leaders signalled their intention to proceed with joint proposals on further 
budget cuts necessary to meet the Maastricht deficit criterion in the face of lower than 
expected state and municipal revenues (Norman and Fisher 1996). Indeed, what united 
the Länder across party lines was their troublesome financial condition (Financial 
Times 1996) which, in their function of public employers, urged the minimisation of 
the pay settlement’s financial burden.  
It was in this peculiar context that public sector wage setters bargained in spring 1996. 
On March 28
th
, the bargaining commission of the ÖTV had formulated its wage 
requests. It asked for a 4.5% increase for 12 months and the full equalisation of Eastern 
wages to those in Western public sector. At about the same time, the pilot agreement 
(Pilotabschluss) for the 1996 bargaining season was reached in the chemical industry 
after negotiations in the state of Rhineland-Pfalz. The deal provided for a modest pay 
rise of 2% in return for job security guarantees and job creation (EIRR May 1996; 
Tarifarchiv 1996). Before the official public sector wage negotiations started at the end 
of April, the ÖTV had entertained talks with the public employers on the possibility of 
an “alliance for jobs in the public sector”. Meetings turned out to be unproductive and 
the attempt failed in mid-April (WSI Tarifarchiv 1996). During the first rounds of 
negotiations between the end of April and the beginning of May the public employers 
submitted a “seven-point list” of demands. They called for longer working hours, a 
reduction in sickness pay and overtime pay, the conversion of overtime into holidays 
rather than extra pay, an increase in part-time employment, the implementation of early 
retirement provisions and the promotion of more temporary employment.  
The parts clashed on the entity of the fiscal savings to be achieved. The Interior 
Minister Kanther leading the employers’ delegation stated that “a two-year pay freeze 
and cuts in sick pay for 3.2 m public sector employees is the only realistic option 
considering the massive public budget deficit”. ÖTV’s chairman Herbert Mai insisted 
that the “public sector employees’ salaries are not a secret reserve cash box for the 
nation”. By late May, after three wage rounds, no compromise seemed on the horizon 
and around 10.000 public sector workers took the streets to protest against the wage 
freeze, cuts in sickness pay, the loss of two days of holiday and cuts in Christmas and 
holiday bonuses demanded by the public employers (EIRR June 1996a).  
When the unions met for the fourth round of negotiations on May 22
nd
, the employers 
offered a one-time pay rate of 0.5% for 1996 and a 1% from May 1997 with twenty-
month contract duration. The proposal was bluntly rejected by the unions and both 
parts referred to the arbitration procedure (WSI Tarifarchiv 1996). After two weeks, the 
arbitrators’ commission, chaired by a bipartisan duo (Carl-Ludwig Wagner (CDU) and 
Hans Koschnick (SPD)), issued a unanimous compromised proposal. This included a 
one-off payment of DM300 (amounting to 0.8% of average incomes) for the year 1996 
for all public sector workers, a pay increase of 1.3% for the year 1997, a pay freeze for 
trainees with a guarantee to create 1.200 additional training places, a freeze on the level 
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of the Christmas bonus and the replacement of one day of granted extra holidays with 
the requirement to work two half-days on Christmas and New Year’s eve.  
The whole package, estimated by Waigel to be around 1% by the end of 1997, was not 
deemed as a climb-down by the government but rather, given also other developments 
in the economy, the public employers regarded it as “reasonable”. They also rejoiced 
the longer duration of the contract which made “planning easier”. Although admittedly 
meagre for the public workers, on June 20
th
 the trade union representatives eventually 
accepted the arbitrators’ proposal. ÖTV and DAG cheered the fact that they could 
circumvent the wage freeze forcefully wanted by the Finance Minister and managed to 
avoid sick pay reductions and longer working hours (EIRR July 1996) 
In analysing the 1996 fiscal year, the IMF action-based database on fiscal consolidation 
describes developments in Germany as follows (Devries et al. 2011, 42): 
“Fiscal consolidation in 1997 was primarily motivated by deficit reduction and meeting the 
Maastricht deficit criteria … To shore up the public finances, the authorities adopted in late 1996 
substantial discretionary fiscal measures as part of the budget for 1997, which were heavily 
weighted on spending cuts … With these measures, the authorities expected that the general 
government deficit would decline to 2% of GDP in 1997, safely under the Maastricht reference 
value. Spending cuts in the 1997 budget amounted to 1% of GDP and were based on wage 
restraint and retrenchments, spending limits imposed at the federal and state level, reducing sick 
pay coverage and restricting spa visits, and tightening eligibility for unemployment benefits.” 
With legislation effected in March 1997, similar provision to those agreed for the 
public employees were applied to the civil servants who received a lump sum of 
DM300 for the year 1996 and a 1.3% wage increase valid as of 1
st
 of March 1997 
for most of the employment categories within the civil service. With a very modest 
contract, valid for twenty months the German public sector, Germany made it to 
EMU and headed toward the new century when new types of pressures emerged 
within the public employers’ camp. 
6.3 ANALYSIS OF THE 1990S 
Figure 12 depicts the trajectory of public sector wage setting in Germany during the 
1990s. Panel a shows that public sector wages start to diverge from the other sectors of 
the German economy from 1994. Public sector wage restraint is even more pronounced 
that restraint in the total service sector. The divergence becomes more marked through 
the wage restraint pursued in between 1996 and 1997. Panel b shows a clear cut 
adjustment of personnel costs for the fiscal year 1997.  
Wage restraint during the 1990s emerged out of a combination of public employers’ 
unilateral action (in 1994) and negotiated restraint in independent collective bargaining 
with the unions (in 1996). Figure 13 provides a diagram visualisation of the sequence 
of events which led to the juncture of wage restraint in 1996-1997. Before summing up 
the causal chain of events, three wider considerations are of order. 
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Figure 12: Trajectory of public sector wage setting during the 1990s 
 
First, the evidence is incongruent with the predictions of the “Ordomerkantilismus 
hypothesis” introduced in the literature review. According to such an explanation, we 
would have expected to observe wage restraint in the German public sector to have 
been pursued by the government as a part of a wider strategy of economic mercantilism 
to engineer an undervaluation of the German economy vis-à-vis its EMU peers. The 
issues of export competitiveness, inflation and real exchange rates – which would be 
the crucial components of such a strategy – have played no role in public sector wage 
bargaining. What motivates the public employers to seek for restraint is the financial 
burden which wage setting imposes on the public coffers. When acting with respect to 
their function of public employers, governmental actors across the three levels of the 
German public administration were primarily moved by the fiscal imperatives of the 
organisations they were responsible for.  
Second, the evidence observed does not validate the “export-sector domination 
hypothesis” either. I could find no evidence of a moderating influence of the export 
sector over the pay settlements in the public sector via the institutions of inter-sectoral 
wage coordination. As a result, not even the “the pattern bargaining hypothesis” can be 
considered valid. Wage restraint in the German public sector stems from logics which 
are almost entirely decoupled from export sector wage setting. During the 1990s two 
sorts of institutional constraints have exerted “exogenous” pressure on the public 
employers. In the immediate aftermath of reunification, the Bundesbank acted as a sort 
of vincolo interno (internal constraint). Through a policy of tight money which was 
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unprecedented for its strength and duration, the Bundesbank used its legal 
independence to rectify the loss of fiscal and wage discipline by the government, the 
wage setters and the government in its function of wage setter for the public sector. In 
the latter phase of the 1990s, after the Bundesbank had been gradually relaxing its 
stance, the Maastricht deficit criterion acted as a vincolo esterno (external constraint). 
When, in spring 1996, it became clear that Germany itself would have not qualified for 
EMU by the fiscal year 1997, the government embarked on a “whatever it takes” 
strategy of fiscal consolidation. It did so under the firm leadership of the Finance 
Minister Theo Waigel. To meet the Maastricht deficit criterion, the Christian-liberal 
coalition coalesced behind the Finance Minister and advanced a DM50bn savings 
package whose core savings were to be achieved thanks to a two-year public sector pay 
freeze. 
Figure 13: Causal chain of public sector wage restraint during the 1990s 
 
It was in this context of urgent and irreversible fiscal emergency that the public 
employers of the three administrative layers overcame “party-politics differences” and 
united behind a firm strategy of fiscal consolidation. Although the legal framework did 
not allow the government to impose the wage freeze on the public employees, even 
without making use of their sovereign authority the public employers, united within the 
governing coalition and vertically (across the federal government, the States and the 
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municipalities) pushed the unions against the wall, forcing them to cave in and accept a 
very modest concessionary agreement in 1996. In the bargaining process wages were 
but one of the many dimensions to be affected. Wage setters negotiate simultaneously 
on a set of different qualitative and quantitative aspects of the employment relation. As 
such, the emphasis on wages which is present in the literature hides the fact that 
interactions among real wage bargaining actors have the nature of multi-issue bargains 
whereby what is being negotiated at any point in time goes well beyond wages. Unions 
have had to defend themselves against the public employers’ offensive on working 
hours, sick-pay entitlements, Christmas and summer bonuses, holidays and extra work. 
In the event, they gave up on wage restraint but protected some other aspects of the 
employment relation.     
Does this mean, however, that inter-sectoral wage bargaining developments between 
the export and the public sector did not matter in Germany? No, they did matter but not 
in the way the institutionalist literature on wage bargaining systems has so far pointed 
out. The historical reconstruction shows that the wage settlements in the export 
industries have, at times, exerted upward pressure on the pay settlements of the public 
sector. With public employers firmly committed to impose wage restraint out of 
financial considerations, the higher settlements in the export industry which served as 
“pilot agreements” rather created upward “imitative pressures”. The public employers 
had to depart from their initial intentions to push for more moderate or even “zero” 
wage rounds in the face of higher pilot agreements in the export industry. In other 
words, in order to escape moderate wage offers or even the threat of a pay freeze, the 
unions could often “play the wage pattern” already agreed in the export industry against 
the public employers. In so doing, they applied pressures on them to revise their initial 
stingy offers upward. Reasoning counterfactually, it could be speculated in 
disagreement with the pattern bargaining explanation that: 
had the pilot contracts in the export sector not been signed before public sector negotiations, 
the public employers would have probably had even more leverage to push through further 
fiscal consolidation than the restraint they already managed to obtain.  
Third, even where they potentially could, German public employers have often 
refrained from deploying their sovereign power in public sector wage setting. This 
occurred because they were internally divided. Most notably, the issue of imposing a 
statutory pay limit on the civil servants came out prominently in German politics in 
1992 with the FDP economics minister Jürgen Möllemann. In an exceptional phase in 
which wage and fiscal discipline was lost and a wage-price spiral had ensued, 
Möllemann intended to exploit the public employers’ sovereign authority to send a 
signal to the private sector and to weaken unions in public sector collective bargaining. 
Interestingly, the 1992 negotiating round shows that internal dividedness within the 
employers’ camp can undermine their actual capacity to deploy their sovereign 
authority in public sector wage setting. In the event, a conflict of interests emerged 
between the economics and interior ministries which also cut across party lines. The 
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FDP which controlled the economics ministry was pushing for a strategy of 
“hierarchical direction”, namely to use legislative powers to force wage and fiscal 
restraint in the polity against the will of the militant unions. The CDU-controlled 
Interior Ministry, where the legal competence for wage setting rests, firmly rejected 
Möllemann’s proposal. The Interior Minister Rudolf Seiters publicly attacked the 
economics minister and rebuked him for interfering in matters beyond his ministry’s 
responsibility. As a result of public employers’ internal dividedness, sovereign power 
was not deployed. 
In all, during the 1990s the public employers remained united in collective bargaining 
negotiations within the public sector Tarifgemeinschaft. This meant that public 
employers negotiated jointly in wage bargaining under the leadership of the Minister of 
the Interior. This leadership will be challenged by the Länder employers in the 2000s. 
A crucial reason for why unity was preserved within the public employers in the 1990s 
was that strong financial divisions were delayed thanks to two factors. On the vertical 
level, the fact that the unification bill was mainly footed by the federal budget softened 
the financial pressures on the Länder. On the horizontal level, tensions between poorer 
(new) Länder and richer (old) Länder were initially neutralised. This was possible 
because, due to the old Länder’s veto, the entry of the new Länder into the fiscal 
equalisation system was delayed until 1995. After 1995, the entry into the system of the 
new States will mean lower transfers to the old Länder and more redistribution to the 
east. This will contribute, in the 2000s, to make relationships among the public 
employers more difficult, triggering the necessity for a new compromise to be found 
through a process of institutional change. Financial tensions among the German 
employers will be the trigger behind the necessity to negotiate an overhaul of the wage 
bargaining structure and of the federal government’s competence to legislate on the 
civil servants’ pay terms during the reform of fiscal federalism. We will soon see how a 
new compromise will be institutionalised during the early 2000s.  
To recap on the causal chain of the 1990s (figure 13), it should be said that in the 
immediate years after reunification both the public and private sector trade unions went 
on the offensive, demanding compensation for inflation and the tax hikes needed to 
finance reunification. A confused government, burdened with the challenge of 
organizing the integration of a command economy into the West-Germany’s model of 
capitalism, initially tolerated budget deficits and relatively high pay settlements in the 
public sector. To their merits, in 1992 the public sector unions showed great 
associational power and the industrial conflict which ensued – one of the biggest in 
Germany’s post-war history – shared the sympathy of the wider public. The policy 
environment changed, however, when the Bundesbank hardened monetary policy, 
inducing an economic recession and high unemployment. Public employers were 
forced to make a U-turn on fiscal policy. Again, Keynesianism in Germany proved to 
be a no go. This was not so much for lack of political willingness or an inherent 
preference for an export-led growth model but because of the non-accommodating 
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stance of the Bundesbank. In public sector wage setting, when the available fiscal space 
tightened up and deficits emerged, the public employers’ ability to pay was 
compromised. This triggered an increasingly assertive stance on public sector wage 
setting. In 1994 the public employers did use their legislative authority to impose a 
yearly wage freeze to the civil servants. This marked the beginning of the trajectory of 
public sector wage restraint and wage dualisation observable the German political 
economy (figure 12).  
In 1996 the public employers united under the leadership of the Finance Minister Theo 
Waigel extracted budget savings without the use of their sovereign authority. They did 
so through independent collective bargaining with the trade unions. A moderate wage 
settlement in the public sector was instrumental – and perhaps crucial – for Germany to 
meet the legal obligations it had stipulated the European counterparts in Maastricht. 
Since Theo Waigel had styled himself as the stubborn defender of financial stability in 
the single currency, had Germany failed to meet the Maastricht criteria itself, the 
German government would have been severely embarrassed internationally. The fact 
that Waigel had in many occasions publicly mocked Southern European leaders for 
failing to meet the criteria certainly did not help. Ironically enough, German Finance 
Ministers will be haunted by the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact throughout 
the early 2000s.  
Concluding with a thought experiment on the history of the German political economy 
over the course of European integration, one could speculate counterfactually what 
follows: 
given the veto which the SPD and the Länder were exercising in the Bundesrat against most of 
fiscal reforms proposed by the government to bring down the deficit in 1996, had the German 
public employers not pursued forcefully a policy of remarkable public sector wage restraint in 
light of the 1997 fiscal year (in the public sector wage arena they could circumvent the SPD’s 
opposition and unite the Länder in their function of public employers), Germany would have 
most likely failed to meet the Maastricht criteria itself. Were that to be the case, the very EMU 
creation would have been delayed and probably the EMU would have been created as a 
regime of a very different nature.  
Possibly, without the pursuit of a harsh policy of public sector wage restraint in 
Germany the history of the whole continent would have developed differently. This 
indicates, in my view, the significance of public sector wage setting in the EMU. The 
German case shows that public sector wage setting has enormous causal relevance for 
processes and outcomes of fiscal policy coordination in Europe.  
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CHAPTER 7. THE 2000S. THE DOUBLE LÄNDER OFFENSIVE: 
INSTITUTIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
WAGE SETTING 
This chapter covers the developments of the 2000s. It contextualises them against the 
background of the fiscal crisis of the German state and links them to the tax reforms 
pursued by the Red-Green coalition. The chapter is divided in three sub-sections. In 7.1 
the process of institutional change of the collective bargaining framework is 
reconstructed. In 7.2 I look at the process of constitutional reform of the German 
federalism system and show how this unfolded in parallel and in relation to the 
developments described in 7.1. I posit that to appreciate fully these developments they 
should be read and interpreted together. Sub-section 7.3 concludes the chapter with 
critical analyses of these developments in light of the alternative explanations derived 
in the literature review. 
7.1 WAGE RESTRAINT IN THE CONTEXT OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS OF THE WAGE 
BARGAINING STRUCTURE 
In September 1998, the SPD won the Bundestag elections after sixteen years in the 
opposition. The Red-Green coalition which was formed as a result had made tackling 
Germany’s chronic unemployment through a concerted action – a renewal of the 
alliance for jobs - its prior commitment. The SPD won a clear victory vis-à-vis the 
CDU/CSU, with its Chancellor candidate Gerhard Schröder positioning the party 
around the “new centre” (Neue Mitte), focused on a supply-side oriented left-wing 
strategy.  
The beginning of the coalition was marked by two internal political conflicts. On the 
one hand, Schröder was reluctant to second the Greens’ policy priorities (dual 
citizenship for immigrants and nuclear energy policy). On the other, the SPD was 
captured in intestine conflicts between the “economic modernisers” who flanked Mr 
Schröder and the “left-wing traditionalists” spearheaded by the party chairman and 
Finance Minister Oskar Lafontaine (Poguntke 2000a). The latter, a convinced 
Keynesian, had become something of a “loose cannon” in the first months of the 
coalition. In the months which followed the formation of the cabinet, the Finance 
Minister advanced a tax reform meant to be a “Keynesian demand stimulus, Lafontaine 
style” for whose implementation the Finance Minister, in a clear challenge to its 
statutory independence, publicly called on the Bundesbank to cut interest rates (Lees 
2000, 121-28). The Finance Minister also intended to craft a less orthodox monetary 
framework of the EMU and a more expansionary fiscal policy in Germany. This 
strategy was increasingly challenged within and outside the party to the point that, in 
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March, Lafontaine eventually resigned as Finance Minister and as party chairman in 
order to abandon public life. With Lafontaine out of the game, Hans Eichel took over 
the Finance Ministry and in the second half of 1999 the government embarked on a 
policy of moderate budgetary consolidation. 
1999
24
 
The 1999 bargaining season acquires relevance for two interrelated reasons. At the 
sectoral level, the first agreement sealed under the Red-Green coalition at a 3.1% 
resulted in a victory of the unions and unleashed a rift among the public employers who 
became very vocal about the expensive pay settlement. At the local level two path-
breaking accords were reached to deal with the specific needs of the municipal 
employers. These will serve as the basis for the reform of the whole collective 
bargaining structure in the years to come. 
In mid-December 1998, the ÖTV’s negotiating commission had opted for entering the 
1999 bargaining round with a wage request of 5.5% for twelve months. In addition, the 
union was seeking to bring back to 100% of the salary (75% in the East) the Christmas 
bonus which, in previous contracts, had been frozen at the level of the 1993 salary. 
Negotiations started at the end of January and by the second round in early February, 
the employers had not yet submitted an offer (WSI Tarifarchiv 1999). After two rounds 
of failed negotiations, followed by warning strikes in 155 cities with about 100.000 
employees mobilised, on 27 February the public sector wage setters settled on a lump 
sum of DM 300 for the first three months of the year and a 3.1% from April. The 
contract, again, envisaged a longer duration of 15 months (EIRR April 1999). 
The unions were satisfied with the generous deal which was well above inflation. On 
the employers’ side, the deal was very controversial. Controversy emerged on what 
they deemed as an “unacceptable burden upon central and local government 
expenditures”. Although the parties had agreed on a declaration of intent to conclude a 
collective agreement on the introduction of more flexible forms of working time by 
July 1999, employers warned about the loss of jobs at all levels of the administration 
due to the high costs of the deal. Public employers had come under pressure due to the 
pilot agreement reached by IG Metall in mid-February in the Baden-Württemberg 
bargaining region. The unions in the metalworking industry had managed to extract an 
above-inflation settlement on the basis of a DM350 lump sum for January and February 
and a subsequent 3.2% pay increase from March (EIRR March 1999). Public 
employers wanted to avoid an expensive settlement which would have put under 
                                                                
24
 In the 1998 bargaining season the trade unions in the public sector obtained a 1.5% wage increase 
which was then transferred to the civil servants via legislation effected in August 1998. The bargaining 
round is not review here due to its low saliency. A review of the year’s developments can be obtained via 
the website of the WSI Tarifarchiv. 
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renewed strain the public coffers. Yet the 3.2% pay increase in the metalworking sector 
– which was largely copied by most of the other sectors – put upward pressures on the 
public sector deal. In fact, any public sector settlement below that level would have 
enlarged further the damaging widening of public and private sector pay differentials, 
causing recruitment and retentions problems which the public employers wanted to 
avoid (EIRR August 1999; April 1999). 
In the meantime, in mid-February, a significant agreement had been signed in the 
private waste-disposal industry between the ÖTV and the BDE (Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Entsorgungswirtschaft). BDE represented about 1.000 medium-sized 
companies in the industry but the contract acquired great importance because ÖTV 
agreed that, for the newly-hired, the level of the entry wages could be lower than that 
envisaged by the collective agreement by up to 25%. This was the beginning of open 
clauses which could derogate the collective contract in pejus. While ÖTV had been on 
the defensive side against the employers who were trying to reduce wages of current 
employees, BDE’s chairman Gerhard Scheele welcomed the agreement as the right step 
in the direction of more cost competitiveness. In fact, many of the companies in the 
industry had recently quit the employers’ association due to the high costs of the 
contracts (Eurofound 1999b). This is a provision, favourable to municipal employers, 
which will be taken up in the reform of the old BAT system and the creation of the 
TVöD framework in 2005. 
In fact, at about the same time, a milestone collective agreement (TV-V, Tarifvertrag 
Versorgung) was signed between ÖTV and DAG with the municipal public employers 
(VKA) in the sector of public utilities. The deal was widely regarded by all parts as the 
pilot agreement to look at for the modernisation of public sector industrial relations and 
the reform of the wage structure - which would follow in the mid-2000s. The package 
deal eliminated for the first time the legal distinction between the blue-collar workers 
and the salaried employees. It provided for a uniform grading and pay system which 
unified the previously distinct categories. It also introduced elements of performance-
related pay and elements of flexibility in the working hours which were sought by the 
employers. In the event, both ÖTV and the employers regarded it as a compromise on 
the way to modernise public sector employment relations by ensuring more competition 
without eroding labour standards (Eurofound 1999a). 
After the wave of new contracts, in the face of a severe fiscal slippage, the Finance 
Minister Hans Eichel (who had replaced Lafontaine) was forced to introduce a 
DM30bn multi-year savings package in June. The package was composed mostly of 
spending cuts (OECD 1999, 54). Given the tightening of the fiscal space, Schröder 
“flirted” with the idea of imposing a statutory limit on civil servants’ pay as part of the 
consolidation plan. In other words, after the costly agreement reached in February, 
Schröder intended not to transfer via legislation the same provisions agreed with ÖTV 
(3.1%) for the public employees to the civil servants, thus breaking with the tradition of 
“intra-public sector wage coordination” led by the federal legislators. Schröder 
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proposed to limit the legislated pay increase for the civil servants to 0.6%, the inflation 
level. In so doing, the Chancellor defended the policy as “an acceptable contribution to 
the consolidation of the state deficit”. Indeed, by imposing a two-year statutory limit on 
some 1.7m civil servants, the federal government hoped to rectify the generous pay 
deal in the public sector by saving some DM1.8bn (Eurofound 1999c). 
Yet political reality compounded matters and reduced the scope for deploying 
sovereign authority in public sector wage setting. Electorally, the coalition had been 
weakened by the results of all 1999 Land elections. The greens had lost substantially 
while the SPD’s fortunes were revised downward. At the June European election both 
the Greens and the SPD suffered losses. The former especially lost 50% of their votes if 
compared to the 1994 election. The decisive moment which marked the weakest point 
of the coalition was the Saxony Land election in September where the Greens landed 
nowhere while the SPD went down to 10% from its previous 16.6% (Poguntke 2000b). 
Besides intra-coalitional problems, Schröder was faced with the neat opposition of both 
the civil servants’ union (dbb) and the DGB. Indeed, dbb’s head Herhard Geyer urged 
the Chancellor to conduct the bargain “responsibly” and warned the Chancellor that the 
civil servants no longer wished to be “the piggy bank of the nation” (EIRR January 
2000). When, on October 19
th
, between 60.000 and 70.000 public sector employees 
took the streets of Berlin to demonstrate against the Government’s “statutory pay 
diktat” (staatliches Besoldungsdiktat), the federal government abandoned its intention. 
Eventually, with legislation effected in mid-November 1999, the government 
transferred slightly similar provisions of public sector contract to the civil servants who 
obtained a 2.9% increase. Political weakness had de facto trumped the government’s 
capacity to impose restraint through state sovereignty. 
2002
25
 
In March 2001 the landscape of public sector trade union representation was 
overhauled. After years of preparations, a new collective actor in service-sector trade 
unionism was was formally launched. With about 3m members in 2001, the new trade 
union Ver.di became the world’s largest union overcoming IG Metall (Keller 2005b). 
                                                                
25
 In the year 2000, after anguished barganining rounds and the rejection by the unions of the arbitrators’ 
proposal, the parts eventually settled on a DM400 lump sum for the months January to April, a 2% pay 
increase as of August 2000 with a further 2.4% from September 20001. Unions were satisfied with the 
improved which they had managed to push up from the initial offers by the employers. Employers on 
their part were satisfied for they had managed to extract a contract for the record duration of 31 months 
(EIRR July 2000). The agreement was reached as a last-minute compromise after the public employers 
had declared their financial inability to improve the arbitrators’ offer and the unions were ready to call a 
strike (Eurofound 2000). For the civil servants the government delayed legislation until April 2001 when 
it granted a 1.8% increase for the year 2001 and a 2.2% for the year 2002. For the year 2000 the 
government only granted for the period September to December a DM400 lump sum. See also the yearly 
bargaining round as described by the WSI Tarifarchiv. 
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Ver.di was the result of the merging of 5 unions: the white-collar workers union 
(DAG), the media-workers’ union IG Medien, the postal workers’ union (DPG), the 
banking and insurance union (HBV) and the ÖTV. Of these, ÖTV was by far the 
preponderant union with about 1.5million members. The creation of the conglomerate 
union had been set in motion already in autumn 1997 to counteract the increasing 
organisational financial difficulties linked to declining membership throughout the 
1990s. Moreover, with the merger it was hoped to solve demarcation lines among 
competing unions in the service sector, notably in the knowledge economy, banking 
and insurance where HBV and DAG had been long competing (EIRR April 2001). 
During the process which led to the creation of Ver.di , the unions experienced several 
organisational difficulties due to their diverse nature and their membership base 
spanning both the private and public sector. In the process, smaller unions were afraid 
of an excessive preponderance of ÖTV into the new organisation. ÖTV on the contrary 
was afraid of losing its identity in a conglomerate union with smaller industry-specific 
unions. ÖTV in particular experienced internal problems throughout the year 2000 
which made it unclear whether the 80% majority needed to approve the merger would 
be obtained at the internal conference in March 2001. In the preliminary ÖTV congress 
in November 2000 the merger had been approved by the members with a mere 65% 
majority. This allowed the continuation of preparations for the merger although it cast 
doubts on the capacity to arrive at the required 80% majority in the final congressional 
vote. Under this uncertainty, ÖTV’s head Herbert Mai resigned just to be replaced by 
Frank Bsirske. The other unions, in the meantime, had reached an agreement 
committing to push ahead with the merger anyway, even without ÖTV. At any rate, 
against the expectations of the many, on March 16
th
, the conference of ÖTV approved 
the merger with an 87.1% majority. As a result, Ver.di was created. As an organisation, 
Ver.di consists of a horizontal structure composed of thirteen departments covering 
various areas of activity and a vertical structure composed of three division covering 
federal, state and regional areas. Thus, Ver.di took over the role of negotiating leader 
for the public sector in 2002. 
At the September 2002 federal election, the red-green coalition returned to government 
with a very slim majority. The SPD had campaigned on the necessity to tackle high 
unemployment promising that full employment would be achieved incrementally. The 
coalition agreement negotiated between the SPD and the greens in mid-October 
committed the coalition to the reform of the labour market in line with suggestions 
advanced by the “Hartz Commission” which had been appointed in August 2002. 
Furthermore, the government intended to continue the consolidation of the public 
budget, with the Finance Minister Hans Eichel promising to balance the budget by 
2006 (Eurofound 2002). Things turned out rather differently. 
In fact, fiscal policy in 2001 had been expansionary due to the gradual entry into effect 
of the Schröder’s tax reform of the income and business taxes. Reform measures had 
been phased in by the Red-Green government since 1999. On the personal income 
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taxes, the government had envisaged a wave of subsequent reductions to bring the 
bottom statutory tax rates from 25.9% in 1998 to 15% by 2005. The top statutory tax 
was meant to reach 42% over the same time, down from 53% in 1998. The government 
also raised benefits and exemptions for children allowances and increased the basic tax-
free allowance from DM 12.300 to DM 15.000. On the taxation of businesses, the tax 
rate for incorporated companies was brought to 25% for both retained (from 40%) and 
distributed (from 30%) profits (OECD 2001, 52-54; see Box3).  
In all, the combination of foregone revenues linked to the tax reform and higher social 
transfers caused by slower economic growth, increased the 2001 structural deficit to 
2.8% of GDP. This caused the government to overshoot its fiscal target as laid down in 
its 2000 Stability Programme by 1.25% of GDP. Government finances were heavily 
affected by the 2001 step of the entry into force of the tax reform. Foregone revenues 
amounted to more than 1% of GDP. Corporate income tax receipts fell abruptly and 
also VAT receipts, the single largest tax item, slowed down (OECD 2002, Ch. II). Due 
to the collapse of tax receipts from income, VAT and business taxes, the finances of the 
Länder were particularly affected. As a result of the reform, Länder’s deficits more than 
tripled over the course of the years 2001-2003 (figure 14). As a matter of fact, the 
bloody wound inflicted to the Länder’s finances by the Schröder tax reforms, opened a 
cleavage between the federation and the Länder’s public employers which will turn out 
to be fatal. It was in this context that Pedro Solbes, the “quiet commissioner” for 
economic and monetary affairs of the Prodi Commission, became the man in the news 
for his decision to give Germany a public warning on the risk that its budget would 
soon breach the Stability Pact’s ceiling of 3% (Financial Times 2002). 
Public sector negotiations began late in 2002. The previous contract, agreed in June 
2000, envisaged the record duration of 31 months and was thus due to expire at the end 
of October 2002. In its first wage request advanced in late October, Ver.di signalled a 
break with tradition. ÖTV used to enter negotiations with higher wage requests, aligned 
or at times above the other economic sectors, to then compromise downward. Ver.di’s 
chairman Frank Bsirke emphasized a departure from the “usual bargaining rituals” and 
instead oriented Ver.di’s strategy toward a more pragmatic approach. Ver.di foregone a 
pay request similar to other sectors’ claims (5.5% and 6.5%). Instead, it opted for a 
“realistic” request of “more than 3%” for a 12-month period and full East/West wage 
equalisation by 2007. While Ver.di stressed that the pay of skilled workers in the public 
sector should not lag behind developments in the private sector, the public employers 
promptly dismissed Ver.di’s requests on the grounds that an increase between 3% and 
4% would increase fiscal spending by around €6.6bn.  
In the face of worsened financial conditions, Länder and municipal employers became 
increasingly more vocal. The Bavarian Finance Minister Kurt Falthauser argued that, 
given the tight fiscal space, the public employers’ ability to pay amounted to “between 
zero and moderate increases” (EIRR November 2002). Similarly, the SPD Berlin 
mayor Klaus Wowereit urged a zero round. The SPD Prime Minister of Schleswig-
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Holstein, Heide Simonis (SPD), demanded opening clauses to deviate on collective 
agreements, especially with regard to Christmas bonuses. At the same time, the VKA 
initially called for a zero wage round and then proposed to delay negotiations altogether 
by half a year (WSI Tarifarchiv 2002). 
Figure 14: deficits of administrative levels in Germany (1996-2008) 
 
The first round of negotiations failed in mid-November. As exploratory talks continued 
without progress in December, unions staged warning strikes with some 110.000 
employees disrupting local transportation, hospitals, waste collection, airports and 
childcare facilities across 200 cities. At the second round, employers offered a 0.9% 
pay increase as of January 2003 plus a further 1.2% from October 2003. Employers 
offered a €40 single payment for lower income groups in November and December but 
they pretended a 30-minute increase of the working week (up to 39 hours per week) in 
the west, (up to 40 in the East) and an agreement on the reform of the collective 
bargaining structure by the end of 2004. Ver.di’s negotiating commission bluntly 
rejected the offer which was banned as “as a provocation”. Thus negotiations collapsed 
and Ver.di asked for the arbitration procedure (EIRR January 2003). 
On 6 January, the arbitration commission led by the SPD former major of Bremen Hans 
Koschnick (SPD) submitted an offer including a pay increase of 2.4% from January 
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2003 and a further 0.6% from January 2004 together with a lump sum up to € 216 (€ 
194.4 in the East). Additionally, the arbitrators recommended the Christmas bonus be 
frozen until the end of April 2004, the introduction of lower entry-level wages for 
newly-hired, the alignment of East/West wages by 2007 through six steps and the 
obligation to redesign the collective bargaining structure in the public sector by April 
2004. 
On the following day, Berlin decided to resign its membership in the VKA and in the 
Association of Employers’ Public service (Vereinigung der Arbeitgeber des 
öffentlichen Dienstes, VadÖD) (a regional subsidiary association which had been 
created after Berlin had been expelled from TdL in 1993). In so doing, Berlin’s 
authorities argued that the delicate budgetary situation of the city did not allow them 
any option other than to leave the employers’ association and seek a cheaper 
agreement. In fact, Berlin’s mayor Wowereit attempted separate negotiations with 
Ver.di. The Berlin SPD-PDS coalition government tried to achieve a less costly 
agreement on the basis of a “solidarity pact model”. The mayor proposed a multi-year 
wage freeze, a reduction of the annual bonus and the elimination of the summer bonus 
in exchange for a reduction in employees’ working time as well as a job guarantee. 
Ver.di however refused to enter separate talks in order not to let employers’ deviate 
from the national agreement (Behrens 2003). The dispute continued, highlighting the 
increased tensions between the SPD and Ver.di. Berlin’s strategy against Ver.di rested 
on a strategical division of the workforce. Berlin’s move to pull out of the state-level 
association affected only those employees who were employed by the city of Berlin 
(e.g. administration, childcare, etc.). Those employees in sectors such as waste disposal 
and local transport, who had originally been the stronghold of militant public sector 
unionism (Keller 1993), were operating under different privatised agencies and were 
therefore not affected. Ver.di thus entered a dispute against the Berlin’s public 
employers without its major militant groups. The local struggle was eventually resolved 
in August 2003. Ver.di had to make greater concessions in the form of reduced 
individual incomes in exchange for a promise by the state not to impose forced 
redundancies until 2009 (Dribbusch and Schulten 2007). 
At the level of national negotiations, at the same time, Länder and municipal employers 
in Eastern Germany were voicing loud concerns about the need to reach a moderate pay 
settlement to ease the burden on their deficit-ridden budgets. While Ver.di reacted 
positively to the arbitrators’ proposal, the public employers adamantly rejected it as too 
expensive and too much in favour of the unions. A final compromise could be achieved 
on 10 January 2003 on the basis of some changes vis-à-vis the initial proposals of the 
arbitrators. The contract included a one-off payment of 7.5% of the salary for March 
2003 and a further €50 in November 2004. Furthermore, it was agreed that basic pay 
would increase by 2.4% as of 1 April 2003, by a further 1% from a January 2004 and 
another 1% from May 2004. Wage equalisation between the East and the West would 
be achieved gradually by 31 December 2009. Employees in the East would have to pay 
 
 
141 
a social security contribution of 2% by the end of full harmonisation. One day-off a 
year would be cut as of January 2003 (EIRR February 2003). Additionally, the 
employers and the unions agreed upon reforming/modernizing the legal framework of 
collective bargaining in the public sector by the end of January 2005. 
Ver.di was clearly satisfied with the provisions of the agreement which, regardless of 
its extremely long duration (27 months) was viewed as a “success”. For the employers, 
instead, the sealing of the 2002 agreement represented the straw that broke the camel’s 
back. As a result of the settlement, the cleavage between the federation and the 
Länder’s employers grew irreversible. The federal level through the Minister of the 
Interior Otto Schily welcomed the settlement as a “compromise that needed to be 
tolerated” (WSI Tarifarchiv 2002). The Länder and the municipalities – who bear the 
bulk of the costs for public personnel – harshly denounced the agreement which they 
deemed unaffordable for their budgets. The prime ministers in the Eastern States of 
Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia and Saxony soon threatened to leave the TdL as a result and 
suggested they would create their own bargaining association in order to negotiate 
cheaper settlements. A similar wave of threats emerged among the municipal 
employers (Behrens 2003). At that point, the very organisations for the representation 
of States and municipal public employers’ interests in the public sector were under the 
serious threat of experiencing a mass opt-out of their members. 
Thus, a political misalignment within the public employers’ camp could no longer be 
avoided due to the asymmetric financial burden which public sector wage setting 
imposes on the different levels of the German administration. Winter 2003 constituted a 
point-of-non-return for the public employers which grew irremediably divided. At the 
same time, however, the social partners had jointly committed to overhauling the legal 
framework of collective bargaining in the public sector by the end of January 2005. So, 
negotiations were started which lasted throughout the period 2003-2005. The process 
will reveal arduous and the public employers’ political coalition which had 
underpinned the former centralised and encompassing wage bargaining in the public 
sector for forty years will break up. 
2003– 2004 – 2005 
The reform of the collective bargaining framework in the public sector had long been in 
the pipeline. The legal framework had been established in the early 1960s and had 
hitherto remained largely unchanged. Until 2003, labour relations in the public sector 
had been fairly cooperative. Differently from the German private sector where sectoral 
bargain is the norm, public sector collective bargaining had been centralised at the 
federal level. The three public employers (Interior Minister, TdL and VKA) formed the 
so-called collective bargaining association (Tarifgemeinschaft) and negotiated with the 
trade unions for which ÖTV (and from 2002 onwards Ver.di) led negotiations and 
coordinated the demands of the smaller DGB unions. It was already by the mid-1990s, 
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however, that both the employers and the trade unions had converged on the idea that a 
fundamental “modernisation” of the system was necessary. There was the need to take 
into account changes in the labour market and in the financial and economic 
environment.  
After reunification, two crucial factors contributed to undermine the effectiveness and 
desirability of the old framework. On the one hand, high structural budget deficits at all 
levels of government constituted a novelty for the stability-oriented German economy. 
On the other, the process of European integration enhances processes of privatisation 
and liberalisation of public services. As a result, during the 1990s the old framework 
centred on the BAT contract came under pressure from different sources which 
triggered the need for an institutional change. 
The pressures to which public sector wage setting was exposed to in the early 2000s 
cannot be appreciated fully without analysing it against the background of the “macro-
politics” of public finance and the fiscal crisis of the German state which was taking 
place at the turn of the century (Streeck 2007). As it has been noted, in fact, by the late 
1990s German politics was exposed to a series of simultaneous and compelling fiscal 
problems which were partly structural and partly path-dependent, i.e. a legacy of the 
herculean reunification effort. On the one hand, politicians had come under pressure to 
cut statutory non-wage labour costs and to consolidate public finances under the 
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. On the other, international tax 
competition urged the need to make the corporate tax system more business friendly 
while the transition to the knowledge economy suggested the need to increase public 
investment in education, research and technology. All of these challenges, in one way 
or the other, required taxpayers’ money and had to be met by the government in a 
policy environment of weak growth and high unemployment - not least due to the 
legacy of the Bundesbank’s decision to keep monetary policy exceptionally tight for an 
extended period of time after reunification. 
As already mentioned, in the aftermath of reunification the Kohl government, which 
had promised not to increase taxation, had shifted a large chunk of the financial costs of 
supporting the East onto the social security system. In transferring its social policy 
obligations from the state’s budget to the independent budgets of the four para-fiscal 
social security funds, the aggregate social security contribution rate increased steadily. 
But in so doing, the government could avoid raising taxes (Manow and Seils 2000, 
figure 6.3; Streeck 2007; figures 1 and 3). From 1993 the political debate started to be 
dominated by concerns that the German economy had lost its international 
competitiveness due to high social security levies (Poguntke 1994). When in the mid-
90s it became clear that high and rising social contributions acted as a brake on 
employment in the service economy (Scharpf 1997a), from 1996 onwards the 
government increased again the federal subsidies to the social security system in order 
to avoid further hikes in the contribution rate. This put pressures on the federal budget 
and forced both Kohl and Schröder to finally raise some taxes (e.g. a 1% VAT hike in 
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1997 and the introduction of an eco-tax in 1999) (Streeck 2007). During the period 
1990-1997 the general government’s deficit run at an average of 3.1% (own 
calculations from OECD data). This was an unusually excessive level for the German 
political economy which had approached reunification with a fiscal surplus. Public debt 
grew by more than 20% of GDP between 1991 and 2003, skyrocketing to more than 
64% of GDP from less than 42% (OECD 2004, 34-35). The combination of lower 
revenues due to weak growth and higher expenditures linked to the social security 
system led Germany, in the early 2000s, to violate the rules of the Stability and Growth 
Pact for several years in a row. This even prompted the Ecofin Council to initiate an 
excessive deficit procedure against Germany when the budget deficit came close to 4% 
in 2003 (OECD 2008, 52). 
At about the same time, with the entry into the fiscal equalisation system of the Eastern 
Länder in 1995 the deficits of the Western States, which had hitherto suffered only a 
minor blow, started to come under pressure. The effort to meet the Maastricht’s vincolo 
esterno - of which public sector wage restraint had been the central component - had 
helped to consolidate overall finances. Yet the Schröder tax reform, which aimed at 
making the corporate tax system more business friendly, eventually induced a collapse 
in tax revenues which became problematic with the 2001 reform step. This tightened up 
the public employers’ fiscal space. The budgets of the Western Länder were 
disproportionally hit by the fall in tax revenues and the impossibility to manipulate 
their own tax revenues through legislation exerted enormous pressures on the 
expenditures’ side. Needless to say, since personnel costs amount to a very substantial 
proportion of their total outlays (figure 10), the stock of public sector wages had to be 
the first casualty on the altar of fiscal consolidation.  
Mounting deficits, in conjunction with the spread of the NPM mantra and further 
European integration through the provisions of the single market, propelled trends of 
privatisations and outsourcing. But these trends affected mostly municipal and federal 
employers. Since the 1980s, the rise of the European regulatory state (Majone 1994) 
had imposed on national governments the liberalisation and deregulation of formerly 
protected public service sectors such as telecommunications, railways, electricity and 
aviation (Bulfone 2018; Thatcher 2014). This prompted the reorganisation of the 
German public sector to eliminate political control of domestic firms and let market 
forces operate in what had to become a European market. The privatisation of the 
federal postal and telecommunication services and of the German railways moved 
thousands of previously public employees outside the scope of public sector collective 
agreements. Many of the new companies which then entered these liberalised markets 
were often neither signatory of collective agreements nor part of employers’ 
associations (Dribbusch and Schulten 2007, 163).  
The spread of NPM affected mostly the local level where measures aimed at 
“modernizing” the management of local public services (such as local transport, waste 
disposal, street cleaning, energy supply, etc.) through “market-related concepts and 
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instruments to save scarce funds and increase public sector efficiency and effectiveness 
in hard times” (Keller 2011, 2335). Many municipal employers, increasingly in 
competition with private providers, thus started to establish new companies under 
private law. Alternatively they started to outsource the provision of public services to 
private entities. By entering the domain of private law, while pursuing public functions, 
these entities remained outside the scope of the collective agreements in the public 
sector. In a context of financial precariousness, and given their incapability to 
manipulate substantially their revenues, privatisations and outsourcing allowed 
municipal employers to make savings in labour costs by undercutting the sectoral 
contract or through massive job cuts altogether (Dribbusch and Schulten 2007). 
Dynamics of privatisation and outsourcing of local public services created a second line 
of segmentation in the public sector workforce which dealt a mighty blow to the trade 
unions’ power in the public sector. The legal demarcation between civil servants and 
public employees had always been a constant trait of public sector industrial relations. 
The fact that civil servants enjoy no right to strike weakens unions’ associational power 
by legally splitting the workforce between two statuses - one of which cannot undertake 
industrial action. Since the decision on whether to hire under one legal status or the 
other is discretionary and depends on the public employer, widespread situations exist 
(most notably in the education sector) in which civil servants and public employees 
work side by side. These employees often execute similar functions but are subjected to 
different legal restrictions. In such contexts, unions’ capacity to mobilise the workforce 
is severely hampered by the employers’ capacity to “divide and rule”. Privatisations 
and outsourcing of local services weighted in to shift the balance of power in favour of 
the public employers because these dynamics “neutralised” the very militant segments 
of the public workforce.  
This created a further legal distinction between public and privately provided services. 
In fact, the bastions of public sector militancy in Germany have historically been the 
blue-collar workers in local public services, namely local transport, utilities and waste 
disposal (Keller 1993). It was on their disproportional disruptive power and 
mobilisation strength that the public sector trade unions could rely to counteract the 
prerogatives of public employers. Joint bargaining on the unions’ side had always 
rested on the informal convention that those were the workers that would engage in 
strike activity to apply. Thanks to disruptive pressures at the local level, the trade 
unions would then seal public sector contracts at the central level. This circumscribed 
strike action at the local would thus benefit the whole public workforce. 
German public sector white-collar workers feature instead a traditionally weak 
associational power and have had to free-ride on the disruptive power of those militant 
groups at the municipal level. This is partly the case because of their split between two 
different legal regulations, as explained. Most importantly however this is especially 
due to a sense of duty and ethos for which public employees, especially those working 
in the education sector, oppose collective mobilisation (Interview with official in the 
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top echelon of GEW 2017). These dynamics have, over time, substantially weakened 
Ver.di’s mobilisation capacity. The reason is that, along the lines of the old ÖTV, 
Ver.di’s social base tends to be concentrated among workers at the local level while 
GEW, due to its concentrated base in the education sector, tends to be stronger at the 
state level (Interview with officials in the top echelon of ver.di 2017). 
As a result of these trends, since the mid-1990s, ÖTV and DAG had worked together to 
devise a comprehensive restructuring of the collective bargaining framework. In 1994 
ÖTV held a special congress which aimed to debate the future of collective bargaining 
in the public sector. Conscious of the pressures emerging from privatisations, 
outsourcing, European integration and especially financial problems, ÖTV conceived 
for the first time the idea of a unified framework agreement for both white and blue-
collar workers. In November 2001 the bargaining commission of Ver.di set up the so-
called “modernisation commission” in charge of studying a detailed reform plan. In 
March 2002 the commission proposed to enter negotiations with the public employers 
and issued a “100-points paper” that would serve as a basis to discuss the status of 
labour law in the public sector. When the 2002 contract was eventually signed in 
January 2003, in the contract the parts undertook the formal commitment to proceed 
ahead with joint negotiations, setting up the objectives and the principles behind the 
reform. The parts aspired to: increase the efficiency of the public service; introduce 
elements of performance-related pay; make public services more customer and market 
oriented; streamline administrative procedures and increase transparency; make the 
public sector more attractive; eliminate discrimination at the workplace and the 
distinction between white and blue collar workers (WSI Tarifarchiv 2005). 
Overall, the negotiations lasted for around two years until the reform of the bargaining 
system was eventually achieved in February 2005. But bits and pieces of the old 
constellation were left behind. Immediately after the signature of the 2002 contract, in 
May 2003, a “steering committee” composed of representatives of both employers and 
unions started to meet to discuss the elements of the reform. Yet the working of the 
committee proceeded in dribs and drabs amidst turbulent conflicts and the unravelling 
of the employers’ Tarifgemeinschaft. Within the employers’ camp a fundamental 
vertical cleavage had emerged whereby the Länder no longer saw common ground in 
bargaining collectively under the leadership of the Interior Minister. 
In May 2003 the joint bargaining association among the public employers collapsed. 
This association had ensured centralised public sector bargaining for half a century, 
collapsed. The Bavarian Finance Minister Kurt Falthauser representing TdL announced 
its dissolution. Furthermore, TdL announced the termination of the collectively agreed 
provisions on Christmas and summer bonuses in order to renegotiate lower terms. In 
June TdL quit the conditions of the collective agreements with entry into effect upon 
the newly-hired from 1 July. Given the disproportionately high personnel costs which 
Länder employers face, the 2002 contract came under fire among the States’ employers. 
TdL declared that it would no longer accept the traditional leading role of the federal 
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level where only a tiny minority of all public employees is employed. Next to this, 
pulling out of the bargaining coalition had the clear advantage for the States that 
collective bargaining would be disentangled from the municipal employers, i.e. the 
weak chain within the employers’ camp. Getting rid of the local level in negotiations 
was for the TdL a strategic move to break free from the municipal workers’ capacity to 
affect overall wage negotiations through their disruptive power in local infrastructural 
services. 
In truth, the Tarifgemeinschaft had already started to crumble even before the 2002 pay 
settlement was reached when Berlin had withdrawn from its membership in the VKA 
and the Association of Employers’ Public service (VadÖD). This Länder-level 
subsidiary association, which was created after Berlin had been expelled from TdL in 
1993, was included in the employers’ joint negotiations alongside TdL. Berlin resigned 
from its membership. The January agreement eventually led several other Länder and 
municipal employers to voice concerns about the financial viability of the settlement. 
When Baden-Württemberg, Hessen and Saxony threatened to leave the Länder 
employers’ organisation due to the high costs of the contracts, TdL itself came under a 
very existential threat. TdL’s exit was a due action in the course of saving the 
horizontal wage coordination among the Länder employers. In fact, the move was 
driven by the financial interests of Länder employers which were united across the 
party-spectrum. TdL’s exit from the employers’ bargaining coalition was welcomed 
unanimously by both SPD- and CDU-led States (Dribbusch 2003). 
Until March 2004, however, the three public employers continued to negotiate together 
on the institutional reforms with the trade unions. The rupture point came when the 
conflict on weekly working hours escalated. Yo extract further savings, all Länder 
employers, regardless of their political complexion, had been extending the weekly 
working week for their civil servants from 38.5 to 40 hours, inducing the federal 
government to follow suit at the end of 2003. On grounds of “equal treatment” Länder 
employers demanded public employees alike be subjected to a longer working week 
(Dribbusch and Schulten 2007, 170). The row over longer working hours escalated first 
in the state of Hessen in mid-December 2003, leading its CDU prime minister Roland 
Koch to take the state out of the TdL. Hessen’s authorities wanted public employees to 
work longer than the collectively agreed provision of 38.5 hours, in order to align their 
working week to that of the civil servants’ - which had been extended to between 40 
and 42 hours, starting from January 2004. In so doing, the employers tried to force 
Ver.di into negotiating on the issue but the union, for fear of jeopardizing the whole 
working time provisions, refused. Koch took Hessen out of the TdL with the hope to 
force Ver.di to renegotiate a separate agreement. In so doing, he went on justifying his 
decision to leave the employers’ association on the grounds that the January 2003 
contract was too expensive (EIRR January 2004).  
When also other federal States started to demand a longer working week be applied to 
the newly-hired employees TdL, to prevent an internal haemorrhage, was forced to 
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renege on the collective agreements on working time for white- and blue-collar workers 
in West Germany (Interview with official in the top echelon of TdL 2017). At the end 
of March 2004, TdL quit the agreements on working time with immediate entry into 
effect from 1 April. The Bavarian prime minister Edmund Stoiber welcomed the move 
while the federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily deplored the States’ decision 
(Zschaler 2004b). Ver.di ’s leadership started to fear that collective bargaining in the 
public sector would collapse fully and a fragmented and unmanageable bargaining 
scenario would emerge (Dribbusch 2005). Yet Ver.di could not tolerate the behaviour 
in the breach of the 2003 legal agreement and suspended the joint negotiations for the 
reform of the bargaining system. With TdL withdrawing from negotiations altogether, 
talks resumed only between Ver.di and the municipal and federal employers from the 
beginning of April. From then onwards, Ver.di would be engaged on two fronts. On the 
one hand, relations with the Länder employers became increasingly combative on the 
issue of working hours’ extension. On the other, Ver.di was negotiating the overhaul of 
the bargaining system’s legal framework with the federal and municipal employers - 
which it wanted to keep together to avoid the full fragmentation of the system.  
The steering group on the reforms resumed its work in May 2004 and met for around 
15 times before arriving at the preliminary draft of the reform of the bargaining system 
in early January 2005 (WSI Tarifarchiv 2005). In the meantime, in November 2004, the 
federal Finance Minister Hans Eichel had announced that the federal government 
would be seeking a zero wage bargaining round for the new contract to be agreed 
before 31
st
 January 2005. In his announcement he enjoyed the support of the opposition 
and the business community. Weakened by the split among the public employers, 
Ver.di signalled its willingness to negotiate on a zero wage round in exchange for the 
introduction of the new pay system in the public sector – which it wanted at all costs 
(Interview with officials in the top echelon of ver.di 2017). The government was also 
keen on introducing the new system. However, the government made clear that the 
reform would happen only under the condition that it be introduced on a cost-neutral 
basis (EIRR December 2004). After all, the government was under the Commission’s 
radar for breaching the deficit ceiling of the Stability and Growth Pact. In early 
December, along the same lines, also TdL announced its intention to pursue a “zero” 
wage round (General-Anzeiger 2004). 
After two years of turbulent preparations, on 9
th
 February 2005, Ver.di and the federal 
and municipal employers reached a compromise and the new TVöD system was born. 
The new legal framework for collective bargaining in the public sector would cover 
around 2.1 million public employees in between the federal and municipal levels. In 
providing for the sought-after modernisation of the bargaining structure, the agreement 
envisaged a transition period of three years according to which the collectively agreed 
provisions would be valid between October 2005 and the end of 2007. 
In terms of pay improvements, the unions forewent percentage increases altogether and 
accepted instead lump sums for the following three years (35 months to be precise). 
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Accordingly, all employees received a €300 lump sum per year in 2005, 2006 and 
2007. The wages of municipal workers and trainees in Eastern Germany were to be 
adjusted to Western levels by 1.5% a year in 2005, 2006 and 2007. In line with the TV-
V contract signed at the municipal level in 1999, the accord eliminated the legal 
distinction between white- and blue-collar workers in the public sector, thus providing 
for a new harmonised pay scale for all employees. The new scale contains 15 vertical 
categories of employees and 6 horizontal pay grades. The entry pay level at the bottom 
of the new pay scale was reduced, upon request of the unions, to make the public sector 
more competitive vis-à-vis privately provided services. This was meant to contain the 
trend of privatisation and outsourcing of public services. With the lowest wage rate for 
low skilled workers now set at € 1.286 a month in Western Germany and €1.209 in 
Eastern Germany, the new public sector entry level was about €300 lower than before, 
a substantial undercut. An element of performance-related pay was inserted in that 
bonuses (up to 8% of the salary) formerly based on age and family responsibilities 
were, from 2007 onwards, to be handed out on the basis of performance. The Christmas 
and summer bonuses were merged into one payment which, starting from 2007, would 
be equivalent to between 60% (for employees in higher pay scales 13-15) and 90% (for 
employees in lower pay scales 1-8) of the monthly salary - a substantial cut in relation 
to the two previous instalments.  
As for working hours, the federal employees’ working week was set at 39 hours, while 
an opening clause was agreed for municipal employees whereby the parts would be 
able, in the future, to negotiate locally working weeks up to 40 hours. Lastly, a crucial 
element which made the agreement possible was the inclusion of a so-called “most 
beneficial clause” (Meistbegünstigungsklausel). Upon request of the federal employers, 
it was agreed that in case more-employer-friendly terms than those signed in the TVöD 
contract would be agreed in future negotiations with TdL or VKA, those terms proven 
to be more beneficial to the employers will be automatically translated in the TVöD as 
well (Dribbusch 2005; EIRR March 2005; WSI Tarifarchiv 2005). 
Although for Ver.di the reform unequivocally amounted to a reformatio in peius,
26
 the 
unions contented themselves with a compromise achieved under adverse external 
conditions. Faced with the disintegration of the public employers’ camp, Ver.di’s 
success rested on keeping the employers as compact as possible. The alternative 
fragmented landscape which was to ensue without the TVöD contract would have been 
unmanageable for the unions. While remaining firmly against the extension of working 
hours, the unions rather unanimously welcomed the deal even though it was admittedly 
a concessionary bargain.  
To use the words of officials in the top echelon of Ver.di:  
                                                                
26
 The new TVOeD system is considerably cheaper for the public employers. For a comparison between 
the old BAT and the new TVöD systems see EIRR (May 2005) and Keller (2011). 
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“(T)he problem was that employers would leave the BAT because they deemed it too costly 
and too complex, but Ver.di wanted to preserve the framework of collective wage 
negotiations. Accepting TVöD was the price to pay to keep the employers within their 
organisations. The alternative, (i.e.) to negotiate with individual employers, would be too 
difficult to engage with” (Interview with officials in the top echelon of ver.di 2017). 
The problem for Ver.di was particularly acute at the local level vis-à-vis municipal 
employers. 
“The (TVöD) reform was triggered by privatisation because when private services started to 
pay lower wages, unions in the public sector had to react. There it started a competition with 
private organisations which offered lower prices. VKA was very important in this process. So 
was Ver.di which has most of its members at the municipal level. VKA had to compete with 
private services and was undergoing a process of erosion because public enterprises started 
to pull out of the organisation and get their contracts outside VKA. Ver.di had to face the fact 
that the VKA was losing its members. Ver.di and even we (dbb) realised that we had to change 
our politics. We would have liked to go on as we always did, but if we did so, the VKA would 
have become a weak partner, but we wanted to keep the VKA strong and so we declared our 
willingness to change the bargaining system: if VKA loses its members, Ver.di will lose a 
partner they need. The TVöD introduced a lower group which gave the VKA the opportunity 
to compete with private organisations. We wanted to maintain the system but in order to 
maintain it, we had to change it” (interview with official in the top echelon of dbb's 
Tarifbericht 2017) 
Thus, at this historical juncture, the serious cleavage among the employers ended up 
disempowering the unions. To manage collective bargaining in the public sector, Ver.di 
depended on keeping the employers together as much as possible more than the 
employers themselves would have wished to remain together. In fact, they did not. Due 
to different material interests rooted in the asymmetric stocks of personnel costs with 
which they are confronted, the public employers had split and the full disintegration of 
collective bargaining in the public sector was indeed a possible scenario to be taken 
into account. The Finance Minister Eichel cheered the fact that “the low pay increases 
will provide further economic stability” (EIRR March 2005). The VKA boasted the 
introduction of performance-related pay and, above all, the much cheaper pay provision 
for the unskilled workers at the bottom of the pay scale (Dribbusch 2005). 
Sealing the TVöD closed up one of the tables in which Ver.di had been kept busy for 
two years. But the parallel controversy with the Länder employers still needed to be 
solved. After the TVöD agreement, Ver.di tried in vain to convince TdL to take on 
board its results. Speaking for the TdL, the CDU Finance Minister of Lower Saxony, 
Hartmut Möllring, rejected the offer. Two were the bones of contentions. States were 
unsatisfied with the regulation of working hours, which they wanted to extend and with 
the regulation of the Christmas and summer bonuses, which they wanted to reduce 
further. Secondly, and most importantly, they deemed the TVöD still too expansive for 
the dire budgets of the States (WSI Tarifarchiv 2005). Amidst unions’ warning strikes 
staged against TdL’s working time policy, Ver.di and the TdL entered negotiations on a 
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new collective bargaining framework for the Länder in spring 2005. A compromise 
would not be reached until the second half of May 2006. 
2006 
Two legal clauses which had been inserted in the TVöD made the constellation in 
which Ver.di had to negotiate with TdL very complex. These clauses constrained 
Ver.di’s action space. Additionally, the union had again to fight on multiple tables, five 
to be precise. As a result of the multiple fronts open, the environment became 
increasingly combative throughout spring 2005 and the summer of 2006. 
In negotiations with the TdL, Ver.di wanted the Länder employers to adopt similar 
provisions than those agreed in the TVöD. However, TdL did not second Ver.di’s 
desire and firmly aspired to extend the weekly working week. The adoption of the 
“most favourable clause” in the TVöD brought about the necessity for Ver.di not to 
cave in against the Länder employers’ offensive. In fact, had Ver.di accepted an 
extension of the working hours (which it strongly opposed) at the Länder or municipal 
level, this provision would have been lawfully transposed in the TVöD contract as well. 
Simultaneously, the adoption of the “opening clause” on working-hours regulations at 
the municipal level induced local employers in various States to try to extend the 
working week beyond the 38.5 provision of the TVöD. Ver.di tried hard to fight back. 
Conflicts on the working-hours regulation emerged especially in the States of Baden-
Württemberg, Hamburg and Lower Saxony where the municipal employers all argued 
longer working weeks be necessary to cope with their budget constraints (Dribbusch 
2006). 
The first battlefield was in Baden-Württemberg and concerned employees working in 
local health clinics. In summer 2004, the university hospitals (Unikliniken) had 
withdrawn from the employers’ association and aimed at increasing the working week 
up to 40 hours for the newly-hired, a desire which Ver.di opposed strongly. When five 
consecutive negotiations failed, in October 2005 the union coordinated a warning strike 
which involved around 20.000 workers. After one week and a half of strikes, a 
compromise was reached which set the point of reference for the following agreements. 
A differentiated treatment was agreed. Instead of 40 hours, employees below the age of 
forty would work 39 hours, those in between forty and fifty-five years old would work 
38.5 and older workers would work 38 hours per week (WSI Tarifarchiv 2006). 
At about the same time another struggle ensued in Lower Saxony where the municipal 
employers decided to quit the working time provisions of the TVöD as of beginning of 
December 2005. Negotiations were tried in vain and strikes began until a compromise 
could be found in mid-March 2006. The deal established a 39-hour working week with 
the exception of childcare facilities, hospitals and the employees in the capital 
administration where the working week remained at 38.5 hours. 
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Similar developments occurred in Hamburg where the failure of initial negotiations 
between Ver.di and the Hamburg’s employer association (Arbeitsrechtlichen 
Vereinigung Hamburg, AVH) eventually was overcome with an agreement similar to 
that stipulated in Baden-Württemberg. Working hours were decided on a differentiated 
manner on the basis of employees’ age, remuneration and family composition. The 
Hamburg agreement however was not regarded as a pilot agreement for the other 
ensuing disputes. 
The last two controversies in spring 2006 were the harshest for Ver.di. On the one side 
a further controversy took place vis-à-vis Baden-Württemberg’s municipal employers 
(KAV). On the other, Ver.di was simultaneously engaged in talks with TdL to renew 
the collective bargaining framework. Conflicts in Baden-Württemberg were the hardest 
because the KVA employers had no intention whatsoever to compromise. Municipal 
employers there had already terminated working-time regulations in October 2005 and 
had extended the working week up to 41 hours, had cut holiday pay and had reduced 
the Christmas bonus (EIRR Jamuary 2006). Given the failure of negotiations, strikes 
began in early February and protests were carried on for nine consecutive weeks, 
seriously disrupting local services after attempts at conciliation failed. It was only after 
the fifth attempt that, in early April, the parts reached an agreement on the 39-hour 
working week without differentiations. 
In the meantime disputes continued at the state level between Ver.di and TdL. The 
parts had started official negotiations in mid-april 2005. Due to the lack of progress, 
Ver.di staged strikes in mid-february 2006 but TdL’s Hartmut Möllring, Finance 
Minister of Lower Saxony, intended to hold out against the unions’ industrial action. 
“The finances of the regional authorities”, he argued, “are in such a mess that a 
lengthening of the working week would be justified” (EIRR February 2006). TdL 
intended to introduce a 40-hour working week. Ver.di, however, needed necessarily to 
prevent this from happening otherwise, through the “most beneficial clause”, the same 
extension would have automatically been adopted in the TVöD, taking the working 
week up to 40 hours also at the federal and municipal level.  
Top-level discussions continued in between late February and early March. When the 
parts met again on 10 March, Ver.di put a compromise on the table. Along the lines of 
the agreement which had been reached at the local level in Lower Saxony, Ver.di 
suggested to differentiate the regulation of working hours. Differently from that deal, 
however, Ver.di recommended the criterion be based on pay grades rather than age. 
Lower pay grades (1-10) would have a 38.5-hour working week which would gradually 
increase to a 40-hour week approaching the pay grade fifteen. Ver.di also offered 
concessions on the summer and Christmas bonus. Yet the package was rejected by TdL 
as insufficient. Strikes continued throughout March, April and May in what became the 
hardest dispute in public sector wage setting since 1992 (EIRR April 2006; Keller 
2017). 
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Eventually, on 20 May 2006, after 16 weeks of industrial action an agreement was 
reached and the TV-L bargaining framework for Länder’s employees was given birth 
(WSI Tarifarchiv 2006). Negotiators were faced with a trade-off between whether to 
compromise and getting over the impasse or kick the can down the road and face the 
disruptive effects of a paralysis of the system. As common in the German model of 
capitalism, they compromised – settling the dispute on working hours on the basis of an 
average provision. The new TV-L collective agreement applied to all the States but 
Hessen and Berlin. The latter then re-entered the TdL in 2012. 
The agreement covered the period from 1 November 2006 to 31 December 2009. In 
terms of pay, similar to the TVöD, different lump sums were granted until September 
2007 which differed on the basis of income groups. The lowest grades (1-8) received 
€150 in July 2006, €310 in January 2007 and €450 in September 2007. The pay grades 
in the middle of the scale (9-12) obtained during the same period €100, €210 and €300. 
The higher ranks (13-15) got €50, € 60 and €100. After September 2007 all employees 
obtained a 2.9% pay increase for the year 2008. These improvements, however, 
followed after the decision to impose eleven “zero months” from February to 
December 2005. Like in the TVöD, the distinction between white- and blue-collar 
workers was eliminated and a 15-grade pay scale was introduced. Also, a similar 
element of performance-related pay was inserted. A sum equivalent to 1% of the 
monthly pay was to be paid out according to performance and this provision was set to 
increase gradually up to 8% over time. Working hours, the bone of contention which 
had led to a stalemate in negotiations, were set differently for Eastern and Western 
Germany. In the former, the working week was fixed at 40 hours. In Western Germany 
the working week for Länder’s employees, coming into effect from 1 November 2006, 
was to be set by each state on the basis of the average of actual and collectively agreed 
working time in that state. This provision was adopted so that the working week of 
States’ employees would be set in each state as an average of the hours worked by all 
the other public employees in that state, regardless of the administrative level in which 
they were employed. In so doing, a “lowest common denominator” agreement could be 
found through which the TVöD’s “most beneficial clause” was circumvented. This 
solution prevented it from springing into action and, at least in this respect, Ver.di was 
successful in avoiding the further extension of the working week at the federal and 
municipal level. 
So far, the historical reconstruction has covered developments in the collective 
bargaining arena through which public employees are regulated. In parallel to the 
described process of institutional change of the hitherto centralised wage bargaining 
system, an overhaul of legislative competences concerning civil servants’ pay occurred 
through a process of constitutional reform. These two processes unfolded in parallel, 
although in different political arenas. Reconstructing the process of constitutional 
reforms of the civil service’s wage determination is the substance of the following sub-
section. 
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7.2 COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM AND CIVIL SERVICE’S WAGE DIFFERENTIATION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
With reunification, some 2.2 million public servants from the former GDR had to join 
the public sector of the unified Germany. Public employees of the former GDR were 
transferred to the Eastern Länder and their municipalities as provided by art.13 of the 
unification treaty. As a result, municipalities in Eastern Germany were often 
overstaffed when compared to their Western counterparts. This oversized public sector 
was immediately meant to be reduced drastically. The unification treaty contained a 
controversial clause on the so-called “waiting loop” (Warteschleife) which temporarily 
exempted Eastern public employees from the coverage of Western Germany’s 
legislation on unfair collective dismissals. Those public employees whose units were 
closed or reorganised were temporarily suspended for a period of six months during 
which they continued to receive 70% of their previous salary before becoming 
unemployed. The legality of this decision was challenged by the former GDR workers 
before the Federal Constitutional Court. When the court upheld the decision to suspend 
some hundreds of thousands (between 300.000 and 600.000) of public employees 
(EIRR May 1991), this paved the way to a substantial downscaling of the German 
public sector (figure 11). 
The bulk of the dismissals occurred between 1991 and 1992 and civil servants’ political 
affiliation with the old communist regime was often a reason to get the sack (Keller 
1999). Since reunification, state and municipal employers in the Eastern part of the 
country have been reluctant to hire their personnel under the legal status of Beamte, 
filling their ranks mostly with salaried employees. Throughout the 1990s, due to 
budgetary problems, public employers in both the West and East made a significant 
effort to restructure the public sector. Cutbacks were particularly dramatic in the 
Eastern Länder where public employment was reduced by ¼ while that of Eastern 
municipalities more than halved (Kuhlmann and Röber 2004). Next to this quantitative 
restructuring, new regulations providing for the modernisation of the civil service were 
enacted. In 1997 the civil service reform law provided the Länder with better 
opportunities for the delegation of responsibilities, downgrading and transfer of staff 
across different administrations. The law also introduced part-time and more flexible 
forms of employment for civil servants, together with the introduction of financial 
incentives and elements of performance pay.  
But the most fundamental proposal for an overhaul of the German civil service came 
from the left in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, in the early 2000s. Under the 
leadership of the SPD state premier Peer Steinbrück, the NRW government set up a 
commission on “the future of the public sector” chaired by Hamburg constitutional 
lawyer Hans Peter Bull, himself an SPD figure.  
As things went: 
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“(T)he establishment of the Government Commission took place in the context of a debate on 
the modernisation of the administration that had been intensively conducted in NRW since the 
mid-1990s and which, in terms of its "history of ideas", was in turn a reaction to NPM and the 
idea of the "lean state”… Of course - and above all - the debate was based on the "crisis of 
public budgets" that was perceived nationwide at the time”… At the time, the financial 
situation of the Länder and municipalities was rather poor - ultimately insufficient for the 
diversity of the tasks they are charged with - and uncertain. Therefore, the state governments - 
and to a lesser extent the federal government - had to plan for savings. However, the NRW 
state government, like other state governments, did not want to make these necessary cuts 
without a plan … but on the basis of a systematic analysis of the tasks of the administration … 
and the working conditions of the employees and in connection with the … "internal 
modernisation". Another motive for the government commission's review of the employment 
law was its - still existing - dual nature, i.e. the division into civil servants' and collective 
bargaining law with the consequence that often employees with the same tasks had different 
legal status and in particular were paid differently and that the personnel administrations had 
to - and must - work with two different, in each case highly complicated, sets of rules.” 
(Interview with high profile officials of the NRW Government's Commission on "the future of 
the public sector" led by Han Peter Bull 2019) 
In early 2003, the commission reported on its findings. A key problem of the German 
civil service, it was noted, was the costs of its pensions’ provisions. Since public 
employers in the short run do not have to set aside money to pay civil servants’ social 
contributions (pensions are then paid out of the public coffers upon retirement), the 
system had incentivised an oversized civil service. “Cheaper” Beamte were extensively 
recruited during the 1960s and 1970s and, since the corresponding financial reserves 
had not been set aside over time, a hidden “multi-billion” bill will have to be footed by 
future generations. The commission recommended a restructuring of the pension 
system on the basis of two pillars, a statutory pension scheme and an additional tax-
funded pillar (Stuttgarter Zeitung 2003). The commission went on recommending the 
elimination of the civil servant status for all those employees working in occupations 
beyond the core functions of the state (police, judiciary, tax collection, external 
security). The commission thus proposed to overcome the two parallel regulatory 
systems and create a uniform legal framework of public sector employment relations. 
The German public sector, it was acknowledged, needed more elements of competition, 
an orientation toward citizens’ needs and more performance-related pay.  
On the basis of the commission’s proceedings, in spring 2003, Steinbrück called for the 
termination of the civil servant status of public employment through an amendment of 
the German Basic Law. At the same time, the NRW government announced cuts in 
holiday pay and Christmas bonuses for civil servants in view of the “empty public 
coffers”. The abolition of the civil service immediately became a divisive issue in 
which political personalities from the Länder became rather vocal. A group of reformist 
SPD parliamentarians led by the deputy education minister Christoph Matschie called 
for the abolition of the civil service in line with the Commission’s proposals. The 
greens aligned behind Steinbrück’s plan (Keinhorst 2003). At the other side of the 
spectrum, both the CDU and the CSU vocally opposed the abolition of the Beamte 
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status. Hartmut Möllring, the CDU Finance Minister of Lower Saxony, rebuked the 
proposal arguing that the German civil service was “irreplaceable”. Overall: 
“the SPD and the Greens tended to favour the creation of a uniform right of employment, as 
the DGB and some of its member unions had long demanded. The FDP, on the other hand, 
which is close to industry and should have supported the abolition of the special regulations 
for civil servants for other reasons, vehemently represented the interests of the civil servants 
in their special status in this discussion as ever and still today - probably due to by the social 
composition of their membership, to which many civil servants belonged. The CDU was also 
on the side of the opponents of reform.” (Interview with high profile officials of the NRW 
Government's Commission on "the future of the public sector" led by Han Peter Bull 2019) 
On the unions’ side, dbb’s chairman Peter Heesen called for a reformist strategy that, 
while preserving the Beamte status, would allow the introduction of performance-
related evaluations and pay together with a system of sanctions for under-performing 
civil servants (FinancialTimes 2004). At the yearly meeting of the dbb, in January 
2004, the Interior Minister Otto Schily came out in favour of maintaining the civil 
service. The NRW government aimed to start a legislative initiative to amend the 
constitution in the Bundesrat by the summer. However, it soon realised that the 
majority in the upper chamber needed for a such a constitutional change was out of 
sight (FRIGELJ). The dbb, with the greatest stake in the game, strongly opposed the 
abolition of the civil service and actively tried to slow down legislative initiatives. Peter 
Heesen started to engage in high profile lobbying activities. The conditions for a 
political alignment between the dbb and the Minister of the Interior emerged. Both 
Heesen and Schily had agreed on the introduction of elements of performance in the 
civil service. Indeed, both agreed that a major reform was needed. Yet both opposed 
constitutional amendments and the abolition of the civil service altogether. At this 
point, the dbb’s chairman became the key actor in the process. 
The Länder employers were on the offensive from two sides. On the one hand, through 
TdL they had pulled out of the wage bargaining coalition with municipal and federal 
employers just to go on their own squeezing the financial costs of collective bargaining 
for the public employees. On the other hand, they had begun to extend civil servants’ 
weekly working hours and cut summer and Christmas bonuses. When proposals to even 
eliminate the civil service emerged, it became clear to the dbb that it should have taken 
a proactive stance to contain the Länder employers’ offensive. Heesen approached the 
Interior Minister Schily with a plan to set forth a reform plan that would “modernise” 
the civil service without eliminating it from the constitution. Since the beginning of 
2004, the dbb and the Ministry of the Interior negotiated together on the cornerstones of 
a reform plan which was eventually formalised with the publication of a “key-points 
paper” in early October 2004 (Thiede 2004). The paper was the result of a tripartite 
agreement between the dbb, the Ministry of the Interior and Ver.di. It carried the 
signatures of Heesen, Schily and Ver.di’s chairman Frank Bsirske. While Ver.di had 
not been involved in negotiations from the beginning it then joined the process at a later 
stage in what led to the realignment between the two competing unions. In fact: 
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“in the 1990s the relationship between ÖTV and dbb was confrontational and competitive. In 
the 2000s dbb and Ver.di came together in the two parallel processes of reform” (Interview 
with official in the top echelon of dbb 2017). 
In the process of reform of the civil service, 
“the dbb was the key player. Ver.di approached the dbb and there was a realignment between 
the two unions: Ver.di made the dbb part of the TVöD reform and the dbb made Ver.di part of 
the Beamtenrecht reform.” (interview with official in the top echelon of dbb's Tarifbericht 
2017) 
The paper proposed the introduction of an element of performance-related pay in civil 
servants’ salaries (up to 8%). The element of variable pay was meant to “increase 
responsibility and motivation in the civil service” by eliminating automatic upgrades 
based on seniority. Due to budget constraints, Schily stressed the need for the reform to 
occur on a cost-neutral basis and proposed that a draft bill be prepared at the beginning 
of 2005 in coordination with the federal government and the Länder. Schily hoped to 
have the reform of the civil service enacted by 2007. Both Bsirske and Heesen boasted 
the concerted agreement in that the reform would eventually make “amendments to the 
basic law superfluous” and “avoid the elimination of constitutional protection of the 
status of civil servant” (AFP 2004). In the minds of the reformers this was the way to 
proceed in order to strike a balance between the need to reform – which the unions 
acknowledged - and the request to avoid the elimination of the civil service – for which 
the NRW state government was pushing for. 
However, there were contrasting voices within the Länder employers and within the 
SPD. A further political cleavage emerged. Talks on the reform of the civil service 
were taking place against the background of the working of the commission on the 
federalism reform. The two processes became intertwined when rumours spread that 
the Länder were planning to claim back the legislative competence for the regulation of 
Länder civil servants’ pay (Beamtenbesoldung Kompetenz). In fact, a 32-member 
commission had been set up in 2003 with the aim to reform the German constitution in 
order to curtail the Bundesrat’s legislative veto power. It had been estimated that the 
Bundesrat could veto 60% of all the bills. This was deemed excessive and often cause 
of political stalemate. The federalism commission - composed by members of the two 
chambers and chaired by SPD chairman Franz Müntefering and the CSU state premier 
of Bavaria Edmund Stoiber – had the task to reduce the Bundesrat’s veto power to 40% 
of all bills (Benoit and Jaklin 2004). Most importantly, in the negotiations of the 
constitutional reform, among the other things, the two chairmen had converged on the 
necessity for the States to claim back the legislative competence on civil servants’ pay. 
It was not by coincidence that the concerted reform plan by Heesen, Bsirske and Schily 
had been published right in anticipation of the federalism commission’s last meetings 
in Berlin, in mid-October. By then, three blocs had emerged which cut across and 
within political parties. On the extremist side, Peer Steinbrück supported by a group of 
reformist SPD parliamentarians was vocally advocating for the elimination of the civil 
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service and the introduction of homogenous public sector employment relations 
regulated via collective bargaining. The “magic trio” composed by the dbb, Ver.di and 
the SPD Minister of the Interior Schily wanted to struck a reformist mid-way, with 
performance-oriented reforms within the framework of the civil service. The “big 
States” in the federalism commission led by Stoiber and Müntefering wanted to 
maintain the civil service but transfer legislative competences on civil servants’ pay 
back to the Länder in order to obtain more freedom and flexibility in the management 
of their own civil servants.  
The SPD was internally divided on how to proceed. Schily was against the abolition of 
the civil service and against the transferal of legislative competencies away from his 
ministry. The dbb was against the abolition of the civil service and against the 
transferal of legislative competencies to the States because this would have jeopardised 
the civil service (with 17 different regulations across the nation) and injected an 
element of competitive federalism (Zschaler 2004a). With the reform proposal, the 
unions and the Interior Ministry had hoped that, by offering the possibility to deviate by 
8% (-4% and +4%) on federal legislation on civil servants’ pay on the basis of 
performance assessments, they would have granted the States the sort of “opening 
clause” that would have dissuaded them to pursue the decentralisation of the 
Beamtenbesoldung Kompetenz through the federalism reform. Yet Müntefering and 
Stoiber were far apart from the trio’s proposal. After all, what the Interior Ministry was 
offering the possibility to save money by minor undercuts to Federation-mandated 
statutory pay, i.e. the possibility to derogate in peius vis-à-vis federal legislation on 
civil servants’ pay. What the richer States wanted instead was the very legislative 
competence so as to go on their own. Both Stoiber and Müntefering had agreed that the 
competence was crucial for the restructuring of the States’ budgets. “Otto and I are far 
apart here”, Müntefering argued when publicly dismissing the moderate reform 
proposal of his fellow SPD colleague and Interior Minister Schily (Der Spiegel 2004). 
To the good hopes of both Heesen and Schily, there was a last minute disagreement in 
the federalism commission and attempts to reform the German political system 
collapsed in mid-December 2004. After compromises had been struck on about every 
aspect of the reform, an unmanageable disagreement emerged on responsibilities for 
school and university education. The federal government insisted it wanted a greater 
role to ensure better standards across the country. The States firmly rejected what they 
perceived as the government’s attempt to centralise control of education policy and 
redraw the balance of power between the two state levels (Williamson 2004). 
Reinvigorated by the failure of the federalism commission, Schily and Heesen 
immediately called on the Länder authorities to now support their concerted reform 
plan. “The temporary failure of the federalism reform should be used by all parties to 
reconsider their positions”, Schily argued at the customary January conference of the 
dbb (Schiermeyer 2005). Indeed, in agreement with the dbb, during spring of 2005 the 
Interior Ministry stepped up the preparation of a draft law modelled on their previous 
 
 
158 
“key-points paper” which it intended to publish at the end of May 2005 (Frankfurter 
Rundschau 2005). Yet Schily’s reformist plan had to be paused again when, in the 
NRW June elections, the tide turned against the Schröder government and early federal 
elections were subsequently announced. When it became clear that the SPD had lost 
support in its traditional stronghold, SPD’s chairman Müntefering announced that the 
Chancellor would seek early Bundestag elections. At the September elections, all 
parties but the FDP suffered losses of vote. This notwithstanding, the liberals ended up 
in opposition and a grand-coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU led by Angela 
Merkel was formed and took office in November (Poguntke 2006). 
The issue of revamping Germany’s federal system had earned its way into the 
coalitional agreement between the SPD and the CDU/CSU (Williamson 2005). 
Moreover, the grand-coalition now commanded the 2/3 majority necessary to amend 
the constitution in the Bundesrat. When it became clear that the reform of the German 
federalism would go through within the newly emerged political constellation, at the 
end of 2005, Schily abandoned its concerted action with the unions and engaged in 
horse-trading to make the best out of the constitutional reform. When in November the 
federal government gave up on the controversial issue of legislative powers in 
education, the root cause of the previous commission’s failure disappeared. The talks 
on federalism reform could now resume. Again, the States claimed back the legislative 
competence on civil servants’ pay. Shily agreed to let the competence go. In return, 
however, Shily obtained that Federal Criminal Police Office – an executive agency of 
the Interior Ministry - be given extensive powers of action in matters related to internal 
defence vis-à-vis international terrorism. In the event, in pursuing the intersst of his 
ministry, Schily bargained one competence for the other, luring for himself the 
vehement criticism of both the dbb and the DGB (Bonn General-Anzeiger 2005). 
Federalism reform I took place in the summer of 2006 and the legislative competences 
to regulate civil servants’ careers and pay were transferred to the States. Ever since, 
several developments have occurred. On the careers, while in 2006 the same federal 
regulations applied, three different state-clusters have now emerged in which 
heterogeneous career systems apply. The Northern coastal Länder (Bremen, Hamburg, 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein) have similar 
systems. Three Länder (Berlin, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt) have opted for the adoption of 
parts of the coastal Länder’s model, although with some modifications. All the others 
have instead opted for highly differentiated laws. This has led, unsurprisingly, to a 
fragmented legal landscape. The explanation for this development has been attributed 
to competition for civil servants among States and with the private sector in local 
labour markets within States (Dose and Reus 2016). With regard to civil servants’ pay, 
a cleavage has emerged between the highest-paying state (Bavaria) and the lowest-
paying state (Berlin). It has been assessed, for instance, that in 2016 the difference in 
yearly pay between a first-grade high school teacher in Bavaria and one in Berlin 
amounted to €6,336 a pay difference of 11.3% (DGB 2016, 13).  
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Overall, with the federalism reform I a layer of competition has been inserted within 
Germany’s cooperative federal system. The new decentralised system of civil servants’ 
pay which has resulted is now a highly fragmented one where those who can afford 
more, pay more and have less problems recruiting a skilled workforce. Länder are now 
competing against each other. Working with an econometric model which included 
partisan political control of the Länder, Dose and Wolfes (2016) find that CDU and 
CSU Länder governments tend to pay slightly better than governments dominated by 
left-wing/green governments. However, party politics is not the key explanatory factor 
for these horizontal wage differentials. Most of the variance across States, they argue, 
is explained by the ratio of Länder debt to GDP. Thus, given that personnel costs are 
major expenditures for the Länder, public employers with high budget deficits are most 
urgently in need to control the financial burden of their civil servants’ pay. A full-
fledged race to the bottom is however prevented by the necessity of States’ public 
employers to recruit qualified personnel in local tight labour markets. This shall ensure 
wages do not excessively lag behind developments in the private economy but it does 
not guarantee the further divergence between richer and poorer States.  
The recruitment problem for Länder employers across Germany is unequally 
distributed. Richer States where local labour markets also feature lower unemployment 
rates experience higher recruitment difficulties in competition with the private sector. 
As a result, they experience stronger upward pressures in civil servants’ pay (Dose and 
Reus 2016). Through the decentralisation of the legislative competence at the Länder 
level, a valuable flexibility valve has been engineered for richer employers (those who 
can pay) to remain competitive recruiters vis-à-vis the private sector. In fact, the 
possibility to independently manipulate pay and career conditions of civil servants de 
facto guarantees to the Länder the possibility to derogate in melius vis-à-vis the 
employment and pay conditions agreed for public employees within the context of 
horizontally coordinated wage bargaining across the Länder in the TV-L contract. 
This, I argue, is a crucial component of the new institutional equilibrium which has 
emerged in the aftermath of the double process of institutional and constitutional 
reform. After an analysis meant to recap and discuss the developments of the early 
2000s, I discuss the features and the logic of this new equilibrium in the next chapter. 
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7.3 ANALYSIS OF THE 2000S 
Figure 15 depicts the trajectory of public sector wage setting in Germany during the 
2000s. Panel a shows the impressive divergence between the manufacturing sector and 
other sectors of the German economy. Particularly pronounced is the wage restraint 
pursued in the public sector during the mid-2000s until the end of the reform process in 
2008. Panel b shows that the fiscal costs of public personnel have been frozen 
throughout. 
Figure 15: Trajectory of public sector wage setting in the 2000s 
 
Akin to what could be observed in public sector wage setting during the 1990s, no 
evidence in support of the “Ordomerkantilismus hypothesis” can be found. Nor could I 
find evidence in support of the “export-sector domination hypothesis”. Likewise, in 
relation to the “pattern bargaining hypothesis”, figure 15 shows the marked 
decoupling of wage trajectories in the export and public sector. The divergent 
trajectories of sectoral wages which figure 15 (panel a) shows cannot be explained via 
the interests of a dominant cross-class coalition in the export sector. Public sector wage 
restraint in Germany’s 2000s is rather the result of a clear-cut downward fiscal 
adjustment, of which public sector wage restraint was just one means among others. 
In fact, what I could observe instead is that the process of public sector wage setting 
follows its own separate logics. It unfolds within the contours of the institutional 
contextualisation of the German state, its sector specific employment relations 
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structures and most importantly in relation to its public finances. The logics of public 
sector wage setting during the 2000s were almost entirely detached from those in the 
export industry. Neither in documents nor in interviews with key policy makers from 
all sides, could I detect any trace of a mercantilist economic ideology, not to mention 
the issue of export competitiveness. I could detect no purposeful mercantilist intention 
to tackle variables such as the REER or the inflation level through public sector wage 
restraint. Nor seemed these actors interested in the German current account. The 
primary driver for the actions of public sector’s actors was always fiscal in nature. Or, 
to put it in better terms, the tightening of the public employers’ fiscal space and the 
budget deficits which ensued put enormous pressure on the employers to reduce the 
fiscal costs of public sector wage setting. This was a time in which Germany was the 
sick man of the Euro. Its public finances were being constantly monitored by the 
European Commission for being in breach of the fiscal rules which Germany’s Finance 
Minister himself had so much pressed for, less than a decade earlier. The first and 
foremost concern of public employers in wage setting – at all levels of the German 
public administration – had to do with the “leeren öffentlichen Kassen” (empty public 
coffers). 
As a result, the public employers became the protagonists of a strategy of fiscal 
devaluation through public sector wage restraint pursued in concomitance with the 
reform of the overall system for public sector wage determination. The unions tried 
hard to hold out as antagonists against the public employers’ offensive; as much as 
they could. At times they tried to resist, but were pushed back due to their weakness. 
This weakness was the result of processes of privatisation and outsourcing which had 
started during the 1990s. Unions’ weakness was further enhanced by the very divisions 
among the employers – whom the unions need to maintain the framework of collective 
bargaining alive. At others, unions had to compromise in pejus against the aggression 
of the public employers. If anything, actors in the export sector may be thought, in the 
background, as likely consenters of the public employers’ need to engineer a fiscal 
devaluation via public sector wage restraint. By no means it is however possible to 
infer from what has been observed that the German government purposefully intended 
to undercut its EMU competitors through a strategic internal fiscal/wage devaluation. 
The fact that fiscal cum public sector wage restraint may have contributed to lower 
internal demand, lower inflation, a more advantageous REER and current account 
surpluses in the EMU does not imply that this was the result of an intelligent (beggar-
thy-neighbour) design. During the early 2000s, “Germany” was rather occupied with a 
full-fledged domestic fiscal adjustment, closely monitored by the European 
Commission. At that specific historical point in time, within the institutional 
constellation in which governments pursued policy, a strategy of fiscal and wage 
reflation was simply not a viable option. 
When one speaks of “Germany” in the arena of fiscal and public sector wage policy 
what is neglected is the decentralised nature of the German state and the dispersion of 
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political authority across both vertical and horizontal dimensions of the German state 
which Katzenstein so well highlighted in his work. The result of this dispersion is often 
a shared authority among state actors in the implementation of both fiscal and public 
sector wage policy. This necessitates coordination. The historical reconstruction of the 
2000s teaches us that what characterises the German public employers as state actors is 
rather their internal dividedness. The story of public sector wage restraint in the 2000s 
is a story about the emergence of an irremediable political cleavage within the public 
employers’ camp. German governments grew increasingly far apart from each other 
during the 2000s. A fundamental political misalignment occurred between the Länder 
on the one hand and the Federation and municipal governments on the other. Public 
sector wage restraint in the 2000s was pursued under a set of very fortuitous historical 
conditions. Some of these conditions were path-dependent (i.e. the fiscal costs of 
reunification), some others were policy-induced (i.e. the Schröder tax reform), some 
others were structural (i.e. the multiple veto points of the German political system and 
the vertical imbalances of the German fiscal constitution), some others were beyond the 
control of the very policy actors (i.e. the Bundesbank’s punitive reaction and the 
prolonged economic recession cum budget deficits which this policy brought about).  
At any rate, the 2000s constitute a watershed moment in the history of public sector 
industrial relations in Germany in that the reforms which were pursued alongside 
restraint have institutionalised a new institutional equilibrium, which I discuss in the 
next chapter. For now, figure 16 provides a diagram visualisation of the sequence of 
events through which public sector wage restraint was produced in the 2000s. The Red-
Green’s tax reform implemented by Schröder further aggravated the status of the 
German public finances, which had already been dealt a blow after the reunification 
effort. The entry into force of the tax cuts in 2001 constituted the fiscal event which set 
the causal chain in motion. In a policy environment characterised by weak growth, high 
unemployment, higher social expenditures and falling tax revenues, the public 
employers’ fiscal space shrunk drastically and so did their ability to pay for personnel 
costs. About the tax reform it could be said that: 
had the tax reform not been implemented, the finances of the Länder would have not suffered 
from such a structural fall of tax revenues. Had this have been the case, public employers’ 
ability to pay would have most likely been greater and the need to pursue a severe policy of 
wage restraint less acute. 
A reduced ability to pay increased the necessity to contain the fiscal costs of public 
sector wage setting. When the 2002 public sector pay settlement was reached in 
January 2003 under the leadership of the Interior Minister, this was deemed too 
expensive by both the Länder and municipal employers. At that point, this constituted 
the straw the broke the camel’s back. Hitherto, collective bargaining in the public 
sector had been encompassing and centralised under the leadership of the federal level 
represented by the Ministry of the Interior. A political misalignment occurred during 
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winter/spring 2003 which led to the internal division of the public employers and the 
collapse of the historical wage bargaining alliance.  
Figure 16: Causal chain of public sector wage restraint during the 2000s 
 
One can appreciate fully the material roots of this cleavage only when considering the 
peculiarities of the German state’s institutional contextualisation. The three institutional 
domains presented in the analytical framework have concurred to shape public 
employers’ preferences and actions as follows. Due to the structure of the German 
politico-administrative system and the asymmetric distribution of administrative 
competences, the bulk of public personnel are employed within sub-national 
governments. As a result, the Länder face the highest proportion of personnel spending 
which they have to meet with their own financial resources. Yet, due to the German 
fiscal constitution whereby tax legislation is a competence of the federal level, the 
Länder’s fiscal autonomy is severely curtailed. This means that States could not 
manipulate their revenues’ flows at will. Germany is indeed very centralised when it 
comes to tax legislation. This put a serious strain on the Länder’s already tight budgets, 
structurally reducing their ability to pay. Given the enormous weight personnel costs 
have in their books, the Länder no longer saw common ground in sticking with the 
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historical bargaining coalition led by the federal level for which personnel costs are 
only a very minor concern. In fact, given its larger fiscal space and minimal labour 
costs, the Federation’s ability to cope with the financial burden of the 2002 pay 
provision was greater. Instead, both the Länder and the municipalities deemed it 
unacceptable. 
In the event, Länder and municipal governments threatened to exit their respective 
employers’ associations due to the high costs of centralised bargaining. When it 
became clear that the Länder governments were serious about opting-out of TdL, in 
May 2003, TdL’s Bavarian Finance Minister Kurt Falthauser announced the dissolution 
of the old public employers’ Tarifgemeinschaft. As a matter of organisational survival, 
TdL had to leave the old coalition. In fact, 
had TdL not pulled out and fought independently for cheaper settlements at the States’ level, 
state governments would have left – as some of them in fact did or were about to do – the 
employers’ organisation. TdL was confronted with an organisational dilemma as to whether 
remain in the Tarifgemeinschaft but lose members or to pull out to preserve its very survival 
outside the Tarifmeinschaft. The choice to leave is thus perfectly understandable. 
Within the public employers’ offensive, Länder governments were the central 
protagonists. In pulling out and moving to a Länder-only collective bargaining 
framework eventually agreed upon in 2006 (TV-L), TdL could achieve two substantial 
goals which enabled the Länder to save money. On the one hand, Länder employers 
could detach themselves from the expensive leadership of the federal level in wage 
bargaining. On the other, Länder employers could separate themselves from the 
disruptive power of militant municipal employees (e.g. local transport, waste disposal) 
which had always made the municipal employers the weak chain in the 
Tarifgemeinschaft. In the process of fiscal adjustment, the Länder employers attacked 
all aspects of public employees’ employment relation. Wage restraint was achieved 
through multi-year moderate lump sums negotiated with the unions ahead of the 
signature of the TV-L contract. This explains the flattening of the trajectory of public 
sector wage growth (figure 7). Working hours, which had been the bone of contention 
throughout negotiations in 2005 and 2006, were extended on the basis of a 
compromise. Each Land was allowed to set working hours by taking the average 
working hours of all public employees in the Land as the benchmark. The various 
bonuses were merged and reduced. Holiday provisions were cut. As a result of all of 
these measures, the Länder could substantially reduce their budget deficits and 
complete their fiscal adjustment (figure 15). Export-sector success was of no interest to 
the Länder governments. 
In parallel and during the same time span, the Länder proactively sought – and 
managed – to obtain the legal competence for the determination of their own civil 
servants’ careers and pay provisions. To block the transferral of the legal competence 
from the federal to the Länder level, a political coalition had formed between the dbb, 
Ver.di and the Interior Ministry Schily. At the same time, some actors led by the 
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NRW’s government were even claiming their intention to eliminate altogether the legal 
status of civil servant from Germany’s constitution. Both dbb’s head Peter Heesen and 
Schily were the key protagonists in trying to block these developments. Heesen and 
Schily, together with Ver.di’s Frank Bsirske formed a “coalition of the moderate”. 
They acknowledged the need to reform the civil service but hoped to preserve it in the 
constitution in the first place. Also, they opposed the transferral of Beamtenbesoldung 
Kompetenz to the States in order to avoid jeopardising the German civil service across 
the country. Within the federalism commission which was working on the overhaul of 
the German federal system, a political coalition of the richer States had emerged which 
claimed the legislative competence be returned to the States. Both chairmen of the 
commission, SPD’s Franz Müntefering and the CSU state premier of Bavaria Edmund 
Stoiber were pushing along these lines. After a first attempt to reform the constitution 
failed at the end of 2004, when the grand coalition came to power a new majority 
emerged and the success of fiscal federalism reform I came in sight. In the new 
constellation, Schily gave up on the moderate reform plan and bargained an alternative 
competence for his ministry before letting the Beamtenbesoldung Kompetenz go back 
to the States. 
The third process of the 2000s is the creation of the TVöD contract in 2005. The 
necessity to reform the collective bargaining structure in the public sector had already 
been acknowledged by all actors in the course of the 1990s. Most likely, had the Länder 
not pulled out, the reform would have happened anyway. But it would have not 
happened in the way it did. The employers would have remained together within the 
bargaining coalition and restructured the legal framework so as to accommodate the 
new pressures emerging from dynamics of privatisation, outsourcing and the mounting 
budget deficits. Yet the States opted-out. Why then did the municipalities remain 
together with the Federation? Why didn’t they go on their own even though they 
feature very different personnel cost structures (figure 11)? The answer to these 
questions has three facets. First, as explained, VKA has historically been the weakest 
among the three employers. Municipal employers depend crucially on the provision of 
local infrastructural services to the community. This means that municipal employees 
have a relatively high disruptive power vis-à-vis municipal employers. In wage 
bargaining negotiations, sticking together with the “bigger brothers” is of convenience 
to municipal employers. In fact, VKA was against the collapse of the employers’ 
coalition: 
“(I)n these years we said it is a big mistake for TdL to get out of the Tarifgemeinschaft ... (in 
this context) being together with the Bund was also a way to keep the Tarifgemeinschaft alive 
and hope the TdL would come back at some point” (Interview with official in the top echelon 
of VKA 2018) 
Second, since VKA hoped to avoid the disintegration of the bargaining coalition 
and publicly urged the TdL to re-enter, an exit move from the VKA would have 
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been, on the one hand, incoherent and on the other it would have eliminated any 
hope to re-establish the joint bargaining coalition in the next future: 
“We asked everytime to TdL to come back. To say so means on the other hand not to go the 
same way (i.e. imitating TdL’s opt-out)” (Interview with official in the top echelon of VKA 
2018) 
Third, what really mattered for VKA at that moment was that the collective bargaining 
structure be reformed so as to take into consideration the possibility for public 
municipal employers to apply downward pressures on wages thanks to the private 
provision of local services. Unless the old collective bargaining structure was reformed, 
the VKA would have suffered from an internal haemorrhage of its members. In fact, 
the possibility to privatise and outsource public services de facto gave municipal 
employers the possibility – and the incentive - to circumvent the costly collective 
contracts of the public sector. Outside the scope of these contracts, the same previously 
public services could have now been provided privately with cheaper labour costs for 
the employers. This put pressure on VKA: 
“had VKA not obtained a favourable renegotiation of the terms of the BAT contract, it would 
have lost many of its members who would have instead opted-out of VKA in order to 
circumvent the public sector contract and bring down labour costs.” 
As explained by a key VKA’s policy maker taking part in these reform processes: 
“the VKA was very important for the TVöD. We came from the TV-V and we wanted this 
Tarifvertrag because the BAT was a big problem for our members and we wanted to 
modernise, deregulate and flexibilise the Tarifvertrag. When we took the decision to negotiate 
the TVöD, the three employers said it would have to be cost-neutral. (in the process) we 
wanted to have the TVöD so we did not attack the working hours” (Interview with official in 
the top echelon of VKA 2018) 
Essentially, the reason why it was convenient for the municipal employers to remain 
together with the Bund was that, eventually, most of VKA’s wishes were satisfied with 
the creation of the TVöD contract in 2005 (most notably the introduction of a lower pay 
grade at the bottom of the new pay scale). Wage restraint was achieved through multi-
year moderate lump sums negotiated with the unions ahead of the signature of the new 
contract. It was, in other words, the federal level which made a step toward complying 
with the municipalities’ needs in order to preserve the collective bargaining framework 
in the German public sector, although without the States.  
The private sector has had a great influence on the politics of public sector wage 
restraint. However, the private sector that mattered was not the exporting industrial 
sector. It was that composed of the sheltered private services, most prominently at the 
municipal level. Dynamics of privatisations and outsourcing of local public services 
created an exit option for municipal employers who started to apply pressures on the 
unions to contain labour costs. This triggered the need for a transformation of the old 
wage bargaining system. In fact, had the old wage bargaining system not been 
reformed, municipal employers would have left – as they were leaving – the VKA. This 
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would have left Ver.di without a reliable and structured negotiating partner at the level 
of the German municipalities.  
As a matter of fact, the unions accepted and contributed to shape the process of 
institutional change of the collective bargaining framework in the public sector. Faced 
with the trade-off between a more employer-friendly collective bargaining system 
versus the collapse of the whole system, the unions strategically opted for the former. 
Keeping the municipal and federal employers together was surely a second-best. Still, 
within that constellation, it was the better option for the unions. The latter option would 
have made them worse off. Needless to say, for the unions this was a concessionary 
bargain against a full-fledged offensive by the public employers. 
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CHAPTER 8. “DIE ÖFFENTLICHEN KASSEN SIND IMMER LEER“, EVEN IN 
THE AGE OF PROSPERITY 
This last chapter differs from the previous two in that it is not narrowly historical. It is 
rather analytical. I do deal with the developments of the post-2008 period. But I do so 
not by looking historically at yearly negotiations as I did in the previous two chapters. 
Here I reflect analytically on the institutional configuration which has resulted from the 
reform process described. This double process of institutional change has led to a new 
low-wage institutional equilibrium in public sector wage setting. Within this 
equilibrium, I posit, only lowest-common-denominator wage policies set around the 
poorer employers’ financial capacity to pay can now be agreed upon. This creates a 
“wage restraint bias” in Germany’s public sector wage setting which prevents the 
pursuit of policies of public sector wage inflation. In what follows I explain why and 
how this occurs by unpacking the micro-foundations of this new institutional 
configuration. 
The evolution of public sector wage setting in post-reunification Germany is a 
trajectory riddled with economic and political problems. Problems require solutions. 
Indeed, ever since West and East Germany have been reunified, history has moved fast. 
The old stability-oriented system has undergone several major changes. Most 
prominently, the system of public sector collective bargaining has changed from being 
centralised under the leadership of the federal Minister of the Interior into a two-tiered 
system in which the Länder employers now negotiate their own terms of employment 
with the unions. Similarly, in the civil service, the legislative competence on civil 
servants’ career structures and pay has shifted back to the Länder governments. While 
until 2006 the civil service was uniform around the country, the fact that each Land can 
now legislate on their civil servants’ terms of employment has led to a fragmentation of 
the system. Civil servants’ career regulations and pay systems now vary increasingly 
across the German States. Richer States’ greater ability to pay means greater capacity 
to recruit. This, in turn, implies winners and losers within a partially competitive 
system. 
Before the turbulent 2000s, wage bargaining ensured that public employees within the 
three levels of the German public administration would receive equal wage setting 
treatments. Problems of vertical coordination among the three employers were resolved 
through wage bargaining centralisation within the employers’ Tarifgemeinschaft. The 
need to ensure an equal treatment between the public employees (subjected to 
negotiations with unions) and the civil servants (subjected to legislation) was resolved 
through a process of state-led coordination ensured by the Ministry of the Interior. 
There used to be an intra-public-sector pattern bargaining with the Ministry of the 
Interior at its core, acting as the transmission belt. In Germany, the three public 
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employers led by the Minister of the Interior would generally first negotiate 
collectively with the unions whose demands were coordinated by the ÖTV. After an 
agreement could be reached via free and independent negotiations, the collectively 
agreed provisions would then be transferred to the civil servants via legislation 
approved by parliament. This ensured that wage setting was coordinated between the 
two legal spheres of the German public employment: the one subjected to labour 
contracts and the one subjected to state sovereignty. Within the German civil service 
across the country, coordination was ensured by the federal nature of centralized 
legislation which applied uniformly in all the States. 
Apart from very rare occasions, collective bargaining always took precedence over 
state sovereignty as a mode of intra-public-sector wage coordination. Attempts to 
reverse the pattern have occurred. The historical reconstruction has shown that under 
circumstances of financial need, there have been attempts by some state actors to 
deploy sovereign authority in civil servants’ wage determination to unilaterally impose 
restraint and disempower unions in collective bargaining negotiations. The success of 
these attempts was rather rare, either because public employers were internally divided 
and political support could not be mobilized (e.g. in 1992) or because they eventually 
deemed it to be unwise due to their political weakness (e.g. in 1999). As a result, even 
in Germany, the actual capacity of public employers to behave as sovereigns in public 
sector wage setting has been shown to be not absolute but contingent. 
But if the Interior Ministry was the transmission belt, due to its veto capacity, the 
Finance Ministry was the “referee” behind the scenes. As explained by representative 
of the German Federal Finance Ministry:  
“the Besoldungsgesetz is drafted by the Interior Ministry. Before the draft is submitted to 
parliament there would be consultations with all the associations and also the Ministry of 
Finance would be involved. Before the draft reaches the parliament there is the need for a 
decision by the whole cabinet and this requires the approval of the Ministry of Finance 
because the remuneration for civil servants also qualifies as a measure having financial 
impact … there are points that need to be discussed between the two ministries (i.e. horizontal 
coordination) because obviously the Ministry of the Interior feels responsible for ensuring a 
strong and well-functioning public service, and so do we. But at the same time, the Finance 
Ministry is responsible for the budget and we always have to keep an eye on public finances 
and budgetary consolidation” (Interview with a State Secretary in the German Finance 
Ministry 2017). 
Indeed, the prominent role of the Finance Ministry in public sector wage setting 
became evident in 1996 when Theo Waigel had to take the lead in steering a process of 
public sector wage restraint. This was meant to make sure Germany would meet the 
Maastricht rules on time. Thanks to public sector wage restraint, Germany met the 
Maastricht criteria and the EMU was launched. Since then, the institutional and 
constitutional reforms of the 2000s have led to a new wage setting institutional 
configuration which is fragmented along three legal dimensions: the TVöD contract 
regulates federal and municipal public employees; the TV-L contract regulates Länder 
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public employees; each Land’s legislation regulates employment conditions of the 
State’s civil servants. As a result of these developments the system of public sector 
wage determination is now “neither fully centralised nor fully decentralised”. This has 
paved the way to an interesting puzzle which concerns the wage developments of the 
post-reforms era. 
Figure 17: Trajectory of public sector wage setting in the aftermath of the crisis 
 
According to the Calmfors and Driffill (1988) model (see sub-section 3.4 for a review) 
we should expect wage inflation to emerge in such a system based on intermediate-
level wage bargaining. This should become even more apparent in the German public 
sector considering that Germany is, according to the fiscal federalism literature, 
characterised by soft budget constraints in the vertical fiscal relations between the 
Länder and the Federation (Manow 2005; Rodden 2006; Rodden, Eskeland, and 
Litvack 2003). Since the Federal government cannot credibly commit that it will not 
foot the bill of sub-national governments’ overspending, it would be reasonable to 
expect public sector wage inflation to emerge after the reforms of the 2000s. Such an 
expectation should also be reinforced by Germany’s currently tight labour markets and 
the very good shape of the public finances after 2007. Germany has lately reported 
consecutive budget surpluses. Yet figure 17 shows that public sector wages - even in 
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the age of prosperity and decentralised wage bargaining - are not overshooting. Rather, 
as argued by Keller (2014), there is a “continuation of early austerity measures” in the 
German public sector. Although the trajectory of downward fiscal adjustment has been 
reversed since 2007, public wages have, at best, grown in line with productivity and 
inflation rates. There seems to be no scope for a policy of public sector wage inflation 
in Germany, even in times of budget surpluses. Why is that? Why are the German 
public employers not pursuing a policy of public sector wage inflation in the absence of 
the need for fiscal consolidation? Or, put it somehow differently, why are sub-national 
governments not “overgrazing the fiscal commons” in a semi-decentralised system of 
public sector wage setting?  
In what follows, I conclude the historical German case study by suggesting that, what 
seemed like a fragmented and chaotic reform process has instead now institutionalised 
a wage bargaining system with its own logic and coherence. The two parallel processes 
of institutional and constitutional reforms have eventually led to the creation of a new 
“institutional equilibrium” in the German public sector. By institutional equilibrium I 
mean a situation in which an institutional change of the current wage bargaining system 
would make each of the actors involved worse off. All the public employers have now 
an interest in maintaining the institutionalised status quo, even though these interests 
are diverse within the public employers’ camp. The new “multi-dimensional” system 
allows the German public employers to strike a balance between the need to contain the 
fiscal costs of wage determination and the need to remain competitive recruiters vis-à-
vis the private sector. For sure, the unions are not in an ideal position. But for them, 
given the structural shift of the balance of power which has occurred, challenging the 
status quo has become hard. At any rate, even if they were to succeed, given the 
divisions among the public employers, a change in the status quo can only mean the 
full disintegration of public sector collective bargaining – which is exactly what the 
unions so eagerly tried to avoid via concessionary bargaining in the reforms of the 
2000s. Thus, the unions have now accepted the new institutional constellation, within 
which they now try to achieve incremental improvements for the public sector labour 
force.  
Thus, to preview my answer to the aforementioned questions, I posit that the reason for 
the lack of public sector wage inflation during the age of prosperity is to be found in the 
“micro-foundations” of this new institutional equilibrium. I posit that restraint stems 
from the specific decision making rules and processes which characterise this new 
institutional setting. This is the substance of the next section where I go on unpacking 
the features of this new equilibrium. 
8.1 A NEW INSTITUTIONAL EQUILIBRIUM IN THE GERMAN PUBLIC SECTOR  
THE TVÖD CONTRACT 
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In the TVöD contract three key different collective actors come to interact for the scope 
of regulating pay settlements for municipal and federal public employees. Two 
different public employers have to interact with each other and then with the unions. 
The federal level is represented by the federal Minister of the Interior and the municipal 
level by the VKA. The unions’ front is generally led by Ver.di. The crucial actor to be 
looking at in order to understand the inner logic of the TVöD contract is the VKA. This 
is due to the features of the German political system and the asymmetric nature of the 
German fiscal constitution which the dissertation has identified.  
Municipalities bear extensive administrative responsibilities, for which they require a 
large amount of public personnel. This means a high proportion of personnel costs in 
their books. At the same time, however, municipalities cannot manipulate their tax 
revenues at will. They can do so only to a minimum extent. The room for manoeuvring 
within those few local taxes they have control over is limited by rising competition to 
attract new businesses. Borrowing is allowed only for investment expenditures and 
municipalities’ debt has already been growing exponentially since reunification and 
deindustrialization. The sum of debts at the municipal level has skyrocketed from 
€71,618m (€966 per citizen) in 1991 to €135,178m in 2012 (€1781 per person). This is 
just about the double. Some of the most financially troubled municipalities can be 
found in Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate, North Rhine-Westphalia and Hessen. Since 
Eastern municipalities benefit from specific programmes of fiscal transfers, the 
majority of poorer municipalities are located in the West (Keller 2014, 390-91). 
Moreover, the “political space” within which municipal employers can increase the 
fees of local public services is limited by their proximity and direct accountability to 
residents. The conjunction of these peculiar administrative and fiscal structures curtails 
the municipal employers’ ability to pay and creates pressures to cut on the 
expenditures’ side. 
Within the TVöD framework for collective bargaining, before negotiating with the 
unions, the federal and the municipal level have to coordinate vertically with each other 
in order to proceed in wage setting. However, within the public employers’ camp 
horizontal coordination is much easier at the federal level than at the municipal level. 
At the federal level, horizontal coordination among state actors generally (i.e. under 
conditions of financial stability) means that the Interior Minister has to obtain a green 
light from the responsible state secretary in the Finance Ministry. At the municipal 
level the constellation is much more complex. Fundamental decisions on collective 
bargaining there are taken within the VKA’s Mitgliederversammlung (members’ 
general assembly). According to the VKA’s Satzung (statute), the general assembly is 
composed of the representatives of the 16 States’ municipal associations (KAV) who 
send their members on the basis of a weighted proportion of the employees in their 
municipal administrations/companies. Decisions on wage policy require a ¾ majority 
within the assembly. Since financial troubles are widespread across municipalities, only 
a “compromise at the bottom” is capable of winning the vote of poorer municipalities 
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necessary to achieve a qualified majority in the general assembly. This consensus-
based voting procedure implies that only “lowest common denominator wage policies” 
have a chance of being approved by the municipal decision-makers. 
This means that, as much as market conditions allow, wage policies have to be 
calibrated according to the financial needs of the poorer municipalities. This is because, 
since employers’ membership in the employers’ association is voluntary, pay 
settlements beyond local employers’ ability to pay would trigger an internal 
haemorrhage within the VKA. Were municipal employers not to find membership 
advantageous, they would, sooner or later, pull out and set their own local contracts. 
Indeed, this was a real possibility in the early 2000s and the reform of the BAT system 
was exactly meant to address this very problem. This new system creates notable 
advantages also for the richer municipalities. In fact, through lowest common 
denominator wage policies, those employers with greater ability to pay – who would 
have to pay higher settlements otherwise – seal cheaper pay settlements and enjoy 
fiscal savings. This means that they reduce their fiscal opportunity costs, i.e. the saved 
fiscal resources can be diverted to other public functions (i.e. hoarding, reducing 
current fees, public investment and other expenditures). 
Thus, within this constellation, no negotiating actor has an interest in the disintegration 
of the system. From the unions’ perspective, what needs to be avoided is the collapse of 
horizontal coordination among the municipalities which would mean fragmented wage 
bargaining across Germany’s thousands of municipalities. The employers’ 
organisations VKA and KVA clearly do not wish to lose their members. The municipal 
employers themselves benefit from delegating wage setting tasks to the employers’ 
organisations because this lowers negotiation’s transactions costs and eliminates the 
need for them to set up costly internal administrations for handling wage bargaining. 
However, these benefits remain valuable only to the extent in which the collective 
bargaining framework ensures pay settlements which remain within the limits of 
municipal employers’ ability to pay. Since the Ministry of the Interior is aware of the 
complexity of accommodating different stakeholders within the VKA, under normal 
circumstances, vertical coordination between the ministry and the VKA occurs “by 
default”, with the federal level accommodating the needs of the municipal level. When 
faced with a trade-off between a lowest common denominator pay settlement and the 
paralysis of the wage bargaining machinery, the Federation has a clear preference for 
building a common ground with the municipal employers. After all, the federal level 
features only a tiny minority of public employees among which most of these are civil 
servant not subjected to collective bargaining regulation. 
To put it with the words with a VKA official involved in the reform process: 
“we (the VKA) try to find a common way to get an agreement. For the municipal level it is 
important to keep wages down because of tax reasons … at the federal level it is only one, 
sometimes two people who have to decide, the interior and/or the Finance Ministers. On the 
other side there are many people who have to decide and there are many different interests 
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that need to be balanced … the interests of the municipalities and that of the Ministry of the 
Interior are not always the same. But the Federation has the interest that the municipalities 
can live with their budgets. Ministries also don’t want that the public sector gets too high 
wages that can be the guideline for other sectors … the line of interest is different between the 
Bund and the VKA. In the VKA there are many stakeholders in the Mitgliedersversammlung 
and we need more time to get to a common opinion than one person. It is an organisational 
dynamic. The Federation knows that it cannot push for a stance around which an agreement 
cannot be reached among the many stakeholders of the VKA” (Interview with official in the 
top echelon of VKA 2018) 
This process of consensus-based decision making, I posit, prevents the very possibility 
to pursue inflationary pay settlements within the scope of the TVöD contract. The 
unions are caught in a dilemma, i.e. whether to challenge this equilibrium in the search 
for higher pay settlements or accept the status quo characterised by moderate wage 
increases. The crucial reason for the unions not to challenge the status quo is that, if 
they were to challenge it, they would most likely lose the VKA as a negotiating partner. 
As a result, their very negotiating capacity at the municipal level would be severely 
hampered. Furthermore, if the unions challenged the status quo, the municipal 
employers could always exercise their “exit option” and privatise or outsource public 
services to private entities beyond the TVöD remits. This would reduce unions’ 
strength and reach even further.  
Funnily enough – from the old pattern bargaining perspective – it is instead competition 
with the private sector that contributes to ensure public wages do not lag excessively 
behind the private sector. Thus inter-sectoral dynamics in Germany play the opposite 
role than the one ascribed to them by the literature (sub-section 3.5). Wage 
developments in the private services constitute rather a floor which prevents the public 
employers to squeeze their workers even further. Municipal employers need public 
wages to remain attractive enough to be successful in the current Talent Krieg (war for 
talents) which is ongoing vis-à-vis private employers. 
THE TV-L CONTRACT AND THE LÄNDER’S BEAMTENBESOLDUNGSGESETZ: TWO SIDES OF 
THE SAME COIN 
In the TV-L contract two different collective actors come to interact for the scope of 
regulating pay settlements for the Länder’s public employees. The States’ employers, 
represented by TdL, negotiate collectively with the unions. Here, a similar coordination 
problem occurs, although within a quite different constellation. Similar to the municipal 
level, the German States bear extensive administrative responsibilities. This implies a 
high proportion of personnel costs in their books. Similar to the municipalities, the 
Länder cannot independently manipulate their tax revenues. Revenues are shared across 
levels according to ex ante fixed formulas. Collectively, the Länder could manipulate 
federal tax legislation via their joint action in Bundesrat. The fact that this would 
require hard-to-achieve majorities in the two chambers, however, de facto implies that 
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each Land, alone, cannot manipulate its revenues at will. The conjunction of the 
peculiar German administrative and fiscal structures curtails the Länder employers’ 
ability to pay and creates pressures to cut on the expenditures’ side. 
In the TV-L contract, States’ employers no longer have to coordinate vertically with 
federal and municipal employers. This was in fact the crucial reason to pull out of the 
joint bargaining association in the first place and establish the TV-L. Yet the States still 
need to coordinate with each other horizontally within the employers’ association. The 
effect of Germany’s reunification has been that of augmenting the heterogeneity of the 
German Länder and increasing the spread between the rich and the poor Länder 
employers. In the TdL, each Land is generally represented by its Finance Minister 
within the TdL’s wage bargaining commission (Tarifkommission). Berlin was outside 
the TdL until it re-joined in 2012. Hessen has never re-joined since it pulled out in 
2003. Decisions on wage policy within the TdL wage bargaining commission require a 
qualified majority of at least 9 out of 15 members. Each state has one vote and this 
means in theory that smaller/poorer States can outvote richer/bigger States. In practice, 
however: 
“TdL tries to secure a bigger majority so that the result is a consensus-oriented decision 
making process” (Interview with official in the top echelon of TdL 2017). 
The reasons for a consensus-oriented approach within the TdL are easily understood. 
Since membership in the TdL is voluntary, the Länder governments must find 
membership advantageous. Were them to find it disadvantageous, they would sooner or 
later leave the association and set up their own bargaining units, just like Hessen and 
Berlin did. But Berlin recently decided to re-join the TdL, indicating that there must be 
benefits for both the poor and rich States in remaining within coordinated bargaining. 
In fact, richer and bigger States like Bavaria could in theory pull out and easily offer 
higher pay settlements to their public employees to outcompete poorer States. How do 
poor and rich Länder benefit from state-level coordinated wage bargaining via the TdL? 
To begin with, the TV-L contract is already structurally more favourable to the Länder 
employers than the previous BAT system because: 
“there is a much lower risk of strikes without the municipal level. TV-L has strengthened the 
negotiating power of TdL” (Interview with official in the top echelon of TdL 2017). 
For the poorer States, the crucial reason to maintain horizontal wage coordination is to 
avoid a full-fledged competitive system in which they would be net losers. In fact, were 
each Land to negotiate independently of others, richer public employers (with a greater 
ability to pay) would be able to offer better terms which would be difficult to replicate 
for poorer employers. Thus the greatest benefit of coordination for the poorer States is 
that coordinated bargaining takes out competition for the public employees in a two-tier 
labour market where, after 2006, Länder can now compete for the civil servants. Yet 
similar to poor municipalities, the benefits from coordinated bargaining only exist to 
the extent in which the TV-L contract is set on the basis of poorer States’ ability to pay. 
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In fact, were TV-L to become too expensive for the poor States, they would sooner or 
later have to pull out and go on their own. All actors in the TdL are obviously aware of 
the fact that coordinated bargaining can survive only if – and to the extent in which – it 
accommodates the poorer States’ financial needs. 
For the richer States horizontal coordination with the poorer ones pushes wage 
settlements downward and frees up fiscal resources which they would otherwise have 
to pay. Were public employees’ wages to be set in a fully competitive system, the 
richer States would end up paying higher settlements than those agreed collectively – 
just like in the civil service since 2006. Thus, by being together with poorer States, 
richer States save money through “lowest common denominator pay settlements” 
which are calibrated according to poorer States’ ability to pay. This lowers their fiscal 
opportunity costs and allows governments to divert the resources saved to alternative 
fiscal uses (e.g. hoarding, reducing fees, expanding services or public investment and 
other expenditures). Secondly, for richer States coordinated bargaining also creates the 
opportunity to legitimise moderate pay settlements by shifting the blame on the needs 
of poorer States’ Finance Ministers. 
The richer States have, so to speak, an interest in being outvoted in wage policy 
decisions within the TdL. By compromising on a lowest common denominator 
agreement, the richer States hide behind the poor ones and enjoy the benefits of 
moderate settlements. But taking out competition also means rigidity in the capacity to 
offer better employment terms in order to attract a skilled workforce in the public 
sector. While this is exactly what the poorer Länder wish for, the rigidity creates 
recruitment problems for the richer Länder who face harsher competition with the 
private sector in tighter local labour markets. As TdL officials explain: 
“all States agree that uniformity of employment conditions would be better for all, however 
there should be some flexibility” (Interview with official in the top echelon of TdL 2017). 
It is here, I maintain, that the parallel decentralisation of the legislative competence for 
civil servants’ pay and careers comes into play. It ensures flexibility and a new 
coherence to the system. Not by chance, it was the richer States that pushed within the 
federalism commission to obtain the Beamtenbesoldung Kompetenz. Thus, I argue, the 
institutional (of the TV-L) and constitutional (of the Beamtenbesoldungsgesetz) reforms 
shall be understood as complementary to each other. What the decentralisation of this 
legislative competence de facto does is to allow a “flexibility valve” to the richer 
States. While upward competition is prevented in wage contracts by horizontal 
coordination, richer States’ recruitment needs are met via competition in the civil 
service. In fact, public employers maintain the discretionary capacity to decide the legal 
employment status of the newly-hired. Richer States can thus out-compete poorer 
States by opting for paying better terms in the civil service where they can now 
unilaterally decree the career and pay provisions.  
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Table 3: The three dimensions of the new wage setting institutional equilibrium and their key 
characteristics 
 TVöD contract TV-L contract 
Länder’s 
Beamtenbesoldungsgesetz 
Type of public sector 
wage 
coordination/diversific
ation 
Vertical wage coordination 
between federal and municipal 
level and horizontal wage 
coordination across 
municipalities (through VKA) 
Horizontal wage coordination across 
Länder (through TdL) 
Horizontal diversification 
across Länder 
Logic of wage 
determination 
Wage policy set as lowest 
common denominator that 
avoids poor municipalities’ exit 
from VKA 
Wage policy set as lowest common 
denominator that avoids poor 
Länder’s exit from TdL 
Wage policy set 
independently by each 
Land 
Type of decision 
making 
Consensus-based joint decision 
making in coordination forum 
Consensus-based joint decision 
making in coordination forum 
Land’s specific legislative 
competence 
Type of wage setting 
outcome 
Vertical homogeneity between 
Federation and municipalities 
and horizontal homogeneity 
across municipalities 
Horizontal homogeneity for public 
employees across the Länder 
Horizontal heterogeneity 
for civil servants across the 
Länder 
Direction trend of 
wage setting 
Downwards pressures Downward pressures 
Selective upward pressures 
(only for rich public 
employers) 
Main public 
employers’ derived 
benefits from 
institutional 
equilibrium 
Poorer Municipalities: 
- Avoidance of competitive 
fiscal federalism dynamics 
in public sector wage 
setting 
Richer Municipalities: 
- Minimisation of wage 
setting’s fiscal burden 
Both: 
- Outsourcing of labour 
conflict 
- Minimisation of collective 
bargaining’s transaction 
costs 
Federal level: 
- Maintenance of collective 
bargaining structure 
Poorer Länder: 
- Avoidance of competitive 
fiscal federalism dynamics in 
public sector wage setting 
Richer Länder: 
- Minimisation of wage setting’s 
fiscal burden 
Both: 
- Outsourcing of labour conflict 
- Minimisation of collective 
bargaining’s transaction costs 
Richer Länder: 
- Upward wage 
flexibility through in 
melius wage 
deviations to compete 
with local private 
employers 
Unions’ derived 
benefits from 
institutional 
equilibrium 
Maintenance of collective 
bargaining structure; orderly and 
manageable process of collective 
bargaining (preferred to 
atomistic bargaining); 
maximisation of uniformity of 
pay and employment conditions 
Maintenance of collective bargaining 
structure; orderly and manageable 
process of collective bargaining 
(preferred to atomistic bargaining); 
maximisation of uniformity of pay 
and employment conditions 
Political ties with local 
authorities in the 
representation of civil 
servants’ interests 
In so doing, the richer and poorer Länder employers can strike the necessary balance 
between two opposite interests: wage moderation and avoidance of fully competitive 
labour market (of interest to poor States) and recruitment flexibility (of interest to rich 
States). Through wage bargaining calibrated on the poorer States’ financial needs, both 
the poorer and richer States achieve moderate settlements which keep the financial 
costs of public sector wage setting under control. Opting for the “civil service way” 
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then constitutes de facto an opening clause in melius which enables the richer States to 
remain attractive vis-à-vis private employers. Also in the TV-L, competition with the 
private sector helps to set a limit to the extent in which public employers can enforce 
restraint. 
None of the collective actors involved has in interest in challenging the status quo. TdL 
has an organisational interest in preventing the exit of its members and the collapse of 
the organisation. As such, it has – and did have – the willingness and the capacity to 
accommodate the conflicts of interest between the poor and rich States. At this point, it 
does not really matter who the poor and rich States are and if their composition changes 
over time. What structures these coordination dynamics is the presence of two types of 
qualitatively different public employers with opposite financial and recruitment needs 
embedded within a rigid fiscal federalism system where they lack fiscal autonomy. The 
poor States benefit from the fact that TdL institutionalises a levelling field in wage 
bargaining which is set on the basis of their financial needs. The rich States benefit 
from all sides. On the one hand they extract savings from the low-wage equilibrium in 
collective bargaining. On the other, they can opt-out and resort to the civil service if 
and when they deem it appropriate. All the bargaining parts have furthermore an 
interest in coordinated bargaining via the TdL in that it takes out the labour conflict 
away from the local administrative units. Furthermore, TdL provides legal services and 
platform for best practices where Finance Ministers come to exchange views and 
expertise.  
TdL also lowers substantially wage setting’s transaction costs. Were a state to pull out 
of the TdL, it would need to set up a costly administrative machinery to engage in state 
level negotiations with the unions. In fact, Hessen, which opted to pull out, now: 
“needs a lot of resources to negotiate and at the end of the day the agreement Hessen reaches 
is mostly similar to TdL’s. Hessen ended up in a situation in which they get the TdL’s contract 
without influencing it” (Interview with official in the top echelon of TdL 2017) 
Thus, all negotiating actors have an interest in compromising around lowest common 
denominator bargains to avoid a blockage in public sector wage setting and the 
paralysis of the administrative machinery. For the unions challenging the system is very 
difficult. First of all, their mobilisation capacity is much weaker at the States’ level and 
the unions themselves struggle to mobilise public sector workers, most notably in the 
education sector. Secondly, were the unions to challenge this equilibrium, what they 
would most likely obtain is the disintegration of horizontal coordination across States. 
This will lead to a competitive federalism system and an ever fragmented landscape. 
Employment and pay conditions across States would become even more heterogeneous. 
In wage bargaining unions would have to conduct simultaneously different negotiations 
and eventually industrial actions in the different 16 States. This would undermine the 
unions’ capacity to defend “the German public workforce”.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The central question which this dissertation has addressed is the following. What 
explains Germany’s trajectory of public sector wage restraint vis-à-vis its EMU peers? 
The necessity to pose this question emerged out of empirical and theoretical 
considerations. Beginning with the latter, given the failure of the main alternative 
scholarly explanation in providing a satisfying answer to the question, the dissertation 
has proceeded by asking the following theoretical question. If we cannot explain 
Germany’s public sector wage restraint through the theory of inter-sectoral wage 
coordination via export-led pattern bargaining, what other factors, so far unaccounted 
for, explain Germany’s trajectory of public sector wage restraint? The answer to these 
questions speaks to the wider necessity for policy makers in Europe to understand the 
causes behind the divergent pattern of public sectors’ wage growth which can be 
observed since the launch of the EMU in 1999. As such, these questions constitute a 
subset of the more general question: why have countries which were subjected to the 
same hard monetary regime experienced such divergent trajectories of wage growth in 
their public sectors? Here are the answers this dissertation provides. 
What explains Germany’s trajectory of public sector wage restraint vis-à-vis its EMU 
peers? The short answer to this question is as follows. The proximate cause is to be 
attributed to the political choices which the German public employers have made in 
order to pursue a more general policy of fiscal consolidation. These choices were 
shaped by the state’s institutional setting within which they were taken. Thus, the 
remote causes of these choices are to be found in the interactive effect of three 
institutional domains. The German fiscal federalism system constraints the public 
employers’ capacity to manipulate their fiscal revenues at will. This curtails the 
employers’ fiscal space and triggers the need to act on the expenditures’ side. The 
politico-administrative system, however, is structured in a way that sub-national 
governments bear the bulk of the personnel costs. Thus employers within the German 
public administration are not equal. They are confronted with asymmetric stocks of 
labours costs. This, in turn, creates scope for conflicts of interests among the public 
employers. These conflicts of interests were crucial in the collapse of the public 
employers’ collective bargaining coalition in 2003 and the transferral of the legislative 
competence on civil servants’ careers and pay back to the Länder in 2006. As a result 
of this rift, a political misalignment emerged among the public employers. In the policy 
networks which characterise Germany’s capitalism (Katzenstein 1987), they still rule 
together but, as far as public sector wage setting is concerned, they stand divided.  
Given the legal system of employment relations in the public sector, wage restraint was 
aggressively pursued by the public employers through collective bargaining – for the 
public employees – and via unilateral legislation – for the civil servants. In collective 
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bargaining the employers pushed the unions against the wall and extracted fiscal 
savings from wage restraint, extended working hours, reduced holidays and bonuses 
and cut in other qualitative aspects of the employment relation. Through unilateral 
determination, the public employers could only enforce restraint unilaterally in 1994. 
They tried in other occasions too but they failed to overcome internal problems of 
coordination: they were either politically divided or politically weak. 
If we cannot explain Germany’s public sector wage restraint through the theory of 
inter-sectoral wage coordination via export-led pattern bargaining, what other factors, 
so far unaccounted for, explain Germany’s trajectory of public sector wage restraint? 
The short answer to this question is as follows: the state, its institutional configuration, 
the role of the public employers producing policy within the state’s institutional 
configuration and, perhaps most importantly, the intrinsically fiscal and therefore 
political nature of public sector wage setting. 
Why have countries which were subjected to the same hard monetary regime 
experienced such divergent trajectories of wage growth in their public sectors? 
Regretfully, this dissertation does not provide a satisfying answer to this wider 
question. Answering this question thoroughly was beyond its narrower scope. What I 
can do, however, is to suggest a likely avenue from where to start looking for answers. 
The dissertation carries with it some important insights which have implications 
beyond the case study pursued here.  
First, the state matters. It is not neutral and does much more than serving the interests 
of dominant export sector’s elites. The state has its own interests, preferences and 
strategies which may but must not necessarily be aligned to those of the export sector. 
The state is no subaltern to the export sector and is instead the central entity from 
which to approach the study of public sector wage setting.  
Second, the state is not a unitary entity. It is an institutional contextualisation within 
which various state actors – each of them with their own organisational interests, 
preferences and strategies – interact to produce policy. The fragmented and 
decentralised nature of today’s states creates scope for intra-state conflicts of interest. 
State actors may be divided along different dimensions. They may be divided vertically 
across different levels of government. Or they may be divided horizontally across 
different state institutions (ministries, agencies, etc.). Furthermore, they may be divided 
politically within the same coalition in government. To produce policy, state actors 
have to overcome collective action problems and in the face of their internal 
dividedness they must mobilise the political support and action resources necessary to 
transform their preferences into action.  
When studying policy making these are more than just nuances. These are rather 
crucial aspects behind policy choices. This is particularly true for public sector wage 
setting considering that it necessarily requires the coordination of those state actors in 
charge of the fiscal and wage policy instruments. The political authority within these 
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policy areas is likely to be shared among different actors within the polity’ sub-national 
centres of power. Thus, when the industrial relations literature speaks of “the state in 
industrial relations” what it shall rather mean, I suggest, is the study of state actors 
involved in the process of public sector’s wage determination within the state’s 
institutional configuration.  
Third, continuing to study public sector wage policy as a mere phenomenon of inter-
sectoral wage coordination and export sector dominance ignores the fundamental fact 
that public sector wage policy is fiscal policy. As such, the starting point to understand 
public sector wage policy is to look at the political interactions which produce – and the 
political coalitions which underpin – fiscal policy. Finding the answer to the big puzzle 
of public sector wage divergence in Europe is likely to be facilitated by taking into 
account the insights of this dissertation in future research.  
PUBLIC EMPLOYERS AS SEMISOVEREIGN STATE ACTORS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE RESTRAINT IN GERMANY 
This section provides a summary of the historical sequence of events through which 
public sector wage restraint came about in Germany. Before proceeding, a caveat is of 
order. Even though the question posed in the dissertation refers to the EMU period, I 
have deemed appropriate to begin the analysis of the German case from the country’s 
reunification. Through the causal process observation, I have found that the historical 
causal sequences of the 1990s and the 2000s are substantially different in terms of the 
politics which produced public sector wage restraint. What makes them different is the 
political misalignment which emerged within the public employers’ camp in the early 
2000s. This was “state-structured” in the sense that the public employers’ conflict of 
interests behind the emergence of this cleavage is rooted in the very unique structure of 
the German state’s institutional setting. The rift between the Länder, on the one hand, 
and the federal and municipal employers on the other, put an end to the historical 
public employers’ collective bargaining coalition and paved the way to the 
decentralisation of public sector wage bargaining to the the Länder level.  
The Tarifgemeinschaft had hitherto ensured, for more than forty years, centralised and 
encompassing wage setting in the German public sector. This, in turn, guaranteed 
uniformity of employment conditions and pay terms vertically across the three levels of 
the German public administration and horizontally across the many municipalities and 
Länder of Germany. A similar development occurred with regard to civil servants’ pay 
determination, which in Germany is a distinct legal sphere. At about the same time, the 
(richer) Länder pushed for and obtained via the reform of the fiscal federalism system 
in 2006 the return of the legislative competence on civil servants’ careers and pay. The 
decentralisation of the Beamtenbesoldung Kompetenz has undermined the uniformity of 
the civil service across the country and has injected a component of competitive 
federalism within Germany’s overall cooperative federalism. 
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As a result, the two dynamics of restraint are qualitatively different. In the 1990s 
restraint was pursued within the context of centralised collective bargaining by public 
employers which were internally aligned and coalesced behind the leadership of the 
federal Ministry of Finance. In the 2000s, restraint was pursued after the collapse of the 
public employers’ political coalition and the disintegration of centralised bargaining. 
Public employers grew internally divided and eventually decided to take different 
paths. The emergence of a political misalignment affected both the process and the 
outcomes of the reforms. This reform process has eventually resulted in the 
institutionalisation of what I call a low-wage institutional equilibrium in Germany’s 
public sector wage setting. The two sequences are thus different in their specificities 
because, while the restraint of 1997 occurred under the pressure of an external 
constraint (the Maastricht’s vincolo esterno), the restraint of the 2000s occurred in 
concomitance with and in relation to a double process of institutional and constitutional 
change of the whole legal framework for public sector wage determination.  
These differences are central to a detailed historical explanation of the German case. To 
appreciate them fully, it is worth treating the two causal chains separately as I did in the 
empirical chapters. The abstract fiscal mechanism which instead explains restraint in 
these two sequences will then be discussed subsequently. In what follows I recapitulate 
the two sequences of events which led to public sector wage setting in the 1990s and 
the 2000s, respectively. 
THE 1990S. DIE BLÜHENDEN LANDSCHAFTEN HIT THE VINCOLO ESTERNO 
German reunification in 1990 constituted an extraordinary fiscal event in Germany’s 
economic history. All of a sudden, German policy makers were confronted with the 
herculean task of integrating a command economy into West-Germany’s capitalist 
system. The shock-therapy approach which was adopted to guide the transition led to 
the collapse of the structurally-weak Eastern Germany’s economic system. The 
economic hardship of the East, in turn, required a more expansionary fiscal policy to 
compensate the losers of this capitalist transition and support the economic sector. On 
the day of currency unification, the CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl had promised to turn 
the new Länder into blossoming landscapes (Blühenden Landschaften). To win the 
elections, however, the Chancellor had also promised not to raise taxes and make the 
citizens pay for the reunification effort. The government tolerated budget deficits until 
1993 when it was forced to make a U-turn in fiscal policy by the hard monetary stance 
taken by the Bundesbank. The bulk of the reunification bill was footed by the federal 
budget. The government’s loss of fiscal discipline was financed through a combination 
of deficits and increased social security levies. The increase of taxes was avoided by 
shifting the fiscal costs of reunification to the budgets of the social insurance schemes, 
a recurrent adjustment practice in the German political economy (Manow and Seils 
2000). 
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Next to the fiscal expansion needed to subsidise the East, the trade unions’ loss of wage 
discipline contributed further to inflate economy. Militant unions extracted substantial 
wage increases across the whole economy in the years 1990, 1991 and 1992. During 
the latter year, after one of the most disruptive public sector strike in the history of 
Germany, ÖTV extracted a 5.4% wage increase. This was the last time something 
similar would happen. 
To remedy the loss of fiscal and wage discipline and curb inflationary pressures, in 
summer 1992 the Bundesbank tightened monetary policy to levels hitherto 
unimaginable. The bank intended to hamper the government’s expansionary fiscal 
stance and punish the government in its function of public employer vis-à-vis the trade 
unions, against whom it had caved in granting generous wage increases. It also aimed 
curb the trade unions’ “inconsiderate” demands. This marked the end of the short-lived 
interval of expansionary fiscal and wage policy in Germany. The Bundesbank, in the 
exercise of its legal mandate, imposed a stop-go monetary policy on the German 
economy which caused an economic depression whose effects would be felt for a 
decade (Jörg  Bibow 2003). An export-led recovery was exactly what these policy 
makers were hoping for. In the event, however, economic growth slowed down and 
unemployment soared. As a result, tax revenues decreased and social expenditures 
increased, reducing the public employers’ fiscal space. The Bundesbank’s non-
accommodating monetary stance, a hard vincolo interno (internal constraint) for the 
government, affected the course of fiscal and hence of public sector wage policy in the 
years ahead.  
With a tighter fiscal space, the public employers moved on the offensive. Already in 
1992 the FDP economics minister Jürgen Möllemann had tried to impose a statutory 
pay limit on civil servants’ pay with the hope to send a strong signal of moderation 
throughout the economy. Sovereign authority could not be deployed, however, because 
the public employers were divided on the issue. The CDU Interior Minister Rudolf 
Seiters in charge of civil servants’ legislation opposed unilateral intervention and the 
proposal faded away. With the worsening of the financial situation, the trajectory of 
public sector wage restraint was inaugurated in 1994 when the government did legislate 
on a zero wage round for those civil servants in higher pay grades. 
Public sector wage restraint was pursued forcefully in 1996. This was ahead of the 
fiscal year 1997 on the basis of which the first evaluations for EMU entry would have 
occurred. During the previous years, the Finance Minister Theo Waigel had styled 
himself as the stubborn defender of financial stability in the soon-to-be monetary union, 
requesting the introduction of the stability pact. By autumn 1995, however, the German 
economy slowed down and a shortfall of tax revenues in conjunction with higher social 
expenditures led to an unexpectedly high budget deficit. When it became clear – in 
winter 1996 – that Germany could fail to meet the 3% deficit criterion of the Maastricht 
treaty, the public employers hardened their stance. EMU accession was indeed a hard 
vincolo esterno. Had Germany failed to comply with the rules itself wanted in the first 
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place, EMU’s launch would have probably be delayed or, possibly, even abandoned. In 
spring 1996, a savings package was approved by the Christian-liberal coalition. The 
package intended to rectify the budget deficit by DM50bn through substantial savings 
to be achieved via a wage freeze in the public sector (DM23bn). Due to the legal 
system of public sector industrial relations, the public employers had to negotiate the 
restraint with the unions within the framework of independent collective bargaining. 
During negotiations, to achieve fiscal savings, the public employers pushed also for 
longer working hours, cuts in sickness pay in overtime pay and cuts in holiday 
provisions. Eventually, the unions were pushed against the wall by the public 
employers which were determined to extract the fiscal savings necessary to bring down 
the deficit below the 3% level. The parts compromised on a moderate settlement which 
included a DM300 lump sum for 1996 and a 1.3% pay rate for 1997. This 
concessionary bargain enabled the unions to avoid the spectre of a pay freeze. Most 
importantly to them, unions avoided cuts in sickness and overtime pay. Eventually, 
German public employers extracted substantial savings from a very moderate wage 
bargain and managed to bring the deficit right below the 3%. The SPD in opposition 
and the Länder were blocking through the Bundesrat other savings-extracting measures 
proposed by the government. Due to this opposition, had the public employers not 
pursued restraint via the public sector wage setting arena (to circumvent the veto in the 
Bundesrat), Germany would have most likely missed the Maastricht target.  
In the production of public sector wage restraint in the 1990s, the federal government 
was the protagonist under the firm leadership of the Finance Minister Theo Waigel. 
The public employers went on the offensive to reduce the fiscal burden of wage setting 
in the face of a tighter fiscal space available. In the event, the trade unions were 
antagonists to this employers’ offensive. With regard to export sector’s wage setters, as 
described in detail in the empirical chapter, I could find no evidence of attempts being 
made to impose a pattern of moderation upon the public sector. It is thus better to 
consider them consenters vis-à-vis the government’s strategy of fiscal consolidation 
and public sector wage restraint. This is understandable. After all, fiscal restraint is 
likely to lower the future tax burden, contributes to deflate the economy and sends a 
moderation signal to the private sector’s wage negotiations. So, public sector wage cum 
fiscal restraint works out as a perfect complementarity for the export-led growth model. 
Export sector’s actors, however, were certainly not the protagonists behind the 
production of public sector wage restraint. Nor was restraint imposed via export-led 
inter-sectoral wage coordination. To the contrary, I have found historical instances 
where it was the unions in the export sector who managed to extract higher pay 
settlements which then enabled public sector unions to push up the public employers’ 
initially moderate offers. Independently of the export sector, the German public 
employers were determined to curtail the personnel costs of their administrations for 
reasons purely related to public finance and not export competitiveness. 
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THE 2000S. THE DOUBLE LÄNDER OFFENSIVE: INSTITUTIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORMS OF PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE SETTING 
In 1998 a Red-Green coalition took power which, under the leadership of Gerhard 
Schröder, took a supply-side “new centre” approach to economic policy making. 
Central to this strategy was the phasing in of a business-friendly tax reform which 
created a hole in the finances of the public employers. Particularly affected were the 
Länder employers who, after the entry into force of the reform’s 2001 step, experienced 
a severe deterioration of their deficits. Given the high unemployment level at the time, 
lower revenues came to coincide with high social expenditures. All of these factors 
aggravated further the ongoing fiscal crisis of the German state and urged the public 
employers to take an increasingly assertive stance in public sector wage setting. 
The combination of lower revenues induced by the tax reform and the settlement of an 
expensive public sector contract in the 2002 bargaining season created an explosive 
mix. Sub-national governments had already become vocal about public sector 
settlements beyond their ability to pay after 1999. The agreement reached under the 
leadership of the federal level in January 2003 was the straw the broke the camel’s 
back. The Länder deemed it too expensive and threatened to leave the TdL, were the 
TdL not to pull out of the historical employers’ coalition. The city-state of Berlin did in 
fact pull out in order to engage in negotiations for cheaper terms with the unions. At the 
same time, the 2002 contract envisaged the beginning of a concerted reform process 
aimed at reforming and modernizing the old legal framework for collective bargaining 
in the public sector. After first attempts, the joint negotiations between the employers 
and the unions broke down due to the Länder offensive on working hours. Given that 
many of the Länder employers had already extended weekly working hours for their 
civil servants through legislation, they were now demanding similar provisions be 
applied to the public employees in spite of the terms agreed in the previous collective 
agreement. 
The controversy escalated. TdL unilaterally quit the regulations on working hours and 
the unions stopped the ongoing negotiations of the collective bargaining framework. 
Eventually, TdL decided to quit the negotiations altogether and talks resumed between 
the unions and federal and municipal employers. Negotiations successfully led to the 
adoption of the new TVöD contract in February 2005. The agreement reformed the 
system and eliminated the old distinction between white- and blue-collar workers in the 
public sector. The TVöD incorporated the needs of the municipal employers to arrive at 
a more modern and flexible framework which would have eliminated the incentive for 
them to privatise and outsource public services to shrink labour costs. Wage restraint 
occurred in the form of meagre lump-sums (and other qualitative types of 
downgrading) accepted by the unions which covered the years 2005-2007. 
After agreeing on the TVöD, the unions tried in vain to convince the Länder to re-join 
the collective bargaining coalition or enter into similar provisions. The Länder, 
 
 
186 
however, were determined to continue their offensive on working hours which they 
needed to reduce costs. Throughout 2005 and the spring of 2006, Ver.di fought on 
different fronts against municipal and Länder employers to prevent the extension of the 
working hours. The environment became increasingly combative during 2006 and a 
compromise with TdL could only be reached in late May, after 16 consecutive weeks of 
strikes. This institutionalised the new TV-L contract. In the reform of the collective 
bargaining framework, wage restraint was pursued through a wage freeze in 2006 and 
the agreement of moderate lump-sums to be disbursed in 2007. In parallel, the Länder 
engaged in a process of constitutional reforms. Through the federalism commission, 
under the leadership of richer states, the Länder were claiming back the legislative 
competence on civil servants’ careers and pay. After a first failed attempt at reforming 
the constitution in late 2004, the reform process was made possible within the new 
political constellation which emerged with the grand-coalition which took power in 
2005. In 2006 the legal competence was returned to the Länder, completing the three-
dimensional overhaul of the system of public sector wage determination. 
In these processes, the key protagonists behind the production of wage restraint were 
the Länder employers and, as far as the creation of the TVöD is concerned, the 
municipal employers. Export sector wage setters cannot be regarded as key policy 
actors neither with regard to the process of wage restraint nor with regard to the process 
of institutional and constitutional change. 
THE FISCAL MECHANISM OF PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE RESTRAINT: WIDER IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CPE THEORY AND POLICY MAKING IN THE EMU 
If we cannot explain Germany’s public sector wage restraint through the theory of 
inter-sectoral wage coordination via export-led pattern bargaining, what other factors, 
so far unaccounted for, explain Germany’s trajectory of public sector wage restraint? 
Through theory-guided process tracing I have uncovered, inductively, what I term “the 
fiscal mechanism of public sector wage restraint”. Figure 18 provides a diagram 
visualisation of the elements which compose the mechanism. Through this theoretical 
mechanism it is possible to account for the causal chains behind the production of 
public sector wage restraint observed in both the 1990s and 2000s. The causal process 
which the mechanism describes unfolds as follows.  
At the beginning of the causation chain there is a fiscal event which, by reducing the 
public employers’ available fiscal space, reduces their ability to pay and increases the 
need to pursue a policy of wage restraint. By fiscal event I mean an event, of whatever 
nature, which has fiscal significance (Schumpeter 1918). This means that by inducing a 
deterioration of the public budgets (via higher expenditures, lower revenues, or a mix 
of both) it is of causal significance for it urges the necessity to act upon the 
composition of the budget (i.e. either raise more revenues or cut expenditures). 
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The restraint process, however, is shaped by the institutions of the state which regulate 
the public employers’ revenues and expenditures’ sides. On the revenues’ side, the 
crucial causal factor is the public employers’ fiscal autonomy, i.e. the legal capacity to 
manipulate tax revenues at will. The logic is straightforward. Were fiscal autonomy 
available to the public employers, their ability to pay could be restored by manipulating 
the revenues’ side. Were this to be possible, the very necessity to pursue a policy of 
public sector wage restraint would be reduced in the first place. If this is not the case, 
like in the German fiscal federalism system, public employers must act on the 
expenditures’ side. Here, what matters is the distribution of public personnel within the 
institutions of the state. This is determined by countries’ constitutions, written or 
unwritten. When a fiscal event reduces the public employers’ fiscal space, in the 
absence of the fiscal autonomy necessary to restore it, there is an institutional 
interaction effect between the expenditures and revenues sides. The necessity for fiscal 
consolidation becomes exponentially salient for those public employers with higher 
stocks of labour costs in their organisations’ books. Two institutionalist working 
hypotheses can be derived which have wider implications beyond the German case. 
First, within the scope conditions of an institutional configuration equivalent to that just 
described, we should expect these public employers subjected to high stocks of labour 
costs to be at the forefront of a policy of firm fiscal consolidation. Given the incidence 
of labour costs on total outlays, public sector wage restraint will constitute a major (yet 
most likely not the only) component of this strategy. Second, when a fundamental 
asymmetry in the distribution of personnel costs within the administration of the state 
exists, we could very plausibly expect conflicts of interests to emerge within the public 
employers’ camp. This becomes increasingly more likely if the competences for which 
they are responsible are not adequately matched by the necessary fiscal autonomy, like 
in the German constellation.  
But for a wage policy to be adopted, it must be enacted through the system of 
employment and interest representation. There are two fundamental ways in which 
public sector wage setting can be regulated. In collective bargaining the public 
employers, although state actors, have to go through independent negotiations with the 
trade unions. Failing to do so would expose them to judicial review vis-à-vis those 
other state institutions in charge of checking and balancing the public employers’ 
sovereign prerogatives. Within the context of collective bargaining, public sector wage 
setting then becomes a game of power vis-à-vis the trade unions whose outcome is 
difficult to predict ex ante. On the other hand, if the legal system prescribes a public 
sector employment relations system based on public law, the state can act as a political 
sovereign and regulate the terms of labour via unilateral legislation. However, the 
state’s sovereign prerogative, while absolute de jure, is rather contingent de facto. 
Public employers’ sovereign authority is contingent on two factors: unilateral action 
must be prescribed by the legal system and public employers must overcome problems 
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of internal coordination in order to exercise sovereign authority in public sector 
industrial relations. 
Figure 18: The fiscal mechanism of public sector wage restraint 
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These are the general constitutive elements of the causal mechanism which I have 
observed in the case study. It must be stressed, however, that I do not claim this to be a 
causal mechanism that can be fully generalised to explain all sorts of public sector 
wage policies. On the contrary, such an explanatory mechanism cannot travel beyond 
the scope conditions of policies of public sector wage restraint. This mechanism is not 
likely to explain fully the other two types of public sector wage policies identified in 
chapter 1. To understand what drives policies of public sector wage inflation and 
policies of the golden rule, further research is needed. Within the context of the EMU, 
two very interesting cases are France and Italy.  
France is the case study from where to start in order to investigate the pursuit of public 
sector wage policies more or less in line with the golden rule. What we know about the 
French case is that the French Ministry for the Economy and Finance plays a prominent 
role in drafting the legislation which determines public sector wage policy. It would be 
interesting for future research to explore what types of political conflicts emerge within 
the context of a unitary and more centralised and powerful state like the French one. 
Italy is instead the case study from which to start to study policies of public sector 
wage inflation. To “isolate” the politics of public sector wage/fiscal policy proper from 
other confounding/environmental factors, Italy should be preferred over Ireland and 
Spain. This is because both Ireland and Spain are cases in which public sector wage 
inflation occurred in conjunction with simultaneous housing bubbles. This may have 
contributed to exert upward pressures on wage setting across the economy. Italy is thus 
a better case in that it experienced public sector wage inflation in the absence of a 
housing bubble.  
Insights from the public choice school of thought may be useful starting points to arrive 
at an explanation of Italy’s trajectory of public sector wage inflation. These theories 
would interpret public sector wage/fiscal expansion as the by-product of self-interested 
politicians’ quest for electoral gains and political consent. Without any pretention to 
imply that all politicians are malevolent at all times and in all places, preliminary 
research on the Italian case (Di Carlo 2018b) points at the fruitfulness of exploring 
further the public choice hypothesis. Within the Italian context, the public employers 
were also internally divided on public sector wage policy, but given the different 
institutional configuration of the state, this division took a different form.  
During the period of public sector wage inflation before the crisis (figure 3), Italy was 
ruled by a centre-right coalition under the aegis of Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia 
party. What characterised that government was that, to govern within the proportional 
electoral system, Berlusconi had to rely on the support of the Northern League (Lega 
Nord) and that of post-fascists (Alleanza Nazionale) and neo-Christian-Democrats 
(Unione di Centro). The former party is (or better “used to be” given the most recent 
developments in Italian politics) primarily a political representation of the productive 
classes rooted in the Northern part of the country. The other two parties constituted 
instead a political bloc representing the so-called Destra Sociale (“the right with a 
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social soul”) which stood in representation of the lower middle classes of the Southern 
part of the country. Peculiar to the Italian context is the fact that public sector 
employment and wage policies therein have been historically used as a socio-economic 
stabiliser to support the local poorer and backward economies in the South (Cassese 
1977; Santoro 2014). Public sector wage policy in Italy has for long time worked as a 
form of hidden fiscal transfers to redistribute resources toward the South (Alesina, 
Danninger, and Rostagno 2001). 
The politics that produced public sector wage inflation in Italy was of a different nature 
than that which took place in the context of Germany’s restraint. The Italian dynamic 
resembles more the formation of those “distributive coalitions” described by Olson 
(1982). Within the system of public sector employment relations in Italy, the fiscal 
resources necessary to give ARAN
27
 the mandate to negotiate with the unions were 
decided by the central government. According to the procedure, the budget laws 
allocated the fiscal resources before the bargaining season would start. This 
institutional configuration created the paradoxical situation whereby all the parts 
involved in negotiations knew the exact amount of the resources the government had 
allocated for public sector wage setting before even meeting. Negotiations would thus 
de facto occur not on the quantus of the resources but only on how to distribute the 
money. A political cleavage emerged within the two blocs which composed the 
coalition government. The Northern League, of which the Finance Minister Giulio 
Tremonti was expression at the time, opposed the allocation of generous resources for 
public sector wage policy. The “Southern bloc” represented by the deputy prime 
minister Gianfranco Fini (Alleanza Nazionale’s leader) made more generous pay 
settlements in the public sector a central component of their political strategy targeted 
to their Southern constituency. Gianfranco Fini built up a “public sector’s cross-class 
coalition” with the leader of the CISL trade union, historically strong and highly 
representative in the public sector. Supported by the unions and thanks to his rising 
political strength within the government, Fini defeated the Finance Minister Tremonti 
in a series of harsh intra-coalitional conflicts, eventually forcing Tremonti to resign. 
Public sector wage inflation in Italy during those years was the result of a precise and 
strategic political choice by a part of the public employers in government. The deputy 
Prime Minister Fini formed a political coalition with the unions and mobilised political 
capital within the government to successfully expand the resources earmarked in 
budget laws to disburse more generous wage increases in the public sector contracts. 
This strategy, however, could not continue when the financial crisis (a fiscal event) 
                                                                
27
 ARAN is an independent agency which was created after the 1993 “privatisation” of public 
employment’s legal status and the reform of the wage determination system in the public sector. The 
agency is linked to the central government through a principal-agent relationship. It represents the 
government in its function of public employer and in processes of public sector wage setting. ARAN was 
created exactly to “depoliticise” public sector wage setting, a long-lasting plague of the Italian political 
system (Talamo 2009). 
 
 
191 
blew up, reducing the public employers’ fiscal space and triggering the need for the 
government’s fiscal consolidation. 
Thus, although through different mechanisms than those identified to explain 
Germany’s restraint, the Italian case seems to confirm a central claim which this 
dissertation highlights: public sector wage policy is fiscal policy and, as such, cannot be 
comprehended meaningfully without studying the politics of fiscal policy. This insight 
has wider implications for CPE. The hope is that this dissertation will contribute to 
bring the public sector within the radar of CPE scholars. This should hopefully trigger 
an interest for the so-far neglected role of the public employers as state actors. 
By having shown the weaknesses of the pattern bargaining hypothesis, this dissertation 
calls for a reconsideration of a wider set of works which have ignored the fiscal and 
political nature of public sector wage setting and the crucial role the state plays in 
industrial relations. As the literature review suggested, this seems to be a “structural 
weakness” of the CPE literature which, with notable exceptions, has been prominently 
characterised by an export sector bias. CPE scholars involved in the recent “growth 
models” turn (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016) may find some of this dissertation’s 
insights interesting for their newly-established research agenda.  
When it comes to the politics of growth models, this dissertation suggests that state 
actors are no subaltern to producer groups’ coalitions in the export sector. To be sure, 
the growth models research agenda is still in its infancy and much will hopefully come 
out of it. Yet, for the moment being, the interpretation given of the German case is not 
so different from the standard understanding of the German political economy as 
functioning with an export sector elite at its core. A mainstream story is being told from 
a demand-side perspective. What has been added, and which remains anyway highly 
controversial, is that:  
“German export firms, by virtue of the price sensitivity of their products, were less willing to 
concede to the wage claims of their own employees and also pushed much harder than 
Swedish export firms to ensure that wage increases in the export sector would not spill over 
into economy-wide increases in labor costs” (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016, 197).  
In fact, the inference being made with regard to the functioning of the German growth 
model can be conveniently represented through the following syllogism: 
(a) Export sector’s firms whose products are price sensitive need to maintain the economy’s 
REER competitive (i.e. undervalued vis-à-vis its competitors) (p. 189). 
(b) An economy’s REER is maintained undervalued through the “strategic” repression of an 
economy’s wage increases and consumption patterns (the combination of which ensures 
lower ULCs and prices’ inflation) (p. 189). 
(c) The products of Germany’s export firms are price sensitive (p. 190). 
(d) Ergo, the pattern of wage restraint observable throughout the German economy is a by-
product of the export firms’ necessity to maintain an undervalued REER (p. 197). 
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But how could export sector wage setters possibly “push much harder” to enforce wage 
restraint in the other sectors of the economy? Through which institutional/legal 
mechanism do export sector elites dominate the other constitutive actors of the German 
political economy? This fundamental point is still unclear in this research agenda. This 
dissertation suggests export sector elites do not and cannot easily capture the political 
arena as claimed. To the best of my understanding, it seems to me that at the heart of 
these scholars’ interpretation of the German case there continues to be a functionalist 
type of “repressive” inter-sectoral wage coordination based on export-led pattern 
bargaining. The findings of this dissertation bear some insights which may help growth 
models’ scholars to proceed ahead without falling prey to the export sector bias which 
characterises CPE. 
A central theme, very dear to historical institutionalists, is that policy outcomes may 
often be the result of unintended consequences rather than intelligent design. Within 
given institutional constellations, policies pursued for other purposes may often 
produce outcomes which were not in the original intentions of the policy actors who 
have produced them. This observation is a pertinent starting point. In fact, unless and 
until it will be shown empirically and convincingly how the export sector elite captures 
all the other relevant policy actors and successfully imposes wage restraint across the 
other sectors of the German economy, there will always remain a fundamental missing 
link in their arguments. This undermines the credibility of these accounts as much as 
that of similar accounts which, before this new paradigm, provided similar functionalist 
explanations based on supply-side reasoning. Until recently, in fact, it was common to 
believe that the institutional link, i.e. the “spillover mechanism”, which ensured the 
transmission of wage restraint from the export to the sheltered sector was export-led 
pattern bargaining. This dissertation has shown this not to be the case anymore. 
Furthermore, this dissertation has made the case that such a capture of the political 
arena by export sector interests may not be so easy in a fragmented and decentralised 
state like the German one. 
Of relevance, the dissertation shows instead that public sector wage setting in Germany 
had its own logics and unfolded within its own institutional configuration. Public sector 
employers, as state actors, were not neutral actors. Neither were they co-opted by 
export sector’s wage setters. In disagreement with these export-sector-centred accounts 
of German industrial relations, the dissertation has shown that rather the contrary 
occurred. Especially during the 1990s, there were instances in which the pay 
settlements which militant unions in the export sector managed to extract against their 
metalworking employers were damned by the public employers. The public employers 
were struggling already for themselves to impose wage restraint to achieve fiscal 
consolidation. Generous pay settlements in the export sector created imitative spill-
overs and political pressures on the public employers forcing them to revise upward 
their initially meagre offers. The historical reconstructions show that the public 
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employers had their own problems to care about and that these problems were primarily 
of a fiscal nature.  
Thus, Germany’s public sector wage restraint was “unintended” if by “intentional” it is 
meant (as more or less implicitly assumed in this and other related scholarly 
literatures): the strategic pursuit of wage/fiscal restraint as an intentional strategy for 
engineering an undervalued REER which underpins a clearly defined and understood 
growth model. In this sense, the making of the German export-led growth model is 
partially unintended. While, legitimately, export sector actors were and are interested in 
their export competitiveness, there was/is no legal/institutional way in which they could 
impose wage restraint on the public sector. Thus, rather than intelligent design, the 
German growth model today is partially the reflection of yesterday’s public employers’ 
need for fiscal consolidation. This need for consolidation was partly induced and partly 
shaped by the fiscal and political institutions of the German state. Thus the takeaway of 
this dissertation for scholars interested in understanding growth models is that we 
cannot avoid taking seriously the causal role state structures play in the adoption of 
given (macroeconomic) policies. 
Additionally, an important takeaway is that the public sector matters and is not a mere 
satellite of the export sector. Most of this literature refrains from talking about the 
public sector and only considers wage restraint in the low-end services (e.g. retail trade, 
hotels and restaurants, other personal services). But this is hard to comprehend. Why 
should we expect inflationary pressures to emerge in a sector in which the labour force 
is characterised by precarious, non-unionised workers, often with immigrant origins or 
other sorts of poor backgrounds? The segment of the sheltered sector which matters for 
the politics of public sector wage inflation is rather the public sector, an insight which 
is well understood by Hancké (2013). As a result, the public sector and the state 
deserve a better standing and a more central role in the way we are rethinking CPE.  
When studying the German political economy in future research, growth models 
scholars may want to consider the fact that the low-wage institutional equilibrium 
which has been identified in public sector wage setting constitutes a central component 
of Germany’s overall industrial relations system. De facto, what it does is to work as a 
functional equivalence to what used to be the pattern bargaining mechanism or the 
Bundesbank’s signalling game. It prevents inflationary developments in the single 
biggest and most politically relevant of Germany’s sheltered sectors. Public sector 
wages in Germany do not grow inflationary because of the peculiar type of joint 
decision making which characterises Germany’s public sector wage setting system. 
This creates a low-wage trap which delivers benefits to all the public employers 
involved. An alteration of the German fiscal federalism system in the direction of 
attributing greater fiscal autonomy to sub-national governments looks like the most 
promising way to create the conditions for a way out of the status quo. This, however, 
requires a process of constitutional reform which is likely to be blocked by those veto 
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players who currently benefit the most from the “partially-competitive” system of 
public sector wage setting in Germany, i.e. the richer Länder. 
In all, if my findings are correct, this dissertation cannot but end with a negative 
message to all those academics and policy makers who have been encouraging 
Germany to do more to contribute to a more symmetric macroeconomic adjustment in 
the EMU. To do so, it is generally argued, Germany should inflate its economy beyond 
its EMU trading partners’ through the combination of more expansive fiscal and wage 
policies. This will contribute to reduce Germany’s über-competitiveness and will 
support higher demand for imports by German citizens. Without entering the debate on 
the merits and desirability of such a theorized macroeconomic mechanism, this CPE 
dissertation is a reminder to macroeconomists that the adoption of macroeconomic 
policies is contingent on the institutional setting within which policy actors interact to 
produce them. Alas, the farewell message of this dissertation to policy makers is 
negative. Germany’s institutional capacity to adopt inflationary wage policies in the 
public sector is constrained by the structure of its “semisovereign” system of 
governance characterised by a fragmented polity, consensus-based politics and a rigid 
fiscal federalism system. As long as this low-wage institutional equilibrium remains in 
place within the German political economy, there is currently no political agency which 
has the intention and the institutional/legal capacity to push through a policy of public 
sector wage/fiscal inflation which would contribute to relieve the EMU from its 
sorrows. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Table 4: List of interviewees 
 
Type of 
Interview 
Institutional affiliation Date  Place  Comments 
Interview 1 Elite  DGB 10/3/2016 Cologne 
 
Interview 2 Elite  Ver.di 1/4/2016 - Questions answered via email 
Interview 3 Elite  Ver.di 11/4/2016 Berlin 
 
Interview 4 Expert University of Heidelberg  2/12/2016 Heidelberg 
 
Interview 5 Elite  ETUI 6/12/2016 Brussels 
 
Interview 6 Elite  EPSU 6/12/2016 Brussels 
 
Interview 7 Expert WSI 9/12/2016 Düsseldorf 
 
Interview 8 Expert - 13/12/2016 Geneva 
The interviewee held different 
positions in the German 
Finance Ministry, in academia 
and in think thanks 
Interview 9 Elite  DGB 4/1/2017 Berlin 
 
Interview 10 Elite  GEW 10/1/2017 Hennover 
 
Interview 11 Expert University of Bremen 11/1/2017 Bremen 
 
Interview 12 Elite  Ver.di 19/1/2017 Berlin 
The interview was a round 
table with n.3 officials in the 
top echelon of Ver.di 
Interview 13 Expert DIW 20/1/2017 Berlin 
 
Interview 14 Expert 
Technical University of 
Kaiserslautern 
23/1/2017 Kaiserslautern 
Interview 15 Expert FATK 24/1/2017 Tübingen 
 
Interview 16 Elite  GEW 25/1/2017 Frankfurt 
 
Interview 17 Expert University of Heidelberg  26/1/2017 Heidelberg 
 
Interview 18 Elite  Ver.di 3/2/2017 Berlin 
 
Interview 19 Elite  Dbb 7/2/2017 Berlin 
 
Interview 20 Elite  Dbb 15/3/2017 Berlin 
 
Interview 21 Elite  Federal Finance Ministry 10/4/2017 Berlin 
 
Interview 22 Elite  
Bavaria's Economics 
Ministry 
3/7/2017 Munich 
 
Interview 23 Elite  TdL 19/7/2017 Berlin 
 
Interview 24 Elite  Dbb 20/6/2017 Berlin 
 
Interview 25 Elite  TdL 24/7/2017 Dresden 
 
Interview 26 Elite  VKA 24/10/2018 NRW Precise address anonymised 
Interview 27 Elite  
"NRW Government's 
Commission on "the future 
of the public sector"  
26/2/2019 - Questions answered via email 
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APPENDIX B: DATES OF THE SIGNATURE OF SELECTED 
SECTORAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
Table 5: Dates of the signature of selected sectoral collective bargaining agreements, Germany (1991–
2016) 
Source: Author’s elaboration, data from the WSI-Tarifarchiv. 
Year Public Sector Metalworking sector Chemical sector Pilot agreement 
1991 March 16 May 5 June 20 Public sector 
1992 May 7 May 17 June 24 Public sector 
1993 February 4 – – Public sector 
1994 March 11 March 5 January 11 Chemical sector 
1995 May 3 March 7 March 9 Metalworking sector 
1996 June 13  March 29 Chemical sector 
1997 – December 15, 1996 December 9, 1996 Metalworking sector 
1998 March 27 – May 9 Public sector 
1999 February 27 February 18  May 31 Metalworking sector 
2000 June 23 March 28  March 22 Chemical sector 
2001 – – – – 
2002 – May 18 April 18 Chemical sector 
2003 January 10 – May 8 Public sector 
2004 – February 12  May 14 Metalworking sector 
2005 TVöD – February 9 – June 16 Public sector 
2006 TV-L – May 9 April 22 – Metalworking sector 
2007 – May 4 March 4 Chemical sector 
2008 TVöD – March 31 – April 16 Public sector 
2009 TV-L – March 1 November 12, 2008 – Metalworking sector 
2010 TVöD – February 27 February 18 March 21 Metalworking sector 
2011 TV-L –March 10 – March 31 Public sector 
2012 TVöD – March 31 May 19 May 24 Public sector 
2013 TV-L – March 9 May 14 – Public sector 
2014 TVöD – April 1 – February 5 Chemical sector 
2015 TV-L – March 28 February 24 – Metalworking sector 
2016 TVöD – April 29 May 13 June 23 Public sector 
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